Hill v. Bailey
Decision Date | 03 June 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 76153,76153 |
Citation | 187 Ga.App. 413,370 S.E.2d 520 |
Parties | HILL et al. v. BAILEY et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Walter S. Chew, Jr., Montezuma, for appellants.
Verlin L. Jones, Jr., Vienna, for appellees.
Appellee-plaintiffs filed suit and appellant-defendants, having been properly served with the complaint, retained counsel and filed their answer and a counterclaim. Appellants' counsel, after receiving the permission of the trial court and giving notice to his clients, subsequently withdrew from the representation. Appellants did not retain new counsel for approximately one year.
During the period in which appellants were without counsel, the case was placed on the trial calendar. However, appellees' counsel notified the court of the illness of one of the appellants and requested a continuance. By letter, appellees' counsel subsequently requested that the case be placed on the trial calendar for the April 1987 Term of court. Appellants acknowledge that they received a copy of this letter. Counsel for appellees sent a second letter to appellants, informing them of the week during which the case was scheduled to be tried. Appellants deny receipt of the second letter. The case was tried during the week scheduled, but the appellants failed to appear. The trial, from which appellants were absent, resulted in a verdict for appellees. Following the jury's return of the verdict, but prior to the trial court's entry of judgment on the verdict, appellants filed a "Motion to Set Aside Verdict and Judgment and for New Trial." The only issue raised by appellants in this motion was their lack of notice of the date of trial. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied appellants' motion. Appellants bring this direct appeal from the judgment entered by the trial court on the jury verdict and from the trial court's denial of their post-judgment motion.
1. Before the merits of appellants' appeal can be considered, we must first ascertain whether jurisdiction exists. Appellants styled their pleading in the trial court as "A Motion to Set Aside Verdict and Judgment and for New Trial." In denying appellants' motion, the trial court did not indicate whether it was purporting to rule upon a motion for new trial or a motion to set aside. Whether the motion is properly considered to be a motion for new trial or a motion to set aside is determinative of whether appellants are authorized to bring this direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 or whether this appeal must be dismissed for failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedure of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8).
(Emphasis supplied.) Brown v. C & S Nat. Bank, 245 Ga. 515, 518, 265 S.E.2d 791 (1980). (Emphasis supplied.) Newman v. Greer, 131 Ga.App. 128, 129-130, 205 S.E.2d 486 (1974). Therefore, whether it is permissible to attack a judgment for lack of notice by a motion to set aside or by a motion for new trial is dependent upon the face of the record. In the present case, appellants' motion was not based upon a lack of notice appearing on the face of the record. Appellants relied upon extrinsic evidence in the form of numerous affidavits to demonstrate their alleged lack of sufficient notice. Thus, appellants' Scott v. Morris Brown College, 164 Ga.App. 264, 265, 297 S.E.2d 45 (1982). Because appellants seek direct appellate review of a ruling on what is properly denominated a motion for new trial and their notice of appeal from the denial of such motion was not untimely, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal pursuant OCGA § 5-6-34. Compare Crolley v. Johnson, 185 Ga.App. 671, 365 S.E.2d 277 (1988) ( ). Although appellants' motion for new trial was prematurely filed, such premature filing of a motion for new trial does not deprive this court of appellate jurisdiction where, as here, the notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the entry of the trial court's order disposing of the prematurely filed motion for new trial. Harrison v. Harrison, 229 Ga. 692(1), 194 S.E.2d 87 (1972); Joiner v. Perkerson, 160 Ga.App. 343(1), 287 S.E.2d 327 (1981). Compare Leader Nat. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 185 Ga.App. 27, 29(1), 363 S.E.2d 281 (1987) (...
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