Hill v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 20 May 2020
• Docket Number: Nos. 99-4317/14-3718,s. 99-4317/14-3718
• Citation: 960 F.3d 260
• Parties: Danny HILL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Carl ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

960 F.3d 260

Danny HILL, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Carl ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

Nos. 99-4317/14-3718

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Reargued: December 5, 2019

Decided and Filed: May 20, 2020

REARGUED: Vicki Ruth Adams Werneke, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael J. Hendershot, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS: Vicki Ruth Adams Werneke, Lori B. Riga, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael J. Hendershot, Peter T. Reed, Stephen E. Maher, Benjamin M. Flowers, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: MERRITT, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Danny Hill asserts in his habeas petition that the State of Ohio may not execute him because he is intellectually disabled.¹ See Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Atkins , the case that bars the execution of intellectually disabled defendants, was decided and made retroactive after Hill was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Prior to Atkins , Hill had raised his intellectual disability as a mitigating factor in the penalty phase of his trial. See State v. Hill , Nos. 3720, 3745, 1989 WL 142761 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1989). Three psychological experts testified in that proceeding that Hill was intellectually disabled. The Ohio courts agreed, stating that Hill "suffers from some mental retardation" and is "mildly to moderately retarded." See id. at *6 ; State v. Hill , 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 595 N.E.2d 884, 901 (1992) (discussing the experts' testimony). But ultimately, Hill was sentenced to death because all that his intellectual disability counted for at the time was a point in his favor in the sentencing calculation—not a bar to his execution. See Hill , 1989 WL 142761, at *4. When Atkins came down, our court issued a remand order directing the Ohio courts to formally assess Hill's intellectual functioning under Atkins . Hill v. Anderson , 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2002). Even though "Ohio courts reviewing his case have concluded that Danny Hill is retarded, and voluminous expert testimony supported this conclusion," we issued a remand because Hill's Atkins claim "ha[d] not been exhausted or conceded." Id. (citations omitted). This time around, the Ohio courts decided that Hill was not intellectually disabled. See State v. Hill , 177 Ohio App.3d 171, 894 N.E.2d 108, 127 (2008).

We hold that Hill is intellectually disabled and that he cannot be sentenced to death. No person looking at this record could reasonably deny that Hill is intellectually disabled under Atkins . In holding otherwise, the Ohio courts avoided giving serious consideration to past evidence of Hill's intellectual disability. Doing so amounted to an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of even the general Atkins standard. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case with instructions to grant the petition and to issue the writ of habeas corpus with respect to Hill's death sentence.

In addition to his Atkins claim, Hill raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that attacks his trial counsel's performance during his state Atkins hearing, a Miranda claim arguing that certain statements should have been suppressed during his trial, a prosecutorial-misconduct claim, and a due-process claim arguing that Hill was not competent to stand trial at the time of his convictions. For the reasons set forth below, and as explained in our prior opinion, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment denying Hill's habeas petition with regard to the latter three claims, and pretermit the ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding Atkins because we are granting relief on the merits of the Atkins claim.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The facts and legal proceedings surrounding Hill's conviction and death sentence in 1986 are set out in an earlier opinion. See Hill , 300 F.3d at 680–81. Because this case centers on the issue of intellectual disability, what follows is an account of the facts and proceedings relevant to that question in this case.

Several evaluations conducted around the time of Hill's trial in 1986 reveal that Hill "has a diminished mental capacity," a fact acknowledged by the state court after Hill's Atkins hearing. See Hill , 894 N.E.2d at 112 (summarizing the testimony of the three experts who testified during the mitigation phase of the initial trial that Hill was mentally "retarded"). Hill's IQ at the time of trial ranged from 55 to 68, and his moral development was "primitive"—essentially that of a two-year old. Id . There is no dispute that Hill's IQ is so low that he easily meets the first element of the clinical definition of intellectual disability.

Since his earliest days in school, Hill has struggled with academics. At the age of six, a school psychologist noted that Hill was "a slower learning child" and recommended that his teachers "make his work as concrete as possible" without "talking about abstract ideas." R. 97 [disc 1] (Suppl. App.) (Pages 489–91). After kindergarten, Hill was placed into special education classes for the remainder of his time in the public school system. R. 29 (Suppression Hr'g Tr.) (Page ID #3081–92).² Hill struggled to keep up academically even in his special education classes and had difficulty remembering even the simplest of instructions. R. 31 (Mitigation Hr'g Tr. at 174) (Page ID #3486). At the age of thirteen, his academic and social skills were at a first-grade level. R. 97 [disc 1] (Suppl. App.) (Page 568). At the age of fifteen, Hill could barely read or write, and he was noted to have weaknesses in self-direction and socialization, in addition to communication. R. 31 (Mitigation Hr'g Tr. at 79) (Page ID #3391). Those problems persist today.

Hill has also been unable to take care of his hygiene independently from a young age. During his time in a home for children with behavioral issues, Hill could not remember to comb his hair, brush his teeth, or take a shower without daily reminders. R. 31 (Mitigation Hr'g Tr. at 88) (Page ID #3400).³ Even in the highly structured environment of death row, Hill would not shower without reminders.

After receiving two convictions for rape at age seventeen, Hill was assessed for intellectual disability by the juvenile court. R. 97 [disc 1] (Suppl. App.) (Page 527). He was diagnosed as "mildly retarded." Id. Before Atkins was decided, Hill had been diagnosed as intellectually disabled approximately ten times over the course of his life. Id. at 61–76, 513–530, 592–621. During the mitigation phase of his trial for the Fife murder, the psychological experts and the Ohio courts decided that Hill was intellectually disabled and had significant adaptive deficits. Hill , 1989 WL 142761, at *6 ; Hill , 595 N.E.2d at 901. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld his death sentence because it was then constitutional to execute intellectually disabled defendants. See Hill , 1989 WL 142761, at *4.

The Supreme Court decided Atkins in 2002 while Hill's appeal from the district court's denial of his habeas petition was pending before this court. We remanded the case to the district court with instructions to remand Hill's unexhausted Atkins claim to the state court and to stay the remaining claims pending resolution of the Atkins claim. Hill , 300 F.3d at 683. After the case was returned to the state court, three experts—Drs. David Hammer, J. Gregory Olley, and Nancy Huntsman—examined Hill and testified over the course of several evidentiary hearings on Hill's Atkins claim. Dr. Hammer was retained by Hill, Dr. Olley acted as the state's expert, and Dr. Huntsman was appointed by the trial court. Dr. Hammer concluded that Hill met all three prongs for a diagnosis of intellectual disability. However, Drs. Olley and Huntsman concluded that Hill was not intellectually disabled.

The state trial court denied Hill's petition for relief under Atkins , finding that Hill did not exhibit significant adaptive deficits and that any deficits that he did have did not manifest before the age of 18. State v. Hill , No. 85-CR-317 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas Feb. 15, 2006) (unreported) [R. 97 [disc 1] (Suppl. App.) (Pages 3399–3482) ]. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, over a dissent, holding in the first instance that issue preclusion did not require a different result "because the finding that he was mentally retarded was not essential to the imposition of the death penalty in the same way that it is essential in the Atkins / Lott context." Hill , 894 N.E.2d at 116, 127. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case, with two justices dissenting. State v. Hill , 122 Ohio St.3d 1502, 912 N.E.2d 107 (2009) (table).

With the conclusion of his state-court proceedings, Hill moved to reopen and amend his habeas petition in this case to include claims under Atkins . There is no dispute that Hill's IQ is so low (ranging from a low of 48 to a high of 71) that he easily meets the first element of the clinical definition of intellectual disability. The parties disagree, however, on the propriety of the state courts' holdings that Hill did not exhibit sufficient adaptive deficits (the second element) and that Hill's deficits did not manifest themselves before he reached the age of 18 (the third element).

The district court denied Hill's amended petition in a thorough opinion, holding that the deferential standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) mandated denial of Hill's habeas petition. Hill v. Anderson , No. 4:96-cv-00795, 2014 WL 2890416, at *51 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2014). It did so despite its serious misgivings about the state court's rejection of the extensive record evidence that provided important diagnostic information regarding Hill's adaptive functioning and the age of onset...