Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1949
• Docket Number: No. A-2155.,A-2155.
• Citation: 221 S.W.2d 857
• Parties: GREER et al. v. FRANKLIN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 857

221 S.W.2d 857

GREER et al. v. FRANKLIN LIFE INS. CO.

No. A-2155.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 22, 1949.

Rehearing Denied July 20, 1949.

Error to the Court of Civil Appeals of Sixth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by Gladys Greer Nobles, joined by her husband, Hamp Nobles, for herself and as agent for her brothers, against the Franklin Life Insurance Company and Margaret Faye Greer to recover on a life policy, wherein Margaret Faye Greer filed a cross-action to recover on a life policy, and wherein the Franklin Life Insurance Company filed a bill of interpleader. From the judgment, all parties appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part and rendered it in part, 219 S.W.2d 137, and Margaret Faye Greer and others bring error.

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and rendered in part and affirmed in part.

Florence & Florence, Gilmer, D. S. Meredith, Jr., Longview, for Margaret F. Greer, petitioner.

Mat Davis, Gilmer, Robert M. Sikes, and Sam B. Hall, Marshall, for Gladys Greer Nobles et vir, petitioners.

McIntosh & Duncan, J. O. Duncan, and Edwin M. Fulton, Gilmer, W. C. Hancock, Pittsburg, for respondent.

GARWOOD, Justice.

This three-cornered controversy relates to ordinary and accidental death benefits under an insurance policy issued by Franklin Life Insurance Company, a defendant below and the respondent here, upon the life of James Vaulta Greer, who met death from a knife wielded by his wife Margaret, the latter being the beneficiary named in the policy, a defendant below and a petitioner here. The action was initiated against the two named defendants by the remaining parties, Gladys Greer Nobles et al., next of kin of the insured, as joint plaintiffs, they asserting that both kinds of benefits were due by the insurer under the policy, and that the rights of the beneficiary Margaret thereto had been forfeited in their favor by her under Art. 5047, R.C. S., as "the principal * * * in willfully bringing about the death of the insured." The defendant beneficiary by appropriate pleadings asserted her claim to both classes of benefits, and both she and the plaintiffs also sought interest, penalties and attorney fees against the insurer under Art. 4736, R.C.S., Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 4736. The defendant insurer in answering filed a bill of interpleader admitting responsibility to either plaintiffs or the beneficiary for, and accompanied by a court deposit for, the ordinary death benefits in the sum of $3002.41, and also a similar pleading with respect to the accidental death benefits of $1500, but without tender of this latter sum, for which it denied liability, although seeking determination of ownership as between the rival claimants in the event it should be held liable. In a trial to the court judgment was renderd that plaintiffs take nothing; that the defendant beneficiary recover of the defendant insurer the $3002.41 regular life benefits, plus attorney fees of $750, penalties and interest; that the defendant insurer have judgment denying liability for accidental death benefits and allowing it attorney fees of $500 in connection with its interpleader.

On appeal by all parties, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment as to all points except the award under Art. 4736 to the beneficiary Margaret, as to which item the trial court was reversed and judgment rendered for the insurer. 219 S.W.2d 137. We granted writ of error on application of the unsuccessful next of kin to review primarily the holding of the courts below denying their right to the ordinary life benefits as against the beneficiary; the application of the latter being granted as a matter of course under the circumstances. Both applications complain of the holdings below in favor of the insurer on the issues of accidental death benefits, award under Art. 4736, and interpleader fees.

On the point on which the writ was granted, we conclude that there was error and that the judgment must be reversed and rendered for the next of kin.

Art. 5047, R.C.S., was enacted in 1919. Its terms eliminate the interest of the beneficiary in favor of "the nearest relative of insured" where the beneficiary "willfully" brings about the death of the insured. The principle underlying the statute is nothing novel in Anglo Saxon — or Latin — civil jurisprudence, judicial or legislative. See Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 1941, Vol. 1, Ch. 20; Restatement of the Law, Restitution, sections 187, 189; Annotations in 91 A.L.R. 1486, 70 A.L.R. 1539; 20 Tex.L.Rev. 237; 49 Harv.L.Rev. 715; 30 Harv.L.Rev. 622; XXI Columbia L.Rev. 385; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Thompson, Tex.Civ. App., 153 S.W.2d 322, 324, wr.ref.; New York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 6 Sup.Ct. 877, 29 L.Ed. 997; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, D.C.E.D.Mich., 39 F.Supp. 228; Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506, 70 A.L.R. 1529; State v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 W.Va. 109, 170 S.E. 909, 91 A.L.R. 1482; Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17; Schreiner v. High Court of I.C.O. of F., 35 Ill.App. 576. The 1918 decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S.W. 423, which may well have been the cause of the enactment, recognized the injustice of allowing the beneficiary to recover on a policy when she had murdered the insured, though refusing to apply the principle so as to give the proceeds to the next of kin in view of our unqualified statutes of inheritance, including Art. 2465, now 2574, R.C.S., forbidding "corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate" as a result of a criminal conviction. While for various policy reasons, including the interest of simplicity, we think Art. 5047 should, generally speaking, be held to restate, rather than merely supplement, the common law to the extent that life insurance policies may be involved (compare Smith v. Todd, supra), it yet seems altogether proper to interpret and apply the article in the light of the common law, as suggested in Art. 10, R.C.S., particularly paragraphs 6 and 8 thereof.

So viewed, Art. 5047 is not to be treated as a criminal or even a civil penalty statute against the beneficiary. Nor do we think it violates Art. 1, Sec. 21 of the State Constitution, which is in the same terms as Art. 2574, R.C.S., referred to in the Murchison case. Restatement of the Law, supra, Sec. 187, Comment c; Hill v. Noland, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W. 288, wr.ref., does not require a different conclusion. In that case, incidentally, the more modern view of imposing a constructive trust upon property inherited by a murderer from his victim, for the benefit of the heirs other than the murderer, was evidently not suggested or considered. The word "willfully" in Art. 5047 is all that presents any difficulty in the instant case. As we recently pointed out in Paddock, Trustee, et al. v. Siemoneit et al., Tex.Sup., 218 S.W.2d 428, the word is far from being one of art in civil jurisprudence, and while it has been said that there is a difference between its meaning in "common parlance" and in the field of criminal law (see Caldwell v. State, 55 Tex. Cr.App. 164, 115 S.W. 597, 131 Am.St.Rep. 809), the latter, to judge from expressions in various decisions of our Court of Criminal Appeals and in texts such as 12 Tex. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 34, is at least rather flexible. We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that, as used in Art. 5047, "willfully" connotes something more than that the beneficiary shall have intended the death of the insured to result from his or her act. Obviously the factor of illegality must also be present. But we cannot agree that the word means in substance "maliciously." Even in the criminal law decisions it is sometimes said to mean merely that the accused was without legal ground to believe the act to be lawful. Caldwell v. State, supra; Steher v. State, 23 Tex.Cr. App. 176, 4 S.W. 880. Among the common law authorities heretofore mentioned, including the Restatement, the rule is sometimes expressed in terms of the crime of "murder," and there is some confusion of opinion where the conduct of the beneficiary amounts only to "manslaughter." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, supra; Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, supra; see also 20 Tex.L.Rev. supra, p. 239; 49 Harv.L.Rev. supra, p. 722. One of the best considered opinions we have examined on the...