Hill v. Beeler

• Decision Date: 03 February 1956
• Citation: 3 McCanless 325,199 Tenn. 325,286 S.W.2d 868
• Parties: Betty June HILL, etc., Appellant, v. Roy H. BEELER, Attorney General, et al., Appellees. 3 McCanless 325, 199 Tenn. 325, 286 S.W.2d 868
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 868

286 S.W.2d 868

Betty June HILL, etc., Appellant, v. Roy H. BEELER, Attorney General, et al., Appellees.

3 McCanless 325, 199 Tenn. 325, 286 S.W.2d 868

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Feb. 3, 1956.

Rogers Kivett, Tazewell, for appellant.

John Ed O'Dell, Jr., and James M. Glasgow, Asst. Attys. Gen., George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., of counsel, for appellees.

BURNETT, Justice.

This action was commenced by the appellant, Betty June Hill who sues as the widow of P. L. Hill and as the next friend of their minor son. The appellees, defendants below, are the State officials who constitute the State Board of Claims and the Attorney-Secretary for the Board of Claims.

The Board of Claims was created by Chapter 73 of the Public Acts of 1945 and is codified in Williams Cumulative Pocket Supplement to the Code as Sections 1034.26 [199 TENN 328] et seq. The parties named in this bill were those officials of the State holding the positions at the time that the bill was filed. Subsequent to that time, due to death and resignations, new parties have taken the place of some of those named in the bill. These new parties have been properly substituted. The Board of Claims as it is made up consists of a membership of the Commissioner of Highways & Public Works, Commissioner of Finance & Taxation, State Treasurer, The Comptroller of the Treasury, Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of the State. Code Supplement Section 1034.26. Obviously the only one of these members requiring legal training is the Attorney General of the State. The others of course may have legal training but frequently none of them does.

The Board of Claims thus is not necessarily a judicial body but is largely a legislative body which is free to exercise through quasi-judicial functions those claims that the Legislature has constituted it to exercise through proper legislation. This body is delegated under the Statutes above referred to to the examination and determination of certain classified claims against the State. These claims do not necessarily include things which are inherently or necessarily judicial for the determination of this body. Practically all matters which it considers are susceptible of legislative or executive determination.

The State of Tennessee, as a sovereign, is immune from suit except as it consents to be sued. Article I, Sec. 17, Constitution of Tennessee; Code Section 8634; Scates v. Board of Commissioners of Union City, 196 Tenn. 274, 265 S.W.2d 563; Phillips v. Marion County, 166 Tenn. 83, 59 S.W.2d 507; Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. 201, 54 S.W.2d 953; Insurance Co. v. Craig, 106 Tenn. 621, 62 S.W. 155; Moore v. Tate, 87 Tenn. 725, 11 S.W. 935, 10 Am.St.Rep. 712. This being true it necessarily follows that except as the Legislature of the State consents there is no jurisdiction in this Board of Claims to entertain suits against the State.

Legislative Acts conferring jurisdiction upon this Board of Claims to adjudicate claims against the State of Tennessee are and must of necessity be strictly construed. This Board's jurisdiction is limited to the cases specified in the Act, and this limitation cannot be enlarged by implication. Code Supplements Sections 1034.30, 1034.35; Quinton v. Board of Claims, supra; Wallace v. Neal, 191 Tenn. 240, 232 S.W.2d 49. Its jurisdiction, too, is final in all matters. See authorities immediately preceding this statement.

According to the allegations of the bill, complainant filed her claim with the Board of Claims seeking an award from the State of Tennessee for the death of her husband. The Board refused to entertain the claim on the ground that it was without jurisdiction and this bill is brought for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of the rights of the parties under the declaratory judgment statutes, Williams Code, Sec. 8835 et seq. She alleges that the Board of Claims has jurisdiction to entertain, to hear and determine her claim under Code Supplement Section 1034.30, Section 5 of Chapter 73 of the Public Acts of 1945, on the basis of the facts alleged in the original bill. These are substantially the same as those set out in her petition to the Board, a copy of which petition along with a copy of the letter of the Attorney for the Board of Claims is filed as exhibits to the bill herein. In this letter of the Assistant Attorney General and Secretary of the Board of Claims, he recommended to the Board that it was without authority to hear the complainant's claim and set forth his reasons therefor. He, as we said above, is made a party defendant to the present suit. It is argued that the Board had no right to follow his recommendation herein--that it should have heard the parties regardless. Acting upon his recommendation, the Board dismissed the claim.

The factual situation as is set forth in the bill, and the claim as filed with the Board of Claims, is briefly that one Richard Rue, who is a convict at Brushy Mountain Prison serving a term for second-degree murder, was permitted by the gateman to take a truck at about 5:00 o'clock p. m. on April 15, 1950, from the main prison into the Town of Jellico. The convict was addicted to alcohol and became intoxicated. Soon after arriving in Jellico, the convict Rue observed his wife working in a restaurant and went there for the purpose of engaging her '* * * either in conversation, argument or fight * * *'. This convict was thrown out of this restaurant and while thus angered and enraged and under the influence of whisky he took the Prison truck and drove the vehicle across the sidewalk into the front of the restaurant. While thus driving across the sidewalk in front of the restaurant he struck and fatally injured P. L. Hill the husband and father of the appellants.

The bill asserts that the only question or issue for the Court to decide is whether or not the Board of Claims has jurisdiction of an alleged negligence action based on the facts above briefly outlined.

The bill also contains the following averment:

'The 1953 general assembly endeavored to relieve complainant and further justice in her plight, by appropriating $10,000.00 for her in this cause, but said legislation was the first clause in the miscellaneous appropriations bill and the complexity of the law, reverts her claim back to section 1034.30 of the code, and the construction thereof.'

The Court is then asked to construe the Board of Claims statutes heretofore referred to and particularly Section 1034.30 of the Supplement to Williams Code, being Section 5 of Chapter 73 of the Public Acts of 1945, as amended, and to declare whether under the facts alleged the Board of Claims is empowered to hear, determine and award compensation to the complainant.

The defendants demurred to the bill on six grounds. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer without specifying on what particular ground he relied, and therefore we must assume that he sustained it on all grounds. We deem it necessary to take up seriatim each ground of the demurrer because in our view of the matter the first ground of the demurrer is sufficient and we think that in sustaining it alone the Chancellor properly did so and dismissed the suit. This ground is that the suit cannot be maintained under the Constitution and statutes of Tennessee.

In the outset of this opinion we set out at some length when the State may be sued and the authority and jurisdiction of the Board of Claims to allow claims against the State. This Court long ago in construing the constitutional provision, Article I, Sec. 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, said that this provision 'carries with it a positive implication that they shall not be brought otherwise or at all unless legislative authority therefor be affirmatively given.' Insurance Co. v. Craig, supra [106 Tenn. 621, 62 S.W. 157], and we also held that the State could not be subject to litigation at a suit of an individual unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the Legislature to permit such litigation. Quinton v. Board of Claims, supra. There is no statute permitting the action herein. Code Section 8835 et seq., (Declaratory Judgments statute) does not permit an action of the kind, that is, for the State to be sued in the manner in which it is herein sued. The remedy of the appellant, if any, rests exclusively with the Board of Claims and the courts are without jurisdiction to allow a bill for a declaratory judgment. Merely because the Board of Claims is created by a statute does not give the Court under the Declaratory Judgments statutes above jurisdiction to entertain a claim against the State. For as we have said supra, such statutes allowing suits or claims to be made against the State are construed strictly and must be construed according to the letter of the statute without any implications otherwise. As a matter of fact it seems to us that Code Section 8634 prohibits such an action as here brought. This Section is a general denial of jurisdiction of any suit against the State or its officers to reach its Treasury, funds, property, and directs that any such suit shall be...