Hill v. County of Gila, Civil 4251
| Decision Date | 25 November 1940 |
| Docket Number | Civil 4251 |
| Citation | 107 P.2d 377,56 Ariz. 317 |
| Parties | GEORGE M. HILL, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF GILA, State of Arizona, a Body Politic and Corporate, Appellee |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Gila. C. C. Faires, Judge. Judgment affirmed.
Mr. D E. Rienhardt and Mr. George M. Hill, for Appellant.
Mr Edward Y. Weeks, County Attorney, for Appellee.
Mr. Ben C. Hill, Amicus Curiae.
On March 12, 1938, the plaintiff, George M. Hill, offered to purchase of the county treasurer of Gila County the state's tax certificate of purchase, covering lot 5 block 77, Globe Townsite, and tendered in payment thereof the sum of $415.36 plus $216.44, being interest at 10 per cent. Per annum on the amount for which the property sold to the state, to date of tender. At the same time he tendered such treasurer the additional sum of $1,530.56, the full amount of subsequent taxes, without any interest, and fifty cents for making the assignment. The treasurer refused to accept the tender and demanded the additional sum of $395.07, being interest at 10 per cent. per annum on subsequent taxes, as a condition precedent to the assignment of the certificate.
Thereafter plaintiff paid the county treasurer the sum of $2,557.43, being the total of the above sums, for the state's certificate of purchase and subsequent taxes, but he paid the $395.07 under protest, claiming it was in excess of the amount the law required him to pay. This action was brought against Gila County to recover such sum, and whether plaintiff should succeed involves the construction of certain parts of the revenue laws of the state. The lower court was of the opinion plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and this appeal is prosecuted from a judgment to that effect.
The question is controlled by sections 15-58, chapter 103, Laws of 1931, and amendments thereto, prescribing the procedure for the collection of delinquent taxes. Section 20 thereof provides that the county treasurer shall sell, at public sale, real property of his county for delinquent taxes and charges and, in the absence of bids for the property by private parties, that it shall be struck off to the state "for the amount of such taxes, interest, penalties, and charges" and that "a certificate of purchase, as provided in other cases" shall issue to the state. It was under the provisions of this section that the state, in 1932, acquired the certificate in question.
Section 25 provides that when the property is sold to the state the rate of interest on redemption shall be in all cases 10 per cent. per annum and in other cases the interest shall be at the rate agreed upon by the purchaser, but in no event more than 15 per cent.
Section 29 provides that the certificate of purchase shall recite the amount of all taxes, interest, penalties and charges for which the property was sold, together with the rate of interest payable thereon in order to redeem, and further provides that the purchaser, whether the state or a person, may assign the certificate and all rights thereunder.
Section 30 makes it the duty of the county treasurer, when the holder of a tax certificate desires "to pay any subsequent taxes," to "endorse thereon the amount of such subsequent taxes paid."
Section 31 makes it the duty of the county treasurer, when property is sold to the state, to sell and assign the certificate to any person who will pay him "the whole amount then due under such certificate, including interest, penalties and charges" and "in addition pay the whole amount of any subsequent taxes assessed... and the further sum of fifty cents for making each such assignment."
Plaintiff's contention is that the phrase in section 31, "the whole amount of any subsequent taxes assessed," means without any interest, penalties or charges and that he was relieved thereby from paying anything except the taxes, interest, penalties and charges of the certificate assigned to him and any subsequent taxes.
The county attorney contends that other provisions of the revenue laws show that it was not intended by such language to exempt the assignee of the state's certificate from paying interest on delinquent taxes but that such assignee is required to pay such interest just as any other investor in tax certificates is required to do.
We think the phrase "subsequent taxes" as used in sections 30 and 31 means the same thing. Accepting that as true, we turn to section 37 and find that when the owner, his agent, assignee or attorney, or any person having a legal or equitable claim in the taxed property, or who has purchased the property for taxes on a different date and received a certificate of purchase wants to redeem, he may do so
"by payment to the county treasurer of the amount for which such real property was sold, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the certificate of purchase, together with the amount of all taxes accruing on such real estate after the sale and paid by the purchaser and endorsed on such certificate of purchase, with interest on such subsequent taxes at the rate of ten per cent per annum; provided, that all statutory fees paid by the purchaser or his assigns in connection with such certificate shall be added to the amount payable on redemption and shall bear interest at the rate of interest specified in such certificate except as changed by this act." (Italics ours.)
The phrase "subsequent taxes" is, in effect, construed to mean "all taxes accruing... after the sale when paid by the purchaser and endorsed on such certificate of purchase," and it is provided that interest shall be paid by the redemptioner on such sums, together with the statutory fees. If any of the persons entitled to redeem should exercise that right under this section, he would be compelled to pay plaintiff 10 per cent. on any taxes paid by plaintiff as assignee of the state, or at the rate specified in the certificate if sold to a private investor. It is quite apparent that the provisions of section 37 apply to redemptioners from the state as well as from private investors, for it states that the rate of interest shall be as stated in chapter 103 and not as stated in chapter 46 Laws of...
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