Hicks v. Hoagland
| Decision Date | 05 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D06-343.,5D06-343. |
| Parties | Hal D. HICKS, Appellant, v. Don HOAGLAND, as Receiver for Midwest Transit, Inc., Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Harold C. Hubka, of Cobb & Cole, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Matt E. Beal and Zachary J. Bancroft of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
Hal D. Hicks appeals from an order granting summary judgment for Don Hoagland as receiver for Midwest Transit, Inc. ("Midwest") because Hicks' claim, which sought mortgage foreclosure based upon the breach of a $2.5 million promissory note, was barred by res judicata. We reverse.
The parties had been engaged in extensive and ongoing litigation in Illinois state and federal courts concerning Hicks' conversion of substantial company assets from company use to his personal use. In the Illinois state action, an amended final judgment was entered for Midwest and against Hicks for $21,800,594.45 in 2004.
Hicks sued Midwest in Volusia County Circuit Court in August 2001. He alleged a breach of promissory note, which was executed in June 1998 for $2.5 million. Hicks later amended his complaint to seek foreclosure of a mortgage based on the breach of the $2.5 million note. Hoagland intervened as Midwest's receiver, and the court granted his motion for abatement on the grounds that the pending Illinois state court action concerned the same party and issues. Hoagland also attached Hicks' answer in an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, in which Hicks counterclaimed against Midwest for the note at issue in the Volusia County Circuit Court action. It is undisputed that there is only one $2.5 million note and the same alleged default is at issue in the Florida claim and Illinois counterclaims.
In 2004, after the Illinois state court entered its initial final judgment against Hicks, Hoagland sought to amend his affirmative defenses to include collateral estoppel and to amend his set-off defense. Hicks moved to stay the action in Volusia County because he had filed a motion to modify the final judgment order in Illinois.1 The trial court stayed the action until there was a final judgment in the Illinois state case.
In June 2005, Hoagland moved for an order vacating the stay on the basis of the amended final judgment in the Illinois state court. One paragraph of the Illinois amended final judgment noted that two separate issues had been severed, and the remaining claims had been tried by a bench trial: "[t]he severed claims involving Mideast Transit and Billy Bob's Roadhouse Bar & Grill [were] logically separable and legally distinct from the claims already tried." The Illinois state court had also granted judgment in favor of Midwest and against Hick on "[a]ll claims by [Hicks] against Midwest for monies loaned to Midwest by [Hicks] (2020 account)." Hoagland also attached a copy of Hicks' Illinois counterclaims—count 26 alleged a breach of the promissory note that Hicks alleged in this action. The trial court vacated the stay and permitted Hoagland to amend his affirmative defenses, and Hoagland moved for summary judgment.
Hicks responded to the motion by arguing his federal court counterclaims involving the note were "alive and well." He also alleged that his counterclaim was dismissed before trial in the Illinois state action, but promised that He claimed counterclaim 26 had been dismissed before the trial, and pointed out the court did not explicitly reference "count 26" in its final judgment. Hicks filed an affidavit from his counsel in the Illinois cases, whose affidavit alleged that "Count twenty-six (26) of Hicks' . . . Counterclaim . . . filed in the Illinois state court action was dismissed (not on the merits) prior to trial, so the judge could continue with his bench trial and avoid issues that would require a jury."
The Volusia County Circuit Court granted summary judgment for Hoagland in December 2005. After Hicks' appeal, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted summary judgment against Hicks on the basis of res judicata, fully considering and rejecting the arguments Hicks now raises on appeal; namely, that his promissory note counterclaims were dismissed before trial, and that the state court's opinion letter and failure to reference his counterclaim by number showed there was no adjudication on the merits. Though Hicks argued below that the circuit court should not grant summary judgment because the federal suit would resolve all issues, he now argues on appeal that the federal judgment against him is "irrelevant."
We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. Park v. City of W. Melbourne, 927 So.2d 5, 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of material issues of fact; after the movant has tendered competent evidence supporting its motion, the burden shifts to the other party to come forward with opposing evidence to show a question of material fact exists. Carnes v. Fender, 936 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Austin Outdoor, Inc., 918 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). "[T]he opposing party must come forward with counterevidence sufficient to reveal a genuine issue." Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979). Because summary judgment forecloses the litigant from the benefit of a trial on the merits, courts must exercise caution in granting summary judgment. Bifulco v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 693 So.2d 707, 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Accordingly, the procedural strictures in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 are neither niceties nor technicalities, but must be observed. Id. "[I]f the record reflects the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . or . . . raises even the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach
...a judgment acted as an adjudication on claims, including previously dismissed claims, as a question of fact. See Hicks v. Hoagland, 953 So.2d 695, 698 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2007) (finding res judicata could not apply at summary judgment stage when record was not clear as to whether prior state c......
-
Vasquez v. YII Shipping Co.
...same claims from being litigated by the same plaintiff against the same defendant as in a previous proceeding. See Hicks v. Hoagland, 953 So.2d 695, 698 (Fla.Ct.App.2007). However, Florida's doctrine of res judicata applies only if the litigation in the previous proceeding resulted in a jud......
-
Original Brooklyn Water Bagel Co. v. Bersin Bagel Grp., LLC
...parties to the action, and (4) identity of quality or capacity of persons for or against whom the claim is made." Hicks v. Hoagland, 953 So.2d 695, 698 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a case has been settled, the principles of res judicata apply to the matte......
-
Wilmington Trust, Nat'l Ass'n v. Moon
...burden shift to the other party to come forward with counterevidence that establishes a question of material fact. Hicks v. Hoagland , 953 So.2d 695, 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Because summary judgment is not a substitute for trial, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the court is no......
-
Legal theories & defenses
...Wildflower, LLC v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist. , 179 So.3d 369, 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). See Also 1. Hicks v. Hoagland , 953 So.2d 695, 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). 2. Costello v. The Curtis Bldg. Partnership , 864 So.2d 1241, 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). LEGAL THEORIES & DEFENSES 18-63......