Higley v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2464--I
| Decision Date | 21 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 2464--I,2464--I |
| Citation | 13 Wn.App. 269,534 P.2d 596 |
| Parties | Owen A. HIGLEY, Appellant, v. WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, a Washington Corporation, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Thom, Mussehl, Navoni, Hoff & Pierson, Bert H. Weinrich, Seattle, for appellant.
Guttormsen, Scholfield & Stafford, Jack P. Scholfield, Seattle, for respondents.
Owen A. Higley appeals from the trial court's summary judgment dismissing his complaint against Weyerhaeuwer Company (hereinafter referred to as 'Weyerhaeuser') seeking damages for loss of vision in his right eye allegedly caused by the deliberate intention of Weyerhaeuser to produce such injury within the meaning of RCW 51.24.020. 1 The sole question presented by Weyerhaeuser's motion for summary judgment was whether there was a genuine issue of material fact to show the 'deliberate intention' required by the statute as the basis for Higley's lawsuit.
On October 13, 1972, Higley was employed as a quad saw operator in Weyerhaeuser's Mill No. 2 at Longview. While he was sitting in the quad saw operator's cage located in direct line with the saw's rotating cutter head, a piece of the cutter head broke loose, breaking through a plexiglass shield and driving a piece of the shield into Higley's right eye. 2
On March 6, 1973, Higley filed a complaint against Weyerhaeuser alleging that 'pursuant to RCW 51.24.020, the negligence and acts of omission on the part of (Weyerhaeuser) was (sic) so gross and irresponsible as to become tantamount to that of an intentional act.' On March 20, 1973, Weyerhaeuser filed its answer denying any intention to injure Higley and claiming the immunity provided by the industrial insurance statute, RCW 51.04.010 et seq. Subsequently, based upon Higley's answers to interrogatories and the deposition of Weyerhaeuser employee Thoennes, Weyerhaeuser moved for summary judgment and also moved to defer time for answering Higley's interrogatories until after the summary judgment motion was decided. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Higley filed his own affidavit, together with the affidavits from five other Weyerhaeuser employees, which generally described the circumstances of Higley's accident, indicated the frequency of breaking and flying cutter heads, and stated the inadequacy of the plexiglass shielding and other measures taken by Weyerhaeuser to protect quad saw operators from cutter head projectiles. On July 23, 1973, the trial court granted Weyerhaeuser's motion for summary judgment, and Higley filed timely notice of appeal.
On appeal, Higley presents three basic arguments in support of his contention that the trial court erred in granting Weyerhaeuser summary judgment. First, he argues that Weyerhaeuser committed a battery against him in that it took inadequate precautions to protect him from injury by flying cutter heads and therefore acted with knwoledge that its actions were substantially certain to produce injury. He suggests that such knowledge constitutes a 'deliberate intention' to harm him within the meaning of RCW 51.24.020. Second, Higley argues that if he were permitted further discovery, he would be able to establish facts sufficient to prove such 'deliberate intention.' Third, Higley argues that the granting of immunity from suit to Weyerhaeuser under the circumstances here is contrary to the public policy of the State favoring adequate compensation for injured employees and compliance with applicable safety regulations and laws.
We are of the opinion that Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash.App. 7, 516 P.2d 522 (1973), is controlling in the resolution of this appeal and requires the rejection of the arguments raised herein. We deem it unnecessary to repeat what is said in Winterroth, except to note that, as in the case of the appellant there, Higley has failed to show that his employer had the Specific intent to injure which is required to satisfy the exception contained in RCW 51.24.020. Moreover, it is apparent that no...
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...substantial certainty of producing injury does not rise to the level of specific intent to cause injury. Higley v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 13 Wash.App. 269, 271-72, 534 P.2d 596 (1975). The trial court judge acknowledged this court's holding in Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash.2d 853, 904 P.2d 278......
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Walston v. Boeing Co.
...on other grounds by Stenberg v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 104 Wash.2d 710, 719–20, 709 P.2d 793 (1985)); Higley v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 13 Wash.App. 269, 270, 534 P.2d 596 (1975); Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash.App. 7, 8, 516 P.2d 522 (1973). It further held that the Boeing employees present......
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Birklid v. Boeing Co.
...Nor is an act that has a substantial certainty of producing injury sufficient to show deliberate intention. Higley v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 13 Wash.App. 269, 271-72, 534 P.2d 596 (1975). In Higley, a saw operator was injured when a piece of a saw's rotating cutterhead broke loose, breaking thro......
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Peterick v. State
...on the ground that the employee had failed to show that his employer "had the Specific intent to injure." Higley v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 13 Wash.App. 269, 271, 534 P.2d 596, 598 (1975). More recently, in Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 579, 547 P.2d 856 (1976), the court reaffirme......