Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc.

• Citation: 394 P.3d 390,198 Wash.App. 326
• Decision Date: 27 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. 74617-1-I,74617-1-I
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lawrence HILL, Adam Wise, and Robert Miller, on their own behalves and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Respondents, v. GARDA CL NORTHWEST, INC., f/k/a AT Systems Northwest, Inc., a Washington corporation, Appellant.

198 Wash.App. 326

394 P.3d 390

Lawrence HILL, Adam Wise, and Robert Miller, on their own behalves and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Respondents,

v.GARDA CL NORTHWEST, INC., f/k/a AT Systems Northwest, Inc., a Washington corporation, Appellant.

No. 74617-1-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED: March 27, 2017

Clarence M. Belnavis, Catharine M. Morisset, Fisher & Phillips LLP, 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2750, Seattle, WA, 98101-3274, Alexander A. Wheatley, Attorney at Law, 111 S.W., 5th Ave., Ste. 4040, Portland, OR, 97204-3643, for Appellant.

Daniel Foster Johnson, Breskin Johnson & Townsend PLLC, 1000 Second Avenue, Suite 3670, Seattle, WA, 98104, Adam J. Berger, Martin S. Garfinkel, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, 810 3rd Ave., Ste. 500, Seattle, WA, 98104-1657, for Respondents.

Trickey, A.C.J.¶1 In this class action case, the Plaintiffs, nearly 500 employees of Garda CL Northwest, Inc. (Garda), an armored vehicle company, successfully sued Garda for denying them meal periods and rest breaks guaranteed under Washington's Industrial Welfare Act, chapter 49.12 RCW, and Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW. The trial court awarded the Plaintiffs double damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees. Garda appeals the trial court's certification of the class, denial of its motions for summary judgment, grant of the Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion on liability, award of double damages, award of prejudgment interest, and use of a lodestar to multiply the Plaintiffs' attorney fee award.

¶2 Garda contends that the trial court abused its discretion by certifying the class without making a clear record of its reasons or considering the criteria of CR 23. We hold that the trial court's order was sufficient because it identified the common question that predominated and explained why a class action was superior to individual actions.

¶3 Garda argues that the trial court erred by concluding that neither the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) nor section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempts the Plaintiffs' claims. We hold that the FAAAA does not preempt the Plaintiffs' claims because complying with Washington law would not have had a significant impact on Garda's operations if Garda had sought a variance. We also hold that section 301 of the LMRA does not preempt the Plaintiffs' claims because the Plaintiffs' rights are independent and non-negotiable, and we do not have to interpret the Plaintiffs' various collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with Garda in order to resolve the issue.

¶4 Garda maintains that the trial court erred by granting the Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion on Garda's liability for failing to provide meal periods and rest breaks. It argues that the Plaintiffs' waived their right to meal periods when they acknowledged their CBAs, which purported to contain waivers. Because the Plaintiffs could not waive their meal periods through a CBA, we hold that acknowledging their CBAs did not constitute a waiver. Garda argues further that questions of material fact remain whether the Plaintiffs were able to take rest breaks. We hold that Garda's own testimony and materials established that there was a policy against taking true breaks. Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment on Garda's liability.

¶5 Garda also argues that the court erred by awarding double damages for the missed meal periods because those are not wage violations and Garda's conduct was not willful. We hold that failing to provide meal breaks is a wage violation, but agree that Garda's conduct was not willful. Therefore, we reverse the award of double damages for the meal period violations.

¶6 Garda also argues that the court should not have awarded prejudgment interest for any damages for which it awarded double damages. Because prejudgment interest is not available when the plaintiff receives punitive damages, such as double damages, we reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the rest break damages.

¶7 Finally, Garda contends that the trial court abused its discretion by applying a 1.5 lodestar multiplier to the Plaintiffs' attorney fee award. This multiplier was reasonable given the risks of the case and the fact that the Plaintiffs' attorneys took the case on a contingency basis. We affirm.

FACTS

¶8 Garda is an armored truck company that picks up, transports, and delivers currency and other valuables. Each truck has a two-person crew, consisting of a driver and a messenger. The truck routes vary in length and number of stops, with some requiring as long as 10 hours to complete.

¶9 Garda operates branches in seven cities in Washington: Seattle, Tacoma, Mount Vernon, Wenatchee, Yakima, Spokane, and Pasco. Company-wide policies, applicable to all Washington branches, include rules for ensuring the safety and security of the truck, the crew, and the valuables. The policies require Garda drivers and messengers to be alert at all times and prohibit Garda employees from bringing personal cell phones or reading materials on the trucks.

¶10 Most branches have their own managers. Each branch has its own drivers association, which negotiates CBAs on behalf of that branch's employees. A large percentage of Garda employees signed acknowledgments of their branches' CBAs.

¶11 Each CBA had one of the following provisions regarding meal breaks:

• "[R]outes will be scheduled without a designated lunch break." ^[1]

• "Employees hereto agree to an on-duty meal period." ^[2]

• "The Employees hereto waive any meal period(s) to which they would otherwise be entitled." ^[3]

¶12 Garda employees often go to the bathroom or buy food and beverages while on their routes, but do not take official meal breaks. Garda managers agree that, because of the dangerous nature of their work, all Garda employees must maintain some level of alertness during the entirety of their routes.

¶13 In February 2009, three Garda employees, Lawrence Hill, Adam Wise, and Robert Miller, sued Garda, alleging that Garda did not provide them with legally sufficient rest breaks or meal periods, in violation of the Washington Industrial Welfare Act, chapter 49.12 RCW, and the Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW. They moved for class certification, which the trial court granted in July 2010.

¶14 The class consists of nearly 500 current and former Garda employees (collectively, the Plaintiffs) who worked for Garda between February 11, 2006, and February 7, 2015. The court appointed Hill, Wise, and Miller as the named representatives of the class. Garda moved to compel arbitration under the terms of the CBAs, but the Washington Supreme Court held that the arbitration procedures were unconscionable and remanded the case back to the trial court in September 2013.⁴

¶15 Garda moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Plaintiffs' claims were preempted by section 301 of the LMRA or, in the alternative, that the Plaintiffs had waived their right to meal breaks through their CBAs. The trial court denied Garda's motion.

¶16 In December 2014, Garda received permission to amend its answer to add the affirmative defense that the FAAAA preempted the Plaintiffs' claims. Garda moved for summary judgment on this preemption argument and the trial court denied it. Garda then moved unsuccessfully to decertify the class.

¶17 The Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and their entitlement to double damages. The trial court granted the motion as to liability but denied summary judgment on double damages.

¶18 In June 2015, the case proceeded to a bench trial on the issue of damages and, in September, to a trial on double damages. In October, the court found for the Plaintiffs, awarding $4,209,596.61 in back pay damages, $1,668,235.62 in double damages, and $2,350,255.63 in prejudgment interest. In December, the trial court awarded the Plaintiffs $1,127,734.50 in attorney fees, after applying a 1.5 lodestar multiplier.

¶19 Garda appeals.

ANALYSIS

Class Certification

¶20 Garda argues that the trial court erred by certifying the class and denying its motion to decertify the class. It contends that the trial court oversimplified the case and neglected to weigh individual questions against common questions. We disagree. The trial court's order certifying the class identified the overriding question for this case as whether Garda had provided legally-sufficient rest breaks and meal periods to all class members. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

¶21 Civil Rule 23 governs class actions. Individuals "may sue or be sued" as representatives of a class if

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

CR 23(a).

¶22 Additionally, to maintain a class action, the court must find "that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." CR 23(b)(3).⁵

¶23 "This court reviews a trial court's decision to certify a class for [an] abuse of discretion." Miller v. Farmer Bros. Co. , 115 Wash.App. 815, 820, 64 P.3d 49 (2003). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Miller , 115 Wash.App. at 820, 64 P.3d 49. "The court must articulate on the record each of the CR 23 factors for its decision on the certification issue." Schwendeman v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. , 116 Wash.App. 9, 19, 65 P.3d 1 (2003). We review class decisions "liberally" and will "err in favor of certifying a class." Miller , 115 Wash.App. at 820, 64 P.3d 49.

¶24 In Miller , the trial court certified the class but did not make...