Hill v. Moore

• Decision Date: 09 December 1884
• Docket Number: Case No. 825.
• Citation: 62 Tex. 610
• Parties: MARTHA E. HILL ET AL. v. GEO. F. MOORE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

62 Tex. 610

MARTHA E. HILL ET AL.

v.GEO. F. MOORE.

Case No. 825.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Dec. 9, 1884.

APPEAL from Denton. Tried below before the Hon. A. T. Watts?? Special Judge.

J. A. Carroll and Sawnie Robertson, for appellants, cited: Pasch. Dig., art. 4642; Babb v. Carroll, 21 Tex., 768; Yancey v. Batte, 4?? Tex., 46; Stone v. Brown, 54 Tex., 330;Glasscock v. Hughes, 55 Tex., 461;Dodd v. Arnold, 28 Tex., 100;Titus v. Johnson, 50 Tex., 238.

W. S. Herndon, also for appellants, cited: Brackett v. Devine, 25 Tex. Sup., 194; Tucker v. Brackett, 28 Tex., 336;Wheeler v. Selvidge, 30 Tex., 407;Parker v. Parker, 10 Tex., 97;Robinson v. McDonald, 11 Tex., 390;Kirkland v. Little, 41 Tex., 456;Conner v. Huff, 48 Tex., 364;Cooper v. Singleton, 19 Tex., 267;Good v. Combs, 28 Tex., 50;Burleson v. Burleson, 28 Tex., 418, and other cases.

B. S. & Jno. M. Moore, for appellee, cited: McAlpine v. Burnett, 23 Tex., 649;Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 20 Tex., 237; Long v. Walker, 47 Tex., 172; Walters v. Jewett, 28 Tex., 192;Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Tex., 599;Rippetoe v. Dwyer, 49 Tex., 506;Wethered v. Boon, 17 Tex., 143; Sexton v. Magill, 2 La. Ann., 110, and other cases.

Geo. F. Moore, also for appellee, filed an argument.

STAYTON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE.

This is an action of trespass to try title, brought by appellants, to recover an undivided one-half of a tract of land described by metes and bounds in the petition.

The answer consists of a general demurrer and the plea of “not guilty.”

The cause was tried without a jury, and a judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, who is here the appellee.

The entire statement of facts on which the cause was tried is as follows:

“R. R. Jowell and Martha P. Ragsdale married in Texas in A. D. 1835; that they lived together in this state in Cherokee county, as husband and wife, until her death in the fall of 1848; that she left, surviving, her husband and one child of said marriage, Mary Ann, who was born October 20, 1836. She married F. M. Hill, February 12, 1852, and died March 10, 1872, leaving, as her heirs, her husband, F. M. Hill, and the other plaintiffs herein. At the death of Martha P. she owned a lot of slaves in her own right, and she and her husband owned, as community property, the certificate by virtue of which the land in controversy was located; that after the death of his wife, R. R. Jowell, without qualifying as administrator, or otherwise, upon her estate, sold and conveyed the certificate (less six hundred and forty acres) to George W. Copeland on the 17th day of December, 1852; it was conveyed by the said George W. Copeland to Jesse Duren on November 9, 1854; that Jowell, on the 20th day of May, 1856, conveyed the entire certificate directly to the said Jesse Duren; that Jesse Duren, on the 16th day of October, 1856, conveyed the certificate and the land in controversy upon which it had then been located to the defendant George F. Moore, for the sum of $3,000 in money to him paid by the defendant, that being the full value of the property at that time; that defendant, very soon after his purchase, caused an error in the survey to be corrected, and applied for and obtained a patent to himself as assignee, dated November 29, 1856; that, at the time of his purchase, and the issuance of said patent, defendant lived in Travis county, Texas, and had no actual knowledge of any defect in his title, or any claim of Mary Ann Hill or of these plaintiffs; that, at the death of Martha P., there was no community debts owing by R. R. Jowell; that he sold the certificate and applied the proceeds to his individual use and benefit, and that neither the plaintiffs nor Mary Ann Hill ever received anything from the community estate of R. R. Jowell and Martha P. Jowell.”

From this statement it will be seen that the appellants claim as heirs, by virtue of the community interest which the wife of R. R. Jowell held in the land certificate through which the land was acquired.

That the certificate was the common property of R. R. Jowell and his wife, at the time of her death, is an admitted fact; and that her interest therein at the time of her death passed to her daughter, whose heirs the appellants are, cannot be denied; and on this right they base their right to recover.

It will be further seen from the statement that the defense is based on the ground that the appellee was a bona fide purchaser for value paid, without notice of any right which the heirs of Mrs. Jowell had.

Claiming as the appellants do, they show no such title as would enable them to maintain an action at law to recover any part of the land sued for.

The appellee has the legal title, and that in a court of law would prevail; but under the system of laws and procedure in force in this state, an action of trespass to try title may be maintained upon an equitable title; by which is meant any right in land inferior to the legal title, such as a court of equity, as distinguished from a court of law, in the exercise of its well recognized powers would enforce.

It then becomes necessary to inquire whether, under the facts of this case, a court of equity would extend to the appellants the relief they ask.

The case is in no manner affected by the laws regulating registration, and must be determined by the rules applicable to the rights of a bona fide purchaser as they are enforced and protected in courts of equity.

It is a well recognized doctrine in equity, that a bona fide purchaser of the legal title to property, who pays a valuable consideration therefor, without notice, actual or constructive, of the right of other persons is entitled to protection against others who may have equitable title to or interest in the thing purchased; and it matters not whether the thing purchased be real or personal property. Story's Eq., 409, 435, 436; Pomeroy's Eq., 735-785; Bispham's Principles of Equity, 328; Perry on Trusts, 218; Johnson v. Newman, 43 Tex., 641;Flanagan v. Pearson, 50 Tex., 383; 2 Sugden on Vendors (7th Am. ed.), 507, 526; Basset v. Nosworthy, 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq., 2. In the notes to the elementary works referred to cases are fully cited.

That no one can ordinarily pass greater title than he has to personal property does not militate against this rule; for if one have the legal title to such property, in which others have an equitable title or interest, he may pass the legal title which he has,...