Hill v. State, 5593
| Decision Date | 24 May 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 5593,5593 |
| Citation | 250 Ark. 812,467 S.W.2d 179 |
| Parties | Plutarcho C. HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Louis W. Rosteck, Little Rock, for appellant.
Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., Milton R. Lueken, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant was convicted of robbery by a jury which assessed a penalty of twelve years' imprisonment in the State Penitentiary. From a judgment entered on that verdict appellant brings this appeal. Appellant's present counsel, who did not participate in the trial, was then appointed for appeal purposes.
Appellant first contends that the lower court erred in failing to hear evidence concerning the admissibility and voluntariness of his confession out of the presence of the jury. Appellant cites Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43--2105 (Supp.1969) which provides that the trial court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the admissibility and voluntariness of a confession out of the jury's presence 'when the issue is raised by the defendant.' A hearing on the voluntariness of appellant's confession was conducted in the presence of the jury. The court determined the confession to be voluntary before admitting the confession into evidence. Appellant did not object nor request a hearing out of the jury's presence. In fact, appellant acquiesced in the procedure and cross-examined the proffered witness in the jury's presence with respect to the circumstances surrounding the confession. The issue was not 'raised by the defendant.' This is in accord with Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967). There the court said: 'Since trial counsel consented to the evidence on voluntariness being taken in the presence of the jury, and the judge found the statement voluntary, respondent was deprived of no constitutional right.' Therefore, we find no merit in appellant's contention.
Appellant next contends that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of an F.B.I. agent concerning a purported confession while appellant was in custody. We find no error. An F.B.I. agent questioned appellant in a New Orleans jail for the purpose of identifying him in connection with a federal warrant for his arrest. The agent testified that he advised appellant of his constitutional rights as is required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and that after the Miranda warnings had been read and fully explained to him, appellant signed the 'advice of rights' and 'waiver of rights' form and voluntarily confessed to having committed this alleged robbery. Further, that appellant was not threatened or abused by him or anyone else to his knowledge. Appellant admits signing the statement to the effect that proper warnings had been given; he denies, however, that the warnings were...
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...Tractor & Equip. Co., 249 Ark. 30, 458 S.W.2d 419 (1970); Barnes v. Young, 238 Ark. 484, 382 S.W.2d 580 (1964); cf., Hill v. State, 250 Ark. 812, 467 S.W.2d 179 (1971). See also, Rule 103(2) Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-1001 Duncan argues on appeal, in addition to the constitutional arguments raised ......
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...the evidence was for the jury. Scott v. State, 254 Ark. 271, 492 S.W.2d 902; Houpt v. State, 249 Ark. 485, 459 S.W.2d 565; Hill v. State, 250 Ark. 812, 467 S.W.2d 179. The jury's conclusion on the credibility of the witnesses is binding on this court. Pope v. State, 262 Ark. 476, 557 S.W.2d......
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...cite, suggests that a motion challenging an in-custodial statement may not be waived or abandoned. To the contrary, in Hill v. State, 250 Ark. 812, 467 S.W.2d 179 (1971), we applied the waiver doctrine to voluntariness of confessions, holding that when a defendant permits a jury, rather tha......