Heyward v. Hall
| Decision Date | 04 October 1940 |
| Citation | 144 Fla. 344,198 So. 114 |
| Parties | HEYWARD, Mayor, et al. v. HALL et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Oct. 30, 1940.
En Banc.
Suit by Lynden M. Hall and another against Walter S. Heyward, as Mayor, and others, for an injunction to prevent the taxation and sale and conveyance of plaintiffs' lands for nonpayment of municipal taxes imposed upon the lands in the Town of North Miami. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.
Decree reversed and cause remanded with directions to dismiss bill of complaint. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Ross Williams, Judge.
Redfearn & Ferrell, of Miami, for appellants.
Stanley Milledge, of Miami, for appellees.
Giles J. Patterson, of Jacksonville, T. M. Shackleford, Jr., of Tampa, P. C. Gorman, of Leesburg, and Hull, Landis & Whitehair, D. C. Hull, Erskin W. Landis, and Francis P Whitehair, all of De Land, as amici curiae.
Appellees, plaintiffs below, brought this suit in equity seeking an injunction to prevent the taxation and sale and conveyance of plaintiffs' lands for nonpayment of municipal taxes imposed upon the lands in the Town of North Miami. The grounds alleged are in effect that there is no such municipality in legal existence, de jure or de facto, because the general statute under which the alleged incorporation was attempted, Sections 2935 (1825) et seq., C.G.L., is unconstitutional and void, and because the proceedings attempting to incorporate the non-contiguous tracts of land entirely separated by Biscayne Bay was unauthorized by the general statute and void. There was a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint on the theory that plaintiffs have no right to maintain this suit on the grounds alleged for the reason that it appears there is in existence a municipality on the west side of Biscayne Bay recognized by the statutes of the State within the area sought to be incorporated under the general statute now known as the Town of North Miami, therefore the remedy, if any, is by quo warranto proceedings brought upon relation of the Attorney General in the name of the State. Answers were filed. The Court held the general statute authorizing the incorporation to be unconstitutional; held the incorporation proceedings to be void; and denied the motion to dismiss and decreed the injunctive relief sought on the grounds alleged by plaintiffs. Defendants appealed and assigned error on denying the motion to dismiss and on rendering decree for plaintiffs.
Allegations as to the illegality of Sections 2935(1825) et seq., C. G. L., will be discussed later in this opinion.
The plaintiffs below, appellees here, in effect allege that on or about February 5, 1926, 'a group of individuals residing in a hamlet located in' described 'territory which lies on the west side of Biscayne Bay, together with other individuals residing in' described 'territory located on the east side of Biscayne Bay', attempted under the general statutes of the State, Secs. 2935(1825) et seq., C. G. L., 'to incorporate a municipal corporation called 'town of Miami Shores'; that such statute is an unlawful delegation of legislative power, and violated Amendment XIX of the Federal Constitution; that such attempted incorporation was void and of no effect for the reason that the lands sought to be included in said incorporation were two separate and distinct parcels and tracts of lands; that the lands are separated by Biscayne Bay, which is at points within the described territory approximately a mile in width; that it was impossible to get from the part of the land referred to lying on the west of Biscayne Bay to the part lying east of Biscayne Bay except by boat or by passing through adjoining municipalities; that it was approximately ten miles from the populated part of the land on the west of Biscayne Bay to the land lying east of Biscayne Bay'; that 'subsequently to the attempted incorporation the name of the alleged municipal corporation was changed by the Legislature of the State of Florida from 'Town of Miami Shores' to 'Town of North Miami"; that 'under a judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed in Mahood v. State, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90, the said alleged municipality and its officers were ousted from exercising authority over the lands included within said municipality lying east of Biscayne Bay'; that 'the Attorney General has refused to give his consent to allowing quo warranto proceedings to be instituted for the purpose of testing the legality of the incorporation of said purported Town of North Miami.' The prayer of the bill is that 'E. B. Leatherman, as Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, Florida, and his successors in office, be perpetually enjoined and restrained from issuing a tax deed upon the land of the plaintiffs hereinabove described upon the described tax certificate, and that said tax certificate be cancelled,' and that the other defendants be permanently enjoined and restrained from attempting to assess, levy or collect taxes upon the lands of plaintiffs.
Relief is not sought on the ground that even if the Town exists as a de jure or de facto municipality, yet plaintiffs' lands are so remote from municipal activities and municipal improvements and so situated and conditioned that they cannot be benefitted by being incorporated in the municipality, and that taxation of plaintiffs' lands for municipal purposes violates plaintiffs' organic property rights. See City of Winter Haven et al. v. A. M. Klemm & Son, 141 Fla. 75, 192 So. 646; City of Sarasota v. E. E. Skillin et al., 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837; State v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409, and other cases cited. The grounds alleged in this case for injunctive relief are the invalidity of the stated general statute and of the municipal incorporation formed by the inhabitants under the general statute.
Plaintiffs below have no right to maintain this suit to enjoin municipal taxation on the ground that the challenged municipality was not legally incorporated and does not exist in law, if it actually exists as either a de jure or a de facto municipality on the west side of Biscayne Bay. In such a case quo warranto by the Attorney General is the remedy. See Robinson v. Jones, 14 Fla. 256; MacDonald v. Rehrer, 22 Fla. 198; Town of Kissimmee v. Cannon, 26 Fla. 3, 7 So. 523; Town of Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740; Gaulden v. Bellotte, 79 Fla. 104, 83 So. 866; State v. City of Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473; West v. Town of Lake Placid, 97 Fla. 127, 120 So. 361; State v. City of Cedar Keys, 122 Fla. 454, 165 So. 672; State ex rel. Wurn v. Kasserman, 131 Fla. 234, 179 So. 410.
In this case it clearly appears that the Town of North Miami actually exists and its government is in operation and has been recognized by statutes and by judicial decrees and judgments as having legal existence and operation at least as a de facto municipality on the west side of Biscayne Bay, in Dade County, Florida.
The main contention in support of the decree of the Circuit Court is that the attempt of the inhabitants of a hamlet on the west side of Bay Biscayne in 1926 to establish a municipal government for themselves under the general statute, Sec. 2935 (1825) et seq., C. G. L., to be known as Town of Miami Shores, now Town of North Miami, was wholly void and ineffectual to give the Town a legal existence under the statute because described non-contiguous lands on the east side of the Bay as well as described lands on the west side of the Bay were included in the incorporation proceedings taken by the inhabitants under the general statute and that such inclusion on noncontiguous tracts of land, being unauthorized, rendered the incorporation proceedings null and void under the decision in Town of Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740, and that consequently there can be no de jure or de facto Town of North Miami within the area described in the incorporation proceedings even on the west side of Bay Biscayne, where there was a hamlet at the time of the incorporation and now is a Town asserting municipal authority under the name of Town of North Miami.
The conclusion asserted is not justified for the reason that in the cited Town of Enterprise case the second attempt of the inhabitants of a hamlet or village to establish for themselves a municipal government under the general laws of the state was abandoned; and in reviewing the matter to determine the alleged invalidity of the third effort to establish a municipality the court stated that the second attempt was void and had been abandoned, so it did not affect the proceedings in the third attempt to incorporate, which was sustained. See State v. Town of Winter Park, 25 Fla. 371, 5 So. 818. It is clear from the whole record in the Town of Enterprise case that the court had no purpose to decide and did not intend to adjudicate that the entire second proceedings were wholly void and could be of no legal efficacy whatever; but intended to hold that in the case as then presented, the second incorporation proceedings were illegal because they included noncontiguous tracts of land. There was of course no occasion in that case to consider the applicable law if there had been the exercise of de facto municipal authority over all or part of the described land which presumably contained a hamlet or village in one of the non-contiguous tracts of land. In this case municipal authority, upon incorporation by the inhabitants in 1926 under the statutes, has been exercised over lands described in the incorporation proceedings on the west side of Bay Biscayne where there was and is a hamlet or village which could have been incorporated by the...
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North Miami, Florida v. Meredith
...was contiguous to it and properly claimed west of the Bay." That view was taken also by the Supreme Court of Florida in Heyward v. Hall, 144 Fla. 344, 198 So. 114. North Miami is a municipality which may contract debts, be sued for them, and be compelled to levy taxes to pay them according ......
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...attack the corporate existence of the Town of Medley by declaratory decree, when the proper remedy was by Quo Warranto. Heyward v. Hall, 1940, 144 Fla. 344, 198 So. 114. We therefore conclude that the trial judge was correct in his order granting the dismissal of the cause for the reasons s......
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