Higginbottom ex rel. Davis v. Keithly
| Decision Date | 06 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. NA 98-0021-C B/S.,No. NA 98-0076-C B/S.,No. NA 98-0073-C B/S.,NA 98-0021-C B/S.,NA 98-0073-C B/S.,NA 98-0076-C B/S. |
| Citation | 103 F.Supp.2d 1075 |
| Parties | Joshua HIGGINBOTTOM, By His Natural Guardian, Karen Dale DAVIS, and Merlin Q. Christian Farnworth, By His Next Friend and Natural Guardian, Kathryn Farnworth, and Anton Cousin, By His Next Friend and Natural Guardian, Tracy Mosley, and Steven Deluca, By His Next Friend and Natural Guardian, Ralph Deluca, Plaintiffs, v. Urbie KEITHLEY, In His Individual Capacity and His Official Capacity as Principal of Lillian Emery Elementary School, and Larry Brunson, In His Individual Capacity and His Official Capacity as Teacher of Lillian Emery Elementary School, and Edward Adams, In His Official Capacity as Superintendent of New Albany-Floyd County Consolidated School Corporation, and Jerol Miller, In His Official Capacity as Trustee of New Albany-Floyd County Consolidated School Corporation, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Bruce A. Brightwell, Louisville, KY, Julia A. Fifer, Fifer Law Office, New Albany, IN, Brent Welke, English, IN. for plaintiffs.
William H. Kelley, Kelley Belcher & Brown, P.C., Bloomington, IN, for defendants.
ENTRY DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs, former sixth grade students at Lillian Emery Elementary School, bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against their teacher, the superintendent and trustees of the county School Corporation. They contend that their teacher, Larry Brunson ("Brunson"), subjected them to an unreasonable strip search in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They also allege a number of pendent state law claims based on the search, including battery and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.1 Plaintiff Higginbottom amended his complaint to include a state law breach of contract claim, contending that the student guide issued to parents by the School Corporation created a contract that the School Corporation breached when Brunson conducted the alleged unreasonable strip search. Defendants move for summary judgment, and plaintiffs counter-move for summary judgment on the breach of contract and Fourth Amendment claims.2 For the reasons discussed, the defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.
Larry Brunson taught a class of male and female sixth-graders, including the plaintiffs, at Lillian Emery Elementary School during the 1995-1996 school year. In our March 16, 1999, entry granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings ("prior entry"), we recited the general allegations in the plaintiffs' three complaints, so we dispense with detailing the specifics of plaintiffs' complaints here. In short, plaintiffs contend that after the disappearance of $38.00 that someone left unattended on a snack cart, Brunson singled out the plaintiffs from the rest of the students, took them to the boys' bathroom, and instructed them to strip down to their underwear. He then searched the boys' clothing for the missing money to no avail. Brunson allegedly subsequently insisted that each boy hold out his underwear so that he could inspect their penis and buttock areas to determine if they had stashed the money in those locations. According to plaintiffs' complaints, while Brunson searched the eleven and twelve-year-old boys in the bathroom, someone evidently discovered the missing $38.00 in the possession of another student from another class.
The parties provide us with a factual record on summary judgment that is no more developed than the nascent record that existed when defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Aside from the lack of citation to and development of the factual record, both parties fail to comply with Local Rule 56.1, which requires a party opposing summary judgment (in this case, both parties) to respond to "each factual assertion in the moving party's Statement of Material Facts" and, if applicable, to file a separate Statement of Additional Facts that warrant a denial of summary judgment. Local Rule 56.1(c)(1). The practical result of the parties' omissions is that we have virtually no facts to construe in either party's favor on summary judgment. Left to our own devices, we might have searched the record and teased out the facts we consider most relevant to the issues before us. But where, as here, some claims are especially fact-sensitive, such as plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims, and where the parties have not provided us with the full record, we once again must defer a fuller discussion until the parties develop the record, if that ever occurs. Therefore, for now, we cite only to the parties' brief statements of (allegedly) undisputed and material facts, which each party filed in support of their motions for summary judgment, when considering the claims advanced by the parties in those motions.
The parties agree, or at least fail to dispute, that on May 3, 1996, someone reported $38.00 missing from a snack cart at the elementary school. See Higginbottom Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. at 4, ¶ 4 (Statement of Material Facts). During the afternoon of the same day, Brunson apparently searched each of the plaintiffs in the boys' bathroom and required them to remove all articles of clothing except their underwear. Id. Plaintiffs claim that Brunson had no individual suspicion that any of the plaintiffs had taken the money, although they fail to provide us with any excerpt of the record to support that assertion. Id. ¶ 5. Defendants contend (without citation to the record) that Brunson never touched plaintiffs at any point during the search and that plaintiffs suffered no physical injury, but defendants do not otherwise dispute that Brunson searched the four plaintiffs in some manner. See Defs.' Statement Material Facts ¶¶ 2,5; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 6. Defendants also contend that Brunson did not consider the socio-economic status of any student before searching plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 4. The parties agree that prior to Brunson's search of the plaintiffs, the School Corporation had issued a written student guide to parents that prohibited "strip searches" of students. Id. ¶ 1; See Higginbottom "Findings of Undisputed Fact" Supp. "Cross [sic] Motion for Partial Summ. J. for Breach of Contract" ¶ 5.
Plaintiffs bring this action against New Albany-Floyd County Consolidated School Corporation ("School Corporation") and against Brunson in his individual capacity.3 The plaintiffs allege that both the School Corporation and Brunson violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to Brunson's alleged strip search of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law claims for breach of contract, battery, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. We now proceed to consider the legal merits of the parties' summary judgment contentions.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998). However, neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir.1998), nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir.1998) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir.1992). Yet, if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but also required. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265; Herman v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir.1989).
Plaintiffs claim that the School Corporation violated the terms of a student guide issued to parents when its agent, Brunson, searched the four plaintiffs. They contend that the student guide formed a contract between the School Corporation and the students' parents, with the plaintiffs-students serving as third-party beneficiaries. Plaintiffs also invoke the theories of promissory estoppel and quasi-contract as grounds to hold the School Corporation liable for Brunson's search of plaintiffs. All parties move for summary judgment, insisting (despite the generally inadequate factual record) that the contract claim is amenable to disposition at the summary judgment level since the parties agree on the existence of the student guide and its contents. We find that plaintiffs' claim fails as a matter of law, as plaintiffs fail to offer either relevant legal authority or evidentiary support for their position and neglect even to specify the elements of their claim.
After our prior entry, plaintiff Higginbottom amended his complaint to include a breach of contract...
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