Wallace v. Neal

• Decision Date: 15 July 1950
• Citation: 27 Beeler 240,232 S.W.2d 49,191 Tenn. 240
• Parties: WALLACE v. NEAL. 27 Beeler 240, 191 Tenn. 240, 232 S.W.2d 49
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 49

232 S.W.2d 49

WALLACE v. NEAL.

27 Beeler 240, 191 Tenn. 240, 232 S.W.2d 49

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 15, 1950.

Wm. C. Cook, Dickson, for appellant.

Roy H. Beeler, Attorney General, Robert T. Kennerly, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

NEIL, Chief Justice.

The complainant filed his original bill in the chancery court and prayed for a declaratory judgment 'for the construction of certain Sections, 32, 33 and 34, of Chapter 221 of the Public Acts of 1939', the same being a part of the Civil Service Act of Tennessee.

The bill alleges that complainant was a highway patrolman of the State of Tennessee, his employment beginning on April 7, 1939. On November 10, 1942, he obtained a leave of absence and enlisted in the United States Navy and remained in the service until he was honorably discharged on January 6, 1946; he immediately returned to his post as a patrolman and remained there until April 9, 1949, when he was attempted to be discharged by Sam Neal, Commissioner of Safety, etc. for 'pernicious political activity'. Contention is made that 'the attempted discharge was directly in conflict with the provisions of the Civil Service Law' in that he was not given the required notice of dismissal and that the law was not observed in numerous other respects. The letter of dismissal was as follows:

'Dear Patrolman Wallace:

'Effective at the close of business, Saturday, April 9, you are hereby dismissed from the service of the State Highway Patrol. Please turn in your equipment to Captain J. J. Jackson at Nashville headquarters.

'Yours truly

'Sam Neal'

The bill further recites that at the time complainant received the foregoing letter of dismissal 'he had built up fourteen days as vacation to which he was entitled, with pay, under the Civil Service Laws of the State' and that in truth 'he was given only three days' notice of his dismissal'. It is conceded, however, that on April 9, the attempted date of dismissal, complainant was entitled to pay for nine days in April. 'The complainant received a check covering compensation at his regular rate of pay for twenty-three (23) days in the month of April.'

The bill refers to an official opinion by the Attorney General of the State in which the Civil Service Act was construed in a case where another patrolman, one Stoopman, had been dismissed, and upon which Commissioner Neal relied as authority for dismissing the complainant, and alleges that said opinion is erroneous and should be so declared by this Court.

The defendant demurred to the bill upon the following grounds:

'The bill shows on its face that the complainant therein has completely ignored the full and adequate administrative remedy provided for his relief by Section 34, Chapter 221 of the Public Acts of 1939 (Annotated Code Section 423.24hh) and having failed to exhaust such administrative remedy he has no standing as a complainant in this Court.

'The bill shows on its face that in full compliance with Section 33, Chapter 221 of the Public Acts of 1939 (Annotated Code 423.24gg) complainant was notified on April 6, 1949 of his dismissal by his appointing authority Sam Neal, Commissioner of the Department of Safety of the State of Tennessee and remained on the State payroll as a State employee until April 23, 1949, a period more than the minimum statutory period of ten (10) days after notice of dismissal.

'The bill shows on its face that this case is beyond the jurisdiction and authority of this Court as a suit brought against 'officers of the State acting by authority of the State, with a view to reach the State, its treasury, funds or property, and all such suits shall be dismissed as to the State or such officers on motion, plea, or demurrer by the law officer of the State or counsel employed by the State."

The chancellor sustained each ground of the demurrer and dismissed the bill. Complainant prayed and was granted an appeal to this Court. The four assignments of error singly and collectively challenge the correctness of the chancellor's decree.

The Civil Service Act was designed to establish a State system of personnel administration for the benefit of State employees based upon 'merit principles and scientific methods'. In the 'Department of Personnel' there is created a Commission of five members who are clothed with almost unlimited authority in the supervision and control of all employees, and, within certain limitations, may suspend and dismiss employees from the service of the State. The right of appeal to the Commission is given every employee from any action of the Director or appointing authority. The Sections of the Act which are invoked by the complainant read as follows:

'Section 32. Be it further enacted, That an appointing authority may suspend without pay a regular employee for disciplinary purposes for such length of time as he considers appropriate not exceeding thirty days in any twelve month period. With the approval of the Director a regular employee may be suspended for a longer period pending the investigation or trial of any charges against him.

'Section 33. Be it further enacted, That an appointing authority may dismiss any regular employee in his division when he considers that the good of the service will be served thereby. No dismissal of a regular employee shall take effect unless at least ten days before the effective date thereof the appointing authority gives notice to such employee and files a written statement with the Director. The employee shall have an opportunity to file with the appointing authority a written statement regarding the proposed dismissal, copy of which shall be filed with the Director. A regular employee who is dismissed shall have the right to appeal to the Commission in the manner provided under Section 34 of this Act. If the Director determines that the statement of reasons for a dismissal given by the appointing authority shows that such dismissal does not reflect discredit on the employee dismissed, the name of such employee shall, if he so requests, be placed on the appropriate reemployment list or lists.

'Section 34. Be it further enacted, That any regular employee who is dismissed or demoted may appeal to the Commission within fifteen days after such action is taken. Upon such appeal, both the...