Hickerson v. City of Mexico

• Decision Date: 31 October 1874
• Citation: 58 Mo. 61
• Parties: SILAS L. HICKERSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF MEXICO, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

58 Mo. 61

SILAS L. HICKERSON, Appellant,

v.CITY OF MEXICO, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1874.

Appeal from Audrain Circuit Court.

Craddock, Musick and McFarland, for Appellant.

I. Defendant's evidence of a dedication should have been excluded, because it was res adjudicata. (Freem. Judg., §§ 249, 310; Ridgely vs. Stilwell, 27 Mo., 128; Edgell vs. Sigerson, 26 Mo., 583; Offutt vs. John, 8 Mo., 120; Bent vs. Sternberg, 4 Cowan, 559; Dunkle vs. Wiles, 6 Barb., 515; 1 Kern, 420.)

II. Plaintiff's evidence as to value of ground, and of what had been submitted and passed upon by the jury in the trespass case should have been admitted. (Soulard vs. City of St. Louis, 36 Mo., 546; Tamm vs. Kellogg, 49 Mo., 118; Freem. Judg., § 273; Spradling vs. Conway, 51 Mo., 51; Wright vs. Salisbury, 46 Mo., 26.)Forrest & Ladd and J. R. Williams, for Respondent.

I. The judgment offered in evidence was conclusive as to the value of the lands, and the law conclusively presumes that all evidence which could be legally offered under the issues joined was offered, and that the jury considered all the facts bearing upon the claim of damages, consistent with the pleadings, and as to all matters which in fact were or well might have been investigated by the jury. were so investigated. (LeGuer vs. Governor, 1 John. Cas., 436; Cooper vs. Martin, 1 Dana, 27; Grant vs. Button, 14 John., 377; White vs. Marsh, Id., 232; Holden vs. Curtis, 2 N. H., 268; Loring vs. Mansfield, 17 Mass., 394; Rowe vs. Smith, 16 Mass., 306; Kirt vs. Atchison, 2 Camp., 63; Lumiss vs. Pulver, 9 John., 244.)

It follows then, that appellant could not show by parol what evidence was before the jury, or what was passed upon by them in finding the damages announced in their verdict, and that the court did not err in excluding the evidence offered.

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff applied for and obtained a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant by its agents and servants from committing a trespass upon his property. From the record it appears that the land upon which the alleged trespass was about to be committed, was a traveled road within the corporate limits of the defendant.

Some time prior to the institution of this proceeding, the plaintiff had commenced his action against the defendant for trespass committed upon the same land, in plowing, scraping and digging ditches thereon. In that case he alleged that the land was worth $1,000, and that he was injured in that amount.

To the petition therein the defendant filed its answer, averring that the land was a traveled street within its limits; that it had been used as such for a long time, and that it was dedicated to the public.

Upon this issue the parties went to trial, and there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of eighty dollars, which the defendant subsequently satisfied. After this judgment plaintiff inclosed the ground, and the defendant directed its servants to tear down the inclosure and open the premises to public travel, to prevent which plaintiff applied for the injunction herein.

The defendant in its answer to this suit, set up substantially the same facts which were contained in its answer to the action of trespass, namely, that the ground was a street dedicated to public use.

Upon the hearing of the case, plaintiff introduced in evidence the record of the former action between the same parties. He then offered to show by witnesses, that in that case the only issue presented to the jury and passed upon, was the injury caused by the plowing, scraping and ditching, constituting the trespass complained of, and that the title to the land was not drawn in question, nor was there any testimony in reference to its value. This testimony was excluded by the court. Defendant was then permitted to give evidence tending to show that the land was appropriated and dedicated to public use, to which plaintiff objected. The court then dismissed the bill and plaintiff appealed.

The court erred in allowing defendant, against plaintiff's objections to introduce testimony tending to show that there was an appropriation or dedication of the land for public purposes. That precise question was tried between the same parties in the action for trespass, which was in evidence and was conclusive of the right. Had there been a dedication there could have been no recovery by the plaintiff, and as the matter was determined, it was not open to further contest or dispute.

A judgment in trespass grounded upon the theory that the land belonged to the plaintiff, where a right of way or dedication is pleaded and the finding is adverse to the right claimed by the defendant, is conclusive upon that question in any other action between the same parties. It is not simply the recovery, but the matter adjudicated in reference to the dedication that creates the estoppel. (Freem. Judgm., § 310; Outram vs. Morewood, 3 East., 346; Warwick vs. Underwood, 3 Head, 238.)

The evidence offered by the plaintiff to show upon what issue the trespass...