Hill v. Moseley
| Decision Date | 10 December 1941 |
| Docket Number | 388. |
| Citation | 17 S.E.2d 676,220 N.C. 485 |
| Parties | HILL v. MOSELEY et ux. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for an injury sustained through the attack of a vicious bull harbored or kept by defendants on the premises where plaintiff was required to work. The alleged negligence consisted in exposing plaintiff to attack by the animal whose vicious propensities were known, or should have been known to defendants but of which plaintiff was unaware.
The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff tends to show that defendants owned a farm as tenants by entirety, and thereon conducted farming operations and a dairy and owned a herd of cattle, among them the Guernsey bull whose conduct gave rise to this action.
Plaintiff a lad of thirteen years, living on the Moseley farm, had been employed by Moseley previously, and on the day before had been assisting in bailing oats. Moseley told him to return next day, which he did, and was then told by Moseley to help the milkman, Lee Garris, whereupon plaintiff reported to Garris and asked him "what was his job". Garris told him the first thing was to put the cows out of the lot into the pasture, and to drive them out of the lot. The lot contained the bull and forty or fifty cows and opened through a gate into a lane which led to the pasture a quarter of a mile away. The plaintiff entered the lot to open the gate and drive the herd through, as he was told to do, with the following result: "I heard something behind me and looked and he was about as close to me as from me to where the Judge is sitting, about 1 1/2 yards; he was coming about as fast as he could, I guess, charging."
Testimony as to the vicious disposition of the bull came principally from those who had been tenants on the farm and who had observed his habits. One who had previously handled the bull for defendants testified that he was dangerous, that he had had to jump the fence to get out of the way when the bull tried to attack him, that he had been compelled to use a pitchfork on him to make him move off, and that Mr. Moseley saw how he had to handle him. Mrs. Moseley told him to kill the bull rather than let the animal hurt him.
There was further testimony from former tenants on the farm that the bull was "mean and bad" both by reputation and in fact, and that "he would fight you"; that on one occasion a bulldog had to be put after him to protect a man plowing in the field; that one tenant deemed it necessary to stand guard while his wife did the family washing; that the bull had attacked a tenant house and torn away the steps, "hooked the garden posts off and hooked the chimney, and you could feel the jar of it in the sitting room and then he went around to the front room and started to go in there and I went around to the end room and Mrs. Wells told me to shoot him and I shot him." The load was No. 6 shot and did no serious damage.
Witnesses testified that they had told Mr. and Mrs. Moseley of the dangerous character of the animal, and asked that he be kept up.
There was evidence of the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, medical and surgical experts pronouncing it permanent.
The defendants, in apt time, made motions for judgment as of nonsuit, for the denial of which they excepted. Issues having been answered in favor of plaintiff, judgment was rendered thereon, and defendants excepted and appealed, assigning errors.
Sutton & Greene, of Kinston, for appellants.
J. A. Jones, of Kinston, for appellee.
One who keeps on his premises a domestic animal of known vicious propensity is responsible in law to another whom he has wrongfully exposed to danger of attack by such animal, and who has been injured thereby. Harris v. Fisher, 115 N.C. 318, 20 S.E. 461, 44 Am.St.Rep. 452; Harper, The Law of Torts (1933) § 175; 2 Cooley, The Law of Torts, 4th Ed.1932, § 267; 2 Am.Jur. § 63.
Under most authorities, injuries to persons by domestic animals whose vicious propensities are known to the keeper are classified as strict torts without reference to the principles governing negligence cases. Harper, Torts, § 171, p. 358; 1 Hale's P.C. 439, part I, c. 33, "If notice of viciousness is present the owner of animals is liable irrespective of negligence or care on his part in keeping the animal. ***" Harper, Torts, § 171, p. 359. Strict liability obtains under this doctrine although the invasion of interest is unintended and non-negligent. But we do not wish to become involved in a doctrinal discussion of distinctions which may lose their aptness according to the circumstances of the particular case when not involved on the record before us. Hence, we need not now discuss or decide the extent to which this doctrine is applied in this State. See Banks v. Maxwell, 205 N.C. 233, 171 S.E. 70, and Rector v. Southern Coal Co., 192 N.C. 804, 136 S.E. 113. In the instant case a distinction may be drawn from the fact that the animal was under proper confinement and plaintiff was sent into the enclosure and exposed to the danger by defendant's servant in charge.
The great and affectionately remembered Brogden, in his classic opinion in Banks v. Maxwell, supra, [205 N.C. 233 171 S.E. 71], lays down the requisites establishing liability as follows: ' Applicable to the case at bar, we may add that...
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