Hill v. Fairfield Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC
Decision Date | 28 June 2013 |
Docket Number | 1090549. |
Citation | 134 So.3d 396 |
Parties | Myrtis HILL v. FAIRFIELD NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Barry W. Walker of Walker, LLC, Birmingham, for appellant.
Sybil Vogtle Newton, Reed R. Bates, and Kelley M. Tynes of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, Birmingham, for appellees.
H. Lanier Brown of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, filed brief on application for rehearing, for appellees.
Matthew C. McDonald of Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrère & Denègre, L.L.P., Mobile; and Richard Brockman, Angela C. Cameron, and Monica Nelson Fischer of Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose LLP, Birmingham, for amici curiae Alabama Civil Justice Reform Committee, the Alabama Nursing Home Association, and the Alliance for Long–Term Care Quality Improvement, in support of the appellees' application for rehearing.
On Application for Rehearing
The opinion of October 19, 2012, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.
Myrtis Hill 1 sued the following entities and individuals in the Jefferson Circuit Court: Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC (“Fairfield”); D & N, LLC (“D & N”); DTD HC, LLC (“DTD”); Donald T. Denz; Norbert A. Bennett; Aurora Cares, LLC (alleged to be doing business, and herein sometimes referred to, as “Tara Cares”); and Aurora Healthcare, LLC (collectively referred to as “the defendants”).2 Hill stated claims based upon the Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6–5–540 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the AMLA”), arising out of the fact that she suffered a broken leg while being helped out of bed by a nursing assistant at a nursing home owned and operated by Fairfield (“Fairfield Nursing Home”). Before trial, on motion of the defendants, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of all the defendants except Fairfield. At trial, at the conclusion of Hill's case-in-chief, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Fairfield. Hill appeals the judgments of the trial court as to all the defendants. We reverse.
At the time of the events at issue, Hill was an 85–year–old resident of Fairfield Nursing Home, a 190–bed skilled-nursing facility owned and operated by Fairfield. In the late 1970s, Hill had a stroke that resulted in paralysis in her left side. She was admitted to Fairfield Nursing Home in 1992 after suffering a broken ankle in a fall at her daughter's house.
On May 10, 2006, Hill was being helped out of her bed at the nursing home by LaShaka Smith, a certified nursing assistant, when she lost strength in her legs and either fell or was lowered to the ground by Smith. During that event, her left leg was bent backward and hit the bed. After Hill complained of pain, she was sent to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital for evaluation and was diagnosed with a broken leg.
Hill subsequently initiated this action, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for her injury. The gravamen of her claims is that her broken leg was caused by the failure of Fairfield employees to use proper safety measures when transferring her from her bed. The claims against Fairfield were based on this alleged negligence. The claims against the other defendants were based, among other things, upon Hill's claim that Fairfield served as the alter ego of those other defendants and that the “corporate veil” between those defendants and Fairfield should be “pierced.” A more complete discussion of facts pertinent to this latter claim is set out in Part III.C., below.
In response to a motion for a summary judgment filed by the defendants, Hill made an extensive evidentiary submission to the trial court. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the defendants' summary-judgment motion. Subsequently, the defendants moved the trial court to reconsider its denial of their summary-judgment motion. Hill again opposed the motion; however, this time the trial court granted the summary-judgment motion in part, entering a summary judgment in favor of all the defendants except Fairfield. The trial court did not explain the rationale for its ruling.
The case against Fairfield proceeded to trial. Over the course of a week, the jury heard testimony from Hill; Hill's son, Fred Hill; Janie Dawson, director of nursing at Fairfield Nursing Home; Dr. David Volgas, who treated Hill's leg after the accident; and Toya Nelson, a registered nurse who testified as an expert regarding the applicable standard of care. After Hill concluded her case, Fairfield moved for a judgment as a matter of law, arguing, among other things, that Hill had failed to establish by way of expert testimony from a similarly situated health-care provider that the applicable standard of care had been breached. Fairfield also argued that Hill had failed to establish that the transfer from her bed probably caused her injury. The trial court orally granted the motion and entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Fairfield that same day. Hill subsequently moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its judgment. The trial court denied that motion, and Hill appealed.
Hill argues that the trial court erred both by entering a summary judgment in favor of all the defendants except Fairfield on November 13, 2009, and by entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Fairfield at the conclusion of Hill's case-in-chief on November 23, 2009.
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038–39 (Ala.2004).
“
“Alabama Power Co. v. Aldridge, 854 So.2d 554, 560 (Ala.2002).”
“The plaintiff in a medical-malpractice action is required to present substantial evidence indicating both that the defendant health-care provider ‘failed to comply with the standard of care and that such failure probably caused the injury or death in question.’ ” Mobile OB–GYN, P.C. v. Baggett, 25 So.3d 1129, 1133 (Ala.2009) (quoting § 6–5–549, Ala.Code 1975). On appeal, Hill argues that, during the presentation of her case-in-chief, she adduced substantial evidence indicating that Smith breached the standard of care applicable to Hill's treatment and that her breach proximately caused Hill's injury. The defendants counter that Hill established neither a breach of the standard of care nor causation. These issues are discussed in Parts III.A. and III.B., below.
Hill also challenges on appeal the trial court's summary judgment as to the defendants other than Fairfield, which requires us to examine the evidence submitted by Hill in support of her claim that the “corporate veil” between Fairfield and the other defendants should be “pierced.” This issue is addressed in Part III.C., below.3
We turn first to the question whether Hill established a breach of the standard of care.
In cases brought under the AMLA, the plaintiff generally must establish through expert testimony that there has been a breach of the standard of care; “such expert testimony is allowed only from a ‘similarly situated health care provider.’ ” Holcomb v. Carraway, 945 So.2d 1009, 1012 (Ala.2006). Section 6–5–548(b), Ala.Code 1975, states that a “similarly situated health care provider” is one who meets all the following qualifications:
“(1) Is licensed by the appropriate regulatory board or agency of this or some other state.
“(2) Is trained and experienced in the same discipline or school of practice.
“(3) Has practiced in the same discipline or school of practice during the year preceding the date that the alleged breach of the standard of care occurred.”
At trial, Hill sought to establish a breach of the standard of care through testimony from her expert witness Nelson, a registered nurse since 1997, who had worked in skilled-nursing facilities and who had supervised both certified nursing assistants and licensed practical nurses. In her brief to this Court, Hill summarizes Nelson's testimony as follows:
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