Gorman v. Holte

• Decision Date: 21 February 1985
• Citation: 211 Cal.Rptr. 34,164 Cal.App.3d 984
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Edward I. GORMAN and Eleanor Gorman, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Wayne HOLTE, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. B004998.

Page 34

211 Cal.Rptr. 34

164 Cal.App.3d 984

Edward I. GORMAN and Eleanor Gorman, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Wayne HOLTE, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. B004998.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 21, 1985.

Hearing Denied April 17, 1985.

Schlifkin & Papell, Robert S. Schlifkin, Steven J. Kleifield, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Howard L. Ekerling, Inc., Sherman Oaks, for defendant and respondent.

COMPTON, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs in an action for breach of contract and fraud appeal from an order of dismissal following the granting of defendant's motion to dismiss for want of prosecution pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583, subdivision (b). ¹ We reverse.

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on May 4, 1978 seeking compensatory and exemplary damages flowing from an alleged In March 1981 the parties filed at-issue memoranda. At a trial-setting conference in May 1982 the matter was set for a mandatory settlement conference on December 7, 1982, and for trial on December 28, 1982. The mandatory settlement conference was continued to December 28th, and on that date the parties agreed to entry of judgment for plaintiffs and cross-defendants as a complete settlement of their dispute. They stipulated to the terms of the settlement on the record in open court. We include that stipulation as Appendix A. Plaintiffs' counsel was to prepare an order for the court's signature and submit it to defendant for approval as to form.

breach of a construction contract. Plaintiffs further alleged fraud, breach of warranties, negligence and conspiracy. Defendant filed a cross-complaint.

In February 1983, the order for judgment prepared by plaintiffs' counsel was rejected by defense counsel, who wrote a version of his own that differed in several minor respects. In turn, plaintiffs' counsel found this version to be unsatisfactory and on May 3, 1983, he sent his proposed judgment to the trial court requesting that it be signed notwithstanding defendant's lack of approval. No response by the court appears in the record.

On June 27, 1983, defendant noticed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' action for failure to bring it to trial within five years of filing the complaint. Plaintiffs filed responsive papers and a motion for summary judgment. Following oral argument the court granted the motion to dismiss and simultaneously dismissed the motion for summary judgment as moot. Judgment of dismissal was subsequently entered and this appeal follows.

Plaintiffs argue that Code of Civil Procedure section 583, subdivision (b) is inapplicable where, as here, there remained no issues to be tried after the parties had arrived at a complete settlement of their dispute. We agree.

The purpose of section 583 is to prevent avoidable delay in bringing an action to trial and thus obtaining a resolution of the dispute. (Corlett v. Gordon (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1016, 165 Cal.Rptr. 524; Brown v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 482, 487-488, 164 Cal.Rptr. 445; Dunsmuir Masonic Temple v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 17, 22-23, 90 Cal.Rptr. 405.) An action settled by agreement of the parties will not, of course, proceed to trial. Such a settlement renders the five year limit of section 583 legally irrelevant. (Smithers v. Ederer (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 227, 230, 303 P.2d 771.)

In his effort to bring the present case within the purview of section 583 defendant argues that because the stipulation of the parties did not adjudicate facts or law, or result in a judgment, the action had not been brought to a stage where a "final disposition" was to be made of it, and therefore dismissal under section 583 was mandatory five years after the filing of the complaint. (See McDonough Power Equipment Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 527, 531-532, 105 Cal.Rptr. 330, 503 P.2d 1338.) In our view, however, a final disposition had been made of the dispute. There were no issues left to resolve and nothing remained but to formally execute the agreement.

Defendant misconstrues the thrust of section 583, subdivision (b). It does not require that every action either be brought to trial or suffer dismissal. Such an interpretation would be counter to the well-established and long-supported public policy of encouraging pre-trial settlements. (Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236, 132 Cal.Rptr. 843; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 604, 608, 159 Cal.Rptr. 657; Gopal v. Yoshikawa (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 128, 130, 195 Cal.Rptr. 36.) Section 583 applies exclusively to disputes which can and will be resolved only by trial.

Defendant nonetheless takes the position that plaintiffs' failure to obtain a judgment within five years of filing the Defendant has given scant attention to the settlement agreement that both parties labored so hard to construct. He ignores the fact that, for all intents and purposes, this lawsuit was over and done with on December 28, 1982.

                complaint is fatal to their cause of action.  Nothing in section 583, however, requires that a case reach "judgment" within five years.  It merely requires that a trial commence within the statutory period.  If plaintiffs had obtained entry of judgment based on the stipulated settlement, they still would not have "brought the case to trial."   Would defendant still contend that dismissal under section 583 subdivision (b) was proper?   May any settlement agreement reached subsequent to the filing of a complaint be rendered nugatory merely by the passage of the lawsuit's fifth anniversary?   The questions themselves expose the fallacy of defendant's contentions
                

A settlement is an agreement to terminate or forestall all or part of a lawsuit. (2 California Civil Procedure Before Trial 458, § 33.1, Cont.Ed.Bar (1978).) It need not be in writing. (Nolte v. Southern Cal. Home Bldg. Co. (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 532, 535, 82 P.2d 946; People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Douglas (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 814, 819, 93 Cal.Rptr. 644.) Compromise settlements are governed by the legal principles applicable to contracts generally. (T.M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 273, 280, 204 Cal.Rptr. 143, 682 P.2d 338; 12 Cal.Jur.3d 353, Compromise, Settlement and Release, § 55.) A settlement contract also has the attributes of a judgment in that it is decisive of the rights of the parties and serves to bar reopening of the issues settled. Absent a fundamental defect in the agreement itself the terms are binding on the parties. (A.J. Industries, Inc. v. Ver Halen (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 751, 759, 142 Cal.Rptr. 383; Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 677, 186 Cal.Rptr. 589, 652 P.2d 437; Gregory v. Hamilton (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 213, 221, 142 Cal.Rptr. 563.)

Oral agreements to compromise and settle lawsuits reached at judicially supervised settlement conferences are enforceable in a number of ways, including a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 ², by motion for summary judgment, by separate suit in equity, or by amendment of the pleadings to raise the settlement as an affirmative defense. (Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 203 Cal.Rptr. 356; Gopal v. Yoshikawa, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 132, 195 Cal.Rptr. 36; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at 609, 159 Cal.Rptr. 657; Gregory v. Hamilton, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at 217, 142 Cal.Rptr. 563.) While certain time constraints may govern the mechanics of enforcing the settlement agreement those constraints are not to be found in Code of Civil Procedure section 583(b).

The order of dismissal is reversed.

ROTH, P.J., and GATES, J., concur.

APPENDIX A

"MR. EKERLING [Defendant's counsel]: The stipulation is that the case would be settled upon the following terms and conditions: That the court would enter a judgment for the plaintiff and cross-defendant against the defendant and cross-complainant in the sum of $18,000. The judgment would provide that it may be discharged by making payments in the following amounts: The sum of $1,000 within 30 days from the date of entry of the judgment. Plus the sum of $350 per month with the first payment due 30 days thereafter until the total sum of $7,000 has been paid.... The stipulation will further provide that time is of the essence in this agreement and that the parties will agree to secure the making of said payments by the giving of a note secured by deed of trust as follows: The defendant's note to the plaintiff in the amount of $18,000, which note it is intended by the party shall constitute a merger of the judgment and which note may be satisfied in full by the making of timely payments as aforesaid, namely $1,000 due 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment with monthly payments of $350 beginning 30 days after the date of the first payment. The parties stipulate that upon the making of timely payments as aforesaid totalling $7,000 the plaintiffs and cross-defendants shall cause to be filed a full satisfaction of the judgment together with a full reconveyance of the trust deed securing the note given to secure the judgment. I suppose we should also include a grace period in the making of the payments of 10 days after the date when it is due. The defendant and cross-complainant will furnish the plaintiffs and cross-defendants forthwith with a legal description of the property intended to secure the aforedescribed note which real property is the defendant's home.... THE COURT: Mr. Holte, do you understand the terms of the stipulation that your...