Heywood v. Brainard
| Decision Date | 17 January 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 36384,36384 |
| Citation | 147 N.W.2d 772,181 Neb. 294 |
| Parties | Larry J. HEYWOOD, Appellee, v. Homer BRAINARD, Sheriff of Dodge County, Nebraska, Appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. It is the duty of this court to give a statute an interpretation which meets constitutional requirements if it can reasonably be done.
2. The word 'otherwise' is defined as follows: 'In a different manner; in another way, or in other ways.'
3. In construing a statute, effect must be given if possible to all its several parts. No sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as meaningless or superfluous if it can be avoided.
4. It is a fundamental requirement of due process of law that a statute be reasonably clear and definite.
5. The basic requirement for certainty of a criminal statute demands that it give persons of ordinary intelligence reasonable notice as to what conduct is forbidden by the statute and not require them to speculate on its meaning.
6. Section 60--430.02, R.S.Supp., 1965, held unconstitutional.
Richard L. Kuhlman, Fremont, for appellant.
Kerrigan, Line & Martin, Fremont, for appellee.
Heard before WHITE, C.J., SPENCER, BOSLAUGH, BROWER, SMITH, and McCOWN, JJ., and HASTINGS, District Judge.
This is an appeal from an order in a habeas corpus action releasing the petitioner from custody and determining that section 60--430.02, R.S.Supp., 1965, is unconstitutional.
Petitioner was held in custody by Homer Brainard, sheriff of Dodge County, on a complaint which alleged in part as follows: '* * * Larry J. Heywood, on or about the 23rd day of April, A.D.1966, in the County of Dodge, and State of Nebraska, then and there being, was then and there the person operating a motor vehicle in violation of the State Motor Vehicle laws and did unlawfully flee in an effort to avoid arrest for violating a law of the State of Nebraska, * * *.'
After a hearing, the district court determined that section 60--430.02, R.S.Supp., 1965, under which petitioner was charged, was unconstitutional, and ordered petitioner released from custody.
Section 60--430.02, R.S.Supp., 1965, including the catch line, is as follows:
The statute makes it unlawful for the operator of a motor vehicle to flee in the vehicle in an effort to avoid arrest for violating Any law of this state. It then states that operation of such vehicle in an Otherwise lawful manner shall not constitute fleeing to avoid arrest. This is the wording which raises the question herein. What is meant by 'operation * * * in an otherwise lawful manner'?
It is the duty of this court to give a statute an interpretation which meets constitutional requirements if it can reasonably be done. Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb. 70, 91 N.W.2d 240.
The word 'otherwise' is defined in both Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.), p. 1729, and Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed.), p. 1253, as follows: 'In a different manner; in another way, or in other ways.'
In construing a statute, effect must be given if possible to all its several parts. No sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as meaningless or superfluous if it can be avoided. Rose v. Hooper, 175 Neb. 645, 122 N.W.2d 753.
Does the statute mean that the operator fleeing to avoid arrest must have violated some traffic regulation such as speeding or running a stop sign or some similar violation previous to the pursuit? The Revisor of Statutes may have placed this interpretation on it in the catch line phrase 'operating motor vehicle in violation of law.' This may be a plausible interpretation, but the statute does not appear to be so restricted. The statute says 'for violating any law of this state.' It does not say for violating a law while operating a motor vehicle. Does the statute mean that if a law has been violated and the operator in fleeing from arrest does not violate any traffic regulation, the statute does not apply? This might raise a question as to whether it is possible to operate a vehicle in a lawful manner while fleeing to avoid arrest. There are many other questions that might be raised as to the meaning of the statute, but these are sufficient to point up the problem.
The State interprets the language to mean that it is necessary for it to prove that the operator of the vehicle had: (1) Violated a law of this state; (2) was fleeing in the vehicle to avoid arrest for the violation; and (3) while he was fleeing to avoid arrest, he was further violating another law. What would be the result if the operator subsequently secured an acquittal of the violation for which his arrest was originally sought?
It is a fundamental requirement of due process of law that a statute be reasonably clear and definite. State v. Adams, 180 Neb. 542, 143 N.W.2d 920. The basic requirement for certainty of a criminal statute demands that it give persons of ordinary intelligence reasonable notice as to what conduct is forbidden by the statute and not require them to speculate on its meaning. A crime must be defined with sufficient definiteness and there must be ascertainable standards of guilt to inform those subject thereto as to what conduct will render them liable to punishment thereunder. The dividing...
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...v. Etchison, 190 Neb. 629, 211 N.W.2d 405 (1973), Cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974); Heywood v. Brainard, 181 Neb. 294, 147 N.W.2d 772 (1967). The statute's lack of specificity in definition of criminal conduct is reflected in disputes which arose at trial ove......
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...this court to give a statute an interpretation which meets constitutional requirements if it can reasonably be done.' Heywood v. Brainard, 181 Neb. 294, 147 N.W.2d 772. The reasonable, sensible construction of this statute and the one which appears obvious complies with the legislative inte......
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