Hickey v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 21 January 1895 |
| Docket Number | No. 9034.,9034. |
| Parties | LAWRENCE HICKEY v. ST. PAUL CITY RAILWAY COMPANY and Another.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Edmund S. Durment, for appellant.
Munn, Boyesen & Thygeson, for respondents.
Action to recover for injuries caused by one of defendants' cars operated by electricity on University avenue, in the city of St. Paul. At the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, defendants' counsel moved to dismiss, on the grounds that their clients' negligence had not been established, and also that it had been shown that plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence, and the motion was granted. The facts, as disclosed, were that plaintiff was walking westerly on the southerly sidewalk of the avenue about 7 o'clock in the evening, it then being dark, with a companion; and on reaching a point about 80 feet from Marion street, which crosses the avenue at right angles, looked back, and saw a car, the one which struck him undoubtedly, standing some 700 feet distant at the intersection of Rice street with the avenue. The avenue was well lighted. The plaintiff used glasses, but his hearing was unimpaired. He was well acquainted in that locality; knew of the frequent operation of the street cars upon two tracks, — one, the southerly, being for eastbound cars; the other, northerly, being for west-bound. He admitted that he knew it to be a dangerous place for pedestrians, and had the fact in mind when he started towards the crossing. Walking on about 40 or 50 feet, after noticing that the car had halted at Rice street, he attempted to cross the avenue; and then, using his own language, He stated that he did not hear the bell, did not look for a car, nor did he hear it coming, and stood on the southerly track, the car being on the northerly, when, turning his head to the left, he urged his friend to hasten. The car was running very rapidly down grade, carried the usual headlight, and made noise sufficient to be heard more than 500 feet, according to plaintiff's own admission. When near to plaintiff, and apparently about the time the motorman discovered that he was about to run in front of the car, the latter shouted to him, but without avail. He had not quite reached the rails of the northerly track when caught by the corner of the car, and he was thrown some distance to the left.
In contending that plaintiff cannot be charged with contributory negligence, his counsel is obliged to take the position that, having looked back and noticed the car standing at Rice street, his client was justified in calculating the distance, and estimating the time it would take the car, running at a reasonable rate of speed, to reach the place where he attempted to cross; that he had the right to assume that it would approach at reasonable speed, and was not required to look again in anticipation that its rate of speed would be unreasonable, or even to heed the glare of the headlight, or the loud noise made by the car when in motion. In his argument upon this contention counsel relies upon Watson v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 53 Minn. 551, 55 N. W. 742, and insists that the cases are identical in their controlling features. There the facts were that, in daylight, Watson, the plaintiff, driving four horses, hauling a heavy load of lumber on the top of which he was seated, proceeded along a much-traveled street until he came to another on which ran electric cars. As he came to a point where he could view the track from where he sat, more than 30 feet from the heads of his leaders, he saw a car in motion about a...
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