Hershey v. Weiting

• Decision Date: 16 October 1865
• Citation: 50 Pa. 240
• Parties: Hershey <I>versus</I> Weiting.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 240

50 Pa. 240

Hershey versus Weiting.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 16, 1865.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Dauphin county.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

R. A. Lamberton and B. F. Etter, for plaintiff in error. — By the report of the master, as well as from the opinion of the court below, it is abundantly manifest that a gross fraud was perpetrated and advantage taken by a shrewd son-in-law of an aged mother-in-law. Notwithstanding these facts, which induced the master to declare the papers executed by Mrs. Hershey null and void, the court, with indignation reprobating the whole transaction as a piece of chicanery on the part of Mr. Weiting, "by which this aged lady has been swindled and defrauded out of her worldly substance," dismissed the bill of the complainant, and this for the reason that a "court of equity, having ample ground presented to it for rescinding an executed contract on account of fraud and abuse of confidence, cannot do so, when satisfied from the whole case that the object of the writings was to hinder and delay creditors in the collection of their just debts."

A court of equity looks with extreme jealousy on transactions between parties who stand in any fiduciary relations, or relations of a similar character, by which an undue influence may be obtained by one over the other, and unless he who receives the benefit can show that it was conferred understandingly and with full knowledge of the circumstances, and apart from the bias of that connection, will set them aside: Adams's Equity 412, note; Leisenring v. Black, 5 Watts 303; Greenfield's Estate, 2 Harris 504; Stockton v. Ford, 11 Howard 232; Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sandf. Ch. 569; Merritt v. Lambert, 10 Paige 357; Slocum v. Marshall, 2 Wash. C. C. 397; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 Howard 183; Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Peters 249; Bostwick v. Atkins, 3 Comst. 53; Johnson v. Johnson, 5 Ald. 90; Williams v. Powell, 1 Ired. Eq. 460; Billage v. Southee, 9 Hare 534; Ahearne v. Hogan, 1 Drury 310; Whitehorn v. Hines, 1 Munf. 569; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 334; Espey v. Lake, 16 Jur. 1106; Sears v. Shafer, 2 Leed 268. The court below was therefore warranted in declaring that "this doctrine we would apply to the transactions between a middle-aged, active, and energetic son-in-law and an aged, feeble, and distressed mother-in-law, who looked to him for honest counsel and advice in her almost overwhelming trouble."

Was the learned judge then right in saying "the court will not lend its aid to assist either party"? We respectfully submit that the court below erred in the application of the maxim in pari delicto to the facts established in this case: Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 366; Story's Eq. Juris., § 298; Smith v. Brimley, Doug. 696, Cowp. 790; Osborne v. Williams, 18 Ves. 379; Story's Eq. Juris., § 300; Chesterfield v. Jannsenn, 2 Ves. 156.

But this whole case has been made to hinge upon the statute of 13 Eliz., passed for the protection of creditors, and not of those who, by subtlety, deceit, and undue influence and advice, defraud the trusting and confiding. The statute did not give any greater validity or binding force to such conveyances, as between the parties themselves, than they possessed before: Sherk v. Endress, 3 W. & S. 256. It does not operate in a contest between the actors themselves, on what it declares to be fraud only in its relation to third persons, for in any other aspect there is no fraud whatever, and it is unimportant whether the contract is used to found a claim betwixt the parties to it, or to rebut one; it is free from taint in regard to them, and the one may use it against the other for any purpose whatever. The appellant, if there were no creditors to be paid, could, without any consideration, have presented to her son-in-law all her earthly possessions, but when the gift has been procured by an abuse of a confidential relation equity interposes, and this whether or not creditors exist or complain. To hold otherwise would be to offer a premium to craft and guile. We respectfully submit —

1. That a court of equity has full power to order a cancellation of the transfer of bank stock, of the judgment and the release of dower, although they may be viewed as executed contracts.

2. That the statute of 13 Eliz. does not preclude the active interference of equity to rescue the property of the appellant from the grasp of one who stood in a confidential relation to her, and so obtained it by undue influence and control.

3. That even if the statute could apply, these parties did not stand in pari delicto, and equity will give relief.

Kunkel & Simonton, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered, October 16th 1865, by WOODWARD, C. J.

This bill was filed to obtain the cancellation of agreements and other papers that were made to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors, but the cancellation is asked for by no creditor and only by one of the parties to the papers. The argument is that they should be cancelled at the suit of the plaintiff, because she was betrayed into the making of them by the artifice and fraud of the defendant.

The statute of 13 Elizabeth avoids such papers only for the benefit of creditors, and has no application to the rights...