Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n

• Decision Date: 25 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 39353,39353
• Parties: HIALEAH RACE COURSE, INC., and Tropical Park, Inc., Appellants, v. GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Florida State Racing Commission, a state agency, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 625

245 So.2d 625

HIALEAH RACE COURSE, INC., and Tropical Park, Inc., Appellants, v. GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Florida State Racing Commission, a state agency, et al., Appellees.

No. 39353.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 25, 1971.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 1971.

Peeples, Smith & Moore, Tallahassee, and Miller Walton, of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder, Carson & Wahl, Miami, for appellants.

Thompson, Wadsworth & Messer, Tallahassee, and Landefeld & Romanik, Hollywood, for Gulfstream Park Racing Assn., Inc.

Robert L. Hesse, Sarasota, for Florida State Racing Comm.

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This cause is before the Court on a direct appeal from a judgment of the trial court declaring unconstitutional, on due process and equal protection grounds, Section 550.081, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. We have jurisdiction of the appeal under Section 4, Article V, Florida Constitution, F.S.A Section 550.081, supra, was adopted in 1947 as Chapter 23728, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947, for the purpose of withdrawing from the State Racing Commission its discretionary power to fix each year the racing dates among the three horse racing tracks located in Dade and Broward Counties. The formula prescribed by the statute for the fixing of racing dates, in lieu of the discretionary power formerly reposed in the Commission, was to divide the 120-day racing season into three 40-day periods and to allocate to the horse track producing the largest amount of tax revenue during the preceding year the right to operate during the racing period of its choice. The track producing the next highest tax revenue has the next choice, with the least desirable period going to the track having the least tax revenue. The record shows that, at the time of the adoption of the statute, the appellant Hialeah Race Course, Inc. ('Hialeah' hereafter) had produced the most revenue in the preceding year. Consequently Hialeah had the right to and did select that was then--and apparently still is--the most desirable racing dates, namely, the middle 40-day period. It has continued to do so in each succeeding year to date--some 20-odd years.

Shortly after the enactment of Section 550.081, supra, Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., who is the plaintiff-appellee here, filed suit to contest the validity of the statute on due process and equal protection grounds, among others, naming Hialeah as a defendant. Hialeah filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was denied by the trial court. On certiorari to review the order denying the motion to dismiss, a majority of this Court (with Justice Thomas and the late Justices Terrell and Sebring dissenting) held that the statute 'is not unconstitutional per se' and that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to show a violation of Gulfstream's rights 'when the provisions of the act are complied with an abided by.' The order of the trial court was, accordingly, quashed and the suit dismissed. See Hialeah Race Course v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, Fla.1948, 37 So.2d 692.

The instant suit represents a second attack by Gulfstream on the validity of Section 550.081, supra. Its complaint alleged seventeen changes in the factual situation since the former decision of this Court was rendered some 20-odd years ago, and renewed the attack on the statute on equal protection and due process grounds. The sufficiency of the complaint was upheld by the trial court on motion to dismiss filed by Hialeah, and by the Fourth District Court of Appeal on interlocutory appeal from the order denying the motion to dismiss. See Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., Fla.App.1968, 210 So.2d 750. Upon remand of the cause for trial, the trial court heard the evidence on the issues made by the pleadings, found that Gulfstream had proved the allegations of its complaint, and, as noted above, struck down the statute as a denial of equal protection and due process of law. This appeal followed.

We will first consider Hialeah's assignment of error relating to the defense of res judicata, since this contention would be decisive of the cause if sustained. This defense was one of the grounds for Hialeah's motion to dismiss the complaint in the instant suit; and the question of its sufficiency was presented to and argued before the appellate court in the interlocutory appeal referred to above. The appellate court dealt with it clearly and succinctly and, we think, correctly. It said (210 So.2d at page 753):

'The complaint delineates and alleges approximately seventeen changes of fact and circumstances that have resulted since the enactment of F.S. § 550.081, F.S.A., alleging that the plaintiff, Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., has a physical plant, facilities, racing program and quality of racing which is or could be competitive with Hialeah and on comparable racing dates Gulfstream could attract at least an equal number of spectators and could handle and produce at least an equal amount of parimutuel wagering and at least an equal amount of tax revenue to the State of Florida if it were given the opportunity to run its racing program during the so-called 'middle dates'; that in each year since the enactment of F.S. § 550.081, F.S.A., Hialeah has chosen the middle dates as its racing period and has continued to reap the benefits therefrom, always producing the largest amount of tax revenue for the state giving it the first preference in the selection of racing dates for the next year; that by reason of this perpetuation of Hialeah's position Gulfstream is being denied equal protection under the law because it is an entity in the same class as Hialeah and similarly situated;

'Case law abounds to the proposition that the rule of res judicata extends only to the facts and conditions as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered, or more correctly speaking, at the time the issues in the first action were made, and to the legal rights and relations of the parties as fixed by the facts determined by that judgment. When other facts or conditions intervene before the second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the respective parties, the issues are no longer the same and the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of the second action.'

Hialeah contends, however, that all but two of the alleged 'changed conditions' relied upon by Gulfstream were immaterial, insubstantial and insufficient to alter the legal rights or relations of the litigants, and that these two were not proved at the trial of the cause. The absence of proof to sustain these two allegations is the subject of the first point presented and argued by Hialeah on this appeal. As noted in our discussion of this point, infra, the record contains evidence sufficient to support the finding of the trial judge that Gulfstream 'has proven the allegations of its complaint and that the changed conditions thereby proven have eliminated the 1948 decision of the Supreme Court from operating as an estoppel.' Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's disposition of Hialeah's defense of res judicata.

The two allegations of changed conditions that Hialeah contends were not proved by Gulfstream are that, if given the best racing dates, Gulfstream could produce 'at least an equal amount of tax revenue to the State of Florida,' and that it had facilities 'to protect the revenue of the state.' It is argued that the only proof of these allegations is the unsupported statement of 'belief' by Gulfstream's president. Counsel overlooks the fact that this statement was based on evidence showing that Gulfstream now has facilities comparable to those of Hialeah and that the factors producing the most revenue to the state from horse racing are 'more abundantly favorable during the running of the second established racing period,' to quote the finding of the trial judge in this respect. In these circumstances, the statement of Gulfstream's...