Hill v. Groesbeck

• Decision Date: 24 December 1901
• Citation: 29 Colo. 161,67 P. 167
• Parties: HILL v. GROESBECK et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

67 P. 167

29 Colo. 161

HILL v. GROESBECK et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December 24, 1901

Appeal from district court, Arapahoe county.

Action by Mollie E. Groesbeck and others against Helen Hill. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.

This cause, now pending under the title of 'Hill v. Groesbeck et al.,' is here for the second time. Upon the first appeal it was entitled 'Anderson v. Groesbeck et al.' This change is accounted for by the fact that since the former appeal Mrs. Anderson has, by marriage, become Mrs Hill. When here before, the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs was reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. Anderson v. Groesbeck, 26 Colo. 3, 55 P 1086. In accordance with the explicit instructions then given, the last trial was had upon the original complaint and the amended answer. Stated briefly, the complaint alleges that to one Thomas G. Anderson, a member of the Covenant Mutual Life Association of Illinois, was issued a life policy for $5,000, payable, in case of his death, to Helen Anderson the defendant in this action; that afterwards, and shortly before the death of Mr. Anderson, he desired to make the beneficiaries therein William W. Anderson and Mollie E Groesbeck, each to the extent of $2,000, and Helen Anderson, his wife, to the extent of $1,000, which change was then authorized by the by-laws of the association upon surrender and cancellation of the original policy; that, to carry out such object, Mr. Anderson, by his deed in writing, took such steps as were within his power to cause such substitution to be made, but defendant, having possession of the policy, refused, on demand, to surrender it, and because of such refusal prevented the actual consummation of the intended change, yet by reason of the premises the plaintiffs herein are, in equity, cobeneficiaries in such policy to the extent indicated. Defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint, and set forth three separate defenses: (1) That she had a vested interest in the policy as the result of an antenuptial agreement, by the terms of which the insured promised to make her sole beneficiary if she would marry him, which she did, and thereafter he carried out his promise; (2) that an executed gift of the same was made to her by her husband; (3) that through fraud and misrepresentation practiced by plaintiffs upon Mr. Anderson, the insured, the attempted change of beneficiaries was made. The trial was to the court without a jury, and resulted in findings in favor of plaintiffs, that there was no such antenuptial agreement or gift as alleged, and that plaintiffs were not guilty of the fraud. Having thus found the issues of fact in favor of plaintiffs, and it further appearing that the association had theretofore paid into the registry of the court the entire proceeds of the policy, and that $1,000 thereof, conceded to belong to defendant, had been paid to her, judgment was given in favor of the plaintiffs for, and they were adjudged to be the owners of, the $4,000, the balance remaining. From that judgment the defendant is here by appeal.

Wm. B. Morrison, for appellant.

Joseph N. Baxter and Doud & Fowler, for appellees.

CAMPBELL C.J. (after stating the facts).

There are several considerations which move us to reverse the judgment, and others that require us to go further, and direct a judgment for defendant.

1. Plaintiffs have no rights except under the alleged appointment by Thomas G. Anderson, and if, for any reason, that is invalid, they are not entitled to recover. In Love v. Clune, 24 Colo. 237, 50 P. 34, Mr. Justice Goddard in speaking for the court, said: 'Upon examination of the numerous cases cited wherein the general doctrine is announced that the beneficiaries acquire no vested interest in policies issued by mutual benefit associations until the death of the insured, and may be changed at any time the latter may elect, we find that such change was expressly authorized by the policy under consideration, or by the laws of the association issuing it; and among those passing directly upon the question before us we think the greater number and better-reasoned cases favor the rule that in the absence of any provision upon the subject the beneficiary named cannot be displaced without his or her consent, and that there is no inherent difference between mutual benefit associations and ordinary life insurance companies in regard to the right to change the beneficiary.' The policy itself contained no provision for a change of beneficiary. The plaintiffs introduced in evidence, without objection from defendant, a by-law, which permits a member to change a beneficiary designated in his policy contract without the latter's consent. There is no evidence as to the time when this by-law was passed, or that it was in force at the time of the attempted change. In the absence of any such provision in force at the time the attempted change...