Hill v. Noland

Decision Date20 June 1912
Citation149 S.W. 288
PartiesHILL et al. v. NOLAND et al.<SMALL><SUP>†</SUP></SMALL>
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from District Court, Harrison County; H. T. Lyttleton, Judge.

Action by Tom Hill and others against Patsy Noland and others. From a judgment sustaining a general demurrer to the petition, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

See, also, 147 S. W. 365.

The court sustained a general demurrer to the petition, and the appeal is to revise the ruling. According to the petition Mack Noland died intestate and without any children, but left surviving him his wife, Patsy Noland, the appellee, and the appellants, who are his brothers and sisters. Patsy Noland and her husband owned and at his death were in possession of certain community realty, which is the property in controversy. The brothers and sisters filed this suit against the wife for title and possession and to remove the cloud from the title of a one-half undivided interest in this community property of deceased and Patsy Noland. It was alleged that Patsy Noland had murdered and procured to be murdered her husband, Mack Noland, in September, 1910, for the sole purpose of investing herself with the title to his property, and for that reason the community interest of Mack Noland did not pass and descend to her, but the title and right to possession passed and descended to the brothers and sisters as sole remaining next of kin.

Jones & Bibb, M. P. McGee, and P. M. Young, all of Marshall, for appellants. Beard & Davidson and Young & Abney, all of Marshall, for appellees.

LEVY, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The petition admits that Patsy Noland is the wife of Mack Noland, deceased, and that the property in controversy was their community estate, and that there was no child of the marriage, and that the deceased left no will. Appellants admittedly rely for title and the right to possession to the one-half undivided interest of Mack Noland, deceased, and upon the further allegation that the wife murdered or procured to be murdered her husband for the sole purpose of investing herself with the title to his one-half of the property.

Assuming, as we must, that the facts alleged are true, the question arises as to whether the wife is barred from inheriting her husband's interest in the community estate, to which she would otherwise be entitled, on the ground that her crime disabled her to take his interest in the property. The devolution of property is regulated by statute. Article 1696 of the Revised Civil Statutes provides that upon dissolution of the marriage relation by death all property belonging to the community estate of the husband and wife shall go to the survivor if there be no children or their descendants. The article in plain and unambiguous language designates the person to whom the estate shall descend eo instanti upon the happening of death, and there is neither condition nor exception debarring or forfeiting the estate or the right of succession to the wife or husband. As the rule of inheritance is explicit and imperative, and the statute contains no hint that the wife is to be excluded on account of crime or misconduct, the courts would not be warranted in reading into the statute a clause disinheriting her for her alleged crime. For a court to ingraft an exception upon the statute would be judicial legislation. The penalties for felonious homicide are...

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8 cases
  • Duncan's Estates, In re
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 24 Julio 1952
    ...St. 668, 44 N.E. 1134; Inre Johnson's Estate, 29 Pa.Super. 255; Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637, 29 L.R.A. 145; Hill v. Noland, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W. 288; Murchison v. Murchison, Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W. 423; Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okl. 1, 136 P. 1111, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 536; DeGr......
  • Mitchell v. Akers
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 18 Febrero 1966
    ...who was an heir of his victim, did not forfeit his right but would inherit his part of the property of the deceased. Hill v. Noland, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W. 288; Murchison v. Murchison, Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W. 423. However, later decisions hold that without contravening or circumventing the c......
  • Reagan v. Brown
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • 7 Julio 1955
    ...1895, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637, 29 L.R.A. 145, 50 Am.St.Rep. 765; In re Johnson's Estate, 1905, 29 Pa.Super. 255; Texas.--Hill v. Noland, 1912, Tex.Civ.App. 149 S.W. 288; Washington.--In re Duncan's Estates, 1952, 40 Wash.2d 850, 246 P.2d 445, 39 A.L.R.2d It is stated at page 483, of said ann......
  • Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 22 Junio 1949
    ...the same terms as Art. 2574, R.C.S., referred to in the Murchison case. Restatement of the Law, supra, Sec. 187, Comment c; Hill v. Noland, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W. 288, wr.ref., does not require a different conclusion. In that case, incidentally, the more modern view of imposing a constructi......
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