Heuer v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1893
• Citation: 33 N.E. 411,144 Ill. 393
• Parties: HEUER v. NORTHWESTERN NAT. INS. CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

144 Ill. 393

33 N.E. 411

HEUER

v.NORTHWESTERN NAT. INS. CO.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 19, 1893.²

Appeal from appellate court, first district.

Action by John F. Heuer against the Northwestern National Insurance Company on a fire insurance policy. A judgment in favor of defendant was affirmed by the appellate court, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Rubens & Mott, for appellant.

Tatham & Webster, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, J.

This is an action of assumpsit, begun on March 5, 1890, in the superior court of Cook county, by the appellant against the appellee company, upon an insurance policy issued by said company on July 8, 1889, insuring a stock of jewelry and fixtures belonging to the plaintiff, and contained in the three-story brick building known as ‘No. 426 Milwaukee Avenue,’ in Chicago. The plea was nonassumpsit. By agreement, a jury was waived, and the cause was submitted to the court for trial, without a jury, upon an agreed state of facts. The court refused to hold, as law applicable to the case, four propositions submitted by the plaintiff. The finding and judgment were in favor of the defendant, and the judgment of the trial court has been affirmed by the appellate court, whence the case is brought here by appeal.

The policy is for insurance against loss or damage by fire, and contains the following provision: ‘This company shall not be liable, by virtue of this policy, * * * for any loss or damage by fire caused by means of an earthquake; nor of an invasion, insurrection, riot, civil commotion, or military or usurped power; * * * nor for any loss caused by the explosion of gunpowder nor any explosive substance, nor by lightning or explosion of any kind, unless fire ensues, and then for the loss or damage by fire only.’ By the agreed statement of facts, it is stipulated that on September 13, 1889, at 7 o'clock in the morning, an explosion took place in the basement of said building, by which the damage to the insured property occurred; that the explosion was produced by the lighting of a match in the basement, which was then filled with illuminating gas; ‘that the damages was a damage by the explosion produced in this manner, but was not a damage produced by the burning of the property insured;’ that the illuminating gas was accidentally ignited by the flame from said lighted match, and burned, and instaneously produced this explosion; that the ignition of the match and gas in the basement was immediately followed by a loud report and explosion; that the explosion, so caused, caused the falling of the floor of the store, and the damage to the goods; that there was no damage to the goods by the actual burning of them.

The question presented by the refusal of plaintiff's propositions is whether the loss sustained, under the circumstances thus detailed, was a loss by fire, within the meaning of, the policy. It is conceded that no fire ensued from the explosion, and that the goods were not burned by fire, but were damaged by the falling of the floor, which was produced by the explosion. If, therefore, the loss was in any sense the result of fire, such fire could only have been the flame of the match, which came in contact with the illuminating gas. Is the loss to be attributed to the explosion, or to the lighting of the match, which preceded the explosion? If it is attributable to the explosion, the loss is not covered by the policy, and the company cannot be held liable. The exemption clause provided that ‘this company shall not be liable * * * for any loss caused by * * * explosion of any kind, unless fire ensues.’ The use of the expression, ‘explosion of any kind,’ contemplates the existence of more than one kind of explosion. Without undertaking to make an accurate classification, we deem it sufficient to say that one kind of explosion is that which is produced by the ‘ignition and combustion of the agent of explosion,’ as where a lighted match is applied to a keg of gunpowder, and another kind of explosion is that which does not involve ‘ignition and combustion of the agent of explosion,’ as where steam, or any other substance, acts by expansion, without combustion. Scripture v. Insurance Co., 10 Cush. 356. The exemption clause is broad enough to embrace both kinds of explosion. As the present case, where it appears that a lighted match was applied to the illuminating gas confined in the basement of a building, furnished an instance of the first kind of explosion above specified, it manifestly comes within the terms of the exemption.

It is a well-settled principle in the law of insurance that the proximate, and not the remote, cause of the loss must be regarded, in order to ascertain whether the loss is covered by the policy or not. ‘In jure non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur.’ Lord Bacon says: ‘It were infinite for the law to judge the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of another. Therefore, it contenteth itself with the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree.’ Everett v. London Assurance, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 126. Where a lighted match is applied to a keg of gunpowder,or to illuminating gas confined in a room, and an explosion thereby occurs which causes damage, but is not followed by combustion, the explosion is the proximate cause of the injury, and the lighted match is only the remote cause. In such case, fire does not reach the property injured, but the concussion resulting from the explosion damages it. Here the goods insured were not brought in contact with the fire produced by the lighting of the match, but with the explosive power of a fireless concussion, which caused the floor of the store in which they were situated to fall, and thereby occasioned the injury. In Everett v. London Assurance, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 126, a powder magazine, more than half a mile distant from the house insured, ignited and exploded, shattering the windows and window frames, and damaging the structure generally by the atmospheric concussion caused by the explosion, but not burning, heating, or scorching any part of the premises; and it was there held that ‘it would be going into the causes of causes to say that this was an injury caused by fire to the property insured;’ that the expression, ‘loss or damage occasioned by fire,’ was to be construed as ordinary people would construe it; and that those words ‘mean loss or damage either by ignition of the article consumed, or by ignition of a part of the premises where the article is.’ In Caballero v. Insurance Co., 15 La. Ann. 217, where a fire broke out in a building about 200 feet distant, causing the explosion of gunpowder, which, by the concussion of the air, injured the building insured against fire, it was held that such a loss could not have been within the reasonable intendment of the parties, and was not covered by the policy. In Briggs v. Insurance Co., 53 N....