Hicks v. Hicks
Decision Date | 09 November 2012 |
Docket Number | 2110408. |
Citation | 130 So.3d 184 |
Parties | Bona Faye HICKS v. Donald Ray HICKS. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Background: Property owner who had prevailed in boundary dispute filed a motion for contempt against adjacent land owner for failing to comply with circuit court's order to move fence. The Circuit Court, DeKalb County, No. CV–09–4, Randall L. Cole, J., found adjacent property owner had substantially complied with its order and denied property owner's motion for contempt. Property owner appealed.
Holding: The Court of Civil Appeals, Moore, J., held that any orders stemming from the filing of the motion for contempt were void for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed with instructions.
Certiorari denied, Ala., 130 So.3d 194.Jerry Wayne Baker, Jr., and Thomas B. Woodall, Albertville, for appellant.
W.N. Watson of Watson & Neeley, LLC, Fort Payne, for appellee.
Bona Faye Hicks (“Bona Faye”) appeals from a December 15, 2011, judgment of the DeKalb Circuit Court (“the trial court”) denying her motion for contempt, sanctions, and specific performance stemming from a previous judgment entered by the trial court deciding a boundary-line dispute between Bona Faye and Donald Ray Hicks (“Donald”). We dismiss the appeal.
On January 9, 2009, Dennis Hicks (“Dennis”) and Bona Faye filed a complaint against Donald in the trial court regarding a boundary-line dispute. Following a trial, the trial court entered a judgment on September 18, 2009, ordering Donald to relocate a fence, which had been erected by Donald, to the location of a previous fence that Donald had removed.
On August 12, 2010, Dennis and Bona Faye filed a motion for contempt, sanctions, and specific performance. In that motion, they asserted that Donald had failed to comply with the trial court's September 18, 2009, judgment because he had moved the fence only partially rather than according to the trial court's directions. On September 29, 2011, Donald filed a suggestion of death, indicating that Dennis had died. On October 3, 2011, Donald filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Dennis had died and that Dennis's estate, which, Donald argued, was an indispensable party to the action, had not been opened. Donald requested the trial court to dismiss the action for the failure of Bona Faye to add Dennis's estate as an indispensable party. On October 5, 2011, however, the trial court entered an order denying Donald's motion to dismiss and noting that Bona Faye was prosecuting the motion for contempt, sanctions, and specific performance on her own behalf. The trial court also concluded that Donald had substantially complied with the trial court's September 18, 2009, judgment and denied Bona Faye's motion for contempt, sanctions, and specific performance.
Bona Faye filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate on November 1, 2011, asserting, among other things, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter its October 5, 2011, judgment because no filing fee had been paid upon the filing of the motion for contempt, sanctions, and specific performance. On November 30, 2011, Donald filed a motion to dismiss Bona Faye's postjudgment motion; he also sought an attorney fee.
On December 15, 2011, the trial court entered an order that stated, in pertinent part:
On December 19, 2011, Donald filed a notice to the court, indicating that he had paid the filing fee associated with Bona Faye's motion. Bona Faye filed her notice of appeal to this court on January 26, 2012.
Bona Faye raises only one issue on appeal—that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter its October 5, 2011, judgment because no filing fee had been paid when the motion for contempt, sanctions, and specific performance was filed. Both parties agree that a “contempt action is a separate action requiring the payment of a filing fee.” G.E.A. v. D.B.A., 920 So.2d 1110, 1113 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). Citing Odom v. Odom, 89 So.3d 121 (Ala.Civ.App.2011), Bona Faye argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on her contempt motion for her failure to pay a filing fee when she filed that motion.
In Odom, the former husband filed a “motion for modification” of the support provisions of a judgment divorcing him from the former wife. The trial court purported to deny the former husband's motion, and the former husband appealed. 89 So.3d at 121–22. Citing Vann v. Cook, 989 So.2d 556 (Ala.Civ.App.2008), this court dismissed the appeal and concluded that, because the former husband had failed to pay a docket fee or file a verified statement of substantial hardship seeking waiver of prepayment of any applicable docket fee, the trial court was without jurisdiction to act on the former husband's motion. 89 So.3d at 123. This court stated in Vann:
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“....
Donald attempts to distinguish Odom and Vann from the present case by asserting that, in those cases, no filing fee was paid by either party at any time, whereas, in the present case, he argues, Donald paid the filing fee subsequent to the entry of the trial court's December 15, 2011, order allowing either party to pay the filing fee.
In Bernals, Inc. v. Kessler–Greystone, LLC, 70 So.3d 315, 319 (Ala.2011), the Alabama Supreme Court discussed whether a jurisdictional defect can be cured with regard to lack of standing at the time a complaint is filed:
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