Hill v. Town of Conway, 99-1019

• Decision Date: 04 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-1019,99-1019
• Citation: 193 F.3d 33
• Parties: (1st Cir. 1999) ARLISS J. HILL, VERONA A. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE WILLIAM A. JOHNSON REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AND CAROL J. HENNUM, TRUSTEE CAROL J. HENNUM LIVING TRUST d/b/a MOUNTAIN VALLEY MALL ASSOCIATES, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. TOWN OF CONWAY, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 33

193 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 1999)

ARLISS J. HILL, VERONA A. JOHNSON, TRUSTEE WILLIAM A. JOHNSON REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AND CAROL J. HENNUM, TRUSTEE CAROL J. HENNUM LIVING TRUST d/b/a MOUNTAIN VALLEY MALL ASSOCIATES, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. TOWN OF CONWAY, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 99-1019.

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Submitted May 19, 1999.

Decided Oct. 4, 1999.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Randall F. Cooper and Cooper, Deans & Cargill, P.A. on brief, for appellants.

Russell F. Hilliard, David P. Slawsky, and Upton, Sanders & Smith on brief, for appellee.

Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, and

Pollak,^* Senior District Judge.

POLLAK, District Judge.

The question presented by this appeal is whether the District Court for the District of New Hampshire was correct in dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, brought by plaintiffs, as owners of the Mountain Valley Mall in North Conway, New Hampshire, against the Town of Conway ("Town"). In their § 1983 suit plaintiffs have alleged that the Town effectuated an uncompensated -- and hence unconstitutional -- "taking" of Mountain Valley Mall Boulevard, an access road connecting Mountain Valley Mall to U.S. 302, a major highway. After reviewing the procedural history of the challenges to the Town's action mounted by the plaintiffs prior to filing the § 1983 suit, the district court concluded that it lacked authority to entertain plaintiffs' suit. Specifically, the district court pointed out that before seeking relief in federal court, plaintiffs had initiated two law suits in the New Hampshire courts contesting the legality of the Town's action and had been unsuccessful in both. Viewing the § 1983 suit as an effort collaterally to undercut these state court decisions, the district court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine -- pursuant to which "[l]ower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to sit in direct review of state court decisions," Wang v. New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine, 55 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir. 1995)¹ -- deprived it of jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs' suit.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the district court misapplied Rooker-Feldman. Concluding that the district court reached the right result for the right reasons, we affirm.

I.

The procedural events antecedent to the initiation of this § 1983 suit had their inception in the winter of 1992.² On March 10, 1992, at the annual Town Meeting of the Town of Conway, a resolution was adopted which, inter alia, declared certain roads, including "a portion of Mountain Valley Blvd., to Route 302 to become public roads pursuant to RSA 231:51 on final acceptance and recording of dedication by the Selectmen."³ On April 22, 1992, the Board of Selectmen executed a Declaration of Taking reciting that a portion of roadway including Mountain Valley Mall Boulevard was "being taken for use as a town road under the authority of NHRSA 231:51" in order "to enhance traffic flow in the Town of Conway and enhance public safety and the health and welfare of the Town." On May 8, 1992, the Declaration of Taking was filed with the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals. On April 12, 1993, the Board of Tax and Land Appeals ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to "no damages as a result of the taking."

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed two suits in the Carroll County Superior Court. The first suit -- a statutorily prescribed mode of judicial review of the "no damages" ruling of the Board of Tax and Land Appeals -- sought de novo reassessment of damages. The second suit challenged the legal efficacy of the Town of Conway's Declaration of Taking of Mountain Valley Boulevard, contending that there had been no dedication of the roadway and that the Declaration of Taking had not adequately described the roadway.

Both suits were ruled on by Justice James D. O'Neill, III, Presiding Justice of the Carroll County Superior Court. Justice O'Neill decided the second suit -- the suit challenging the Declaration of Taking -- first. On July 26, 1996, Justice O'Neill ruled that the Declaration of Taking was in compliance with the requirements of New Hampshire law.⁴ On February 6, 1997, the New Hampshire Supreme Court summarily affirmed, and on April 22, 1997, the New Hampshire Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

On July 17, 1997, the Town of Conway moved for summary judgment in the damages reassessment suit. On September 23, 1997, Justice O'Neill granted the Town's motion for summary judgment. Key to the court's analysis was what the court had decided in the Declaration of Taking case which Justice O'Neill characterized as "a separate case involving the same parties disputing ownership to Mountain Valley Boulevard." In that case, wrote Justice O'Neill:

The Court held in pertinent part that Mountain Valley Boulevard was dedicated by the plaintiffs and accepted by the defendant. See Hill, et al. v. Town of Conway, 95-E-86, 66 at pp. 6, 13-15 (Carroll Cty. Super. Ct. 7/26/96). Specifically, the Court found that Mountain Valley Boulevard was platted as a road on a subdivision plan approved by the Conway Planning Board on August 16, 1990; said subdivision plan was recorded in the Carroll County Registry of Deeds; the Town accepted the platted road and easement on the subdivision plan by dedication; and the Town executed and recorded a dedication of Mountain Valley Boulevard as a public road. Id. at 29 (granting to [sic] the Town's requested Findings of Fact #3-7). The Court specified that the plat plan in question constituted a subdivision within the meaning of RSA 672:14. Order at 29 (granting Town's requested Finding of Fact #11, Ruling of Law #1). The Court also ruled that by allowing the Town to perform winter road maintenance, the plaintiffs showed intent to dedicate Mountain Valley Boulevard to the Town of Conway. Id. (Ruling of Law #7); see also Order at 6.

The Supreme Court summarily affirmed this Court's decision on February 6, 1997, then denied the plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on April 22, 1997. The Court finds that the issue(s) disputed in this case is identical to that previously litigated by the parties. The Court's previous ruling as to dedication and acceptance was of essential import to the first decision. Additionally, the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. The issue was resolved finally on the merits. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of dedication and acceptance in the present case. See Aranson v. Schroeder, 140 N.H. 359, 368 (1995) (setting forth elements of collateral estoppel).

The plaintiffs['] remaining argument is that they are entitled to compensation because they did not intend to effectuate a dedication. As referenced above, however, the court has found that the plaintiffs intended to dedicate Mountain Valley Boulevard. Notwithstanding that finding, RSA 231:51 and the decision of Polizzo v. Town of Hampton, 126 N.H. 398, 401 (1985), provide that roadway dedication can be accomplished by filing with a planning board a subdivision plan designating said roadway, and then selling lots in accordance with said plan. The filing of such a subdivision plan exhibits the applicant's intent to dedicate. See 4 Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 25.27, p. 385 ("the filing of a subdivision plat showing streets usually is construed as an offer to dedicate the land marked for such purpose"); Harrington v. Manchester, 76 N.H. 347, 349 (1912). It has been held that one who dedicates a roadway is "entitled to no more than nominal damages," Walker v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 438 (1878); Harrington, 76 N.H. at 348 (emphasis added), or "no more than the commissioners awarded." Wilkins v. Manchester, 74 N.H. 275 (1907) (emphasis added). In the present case, the Board of Land and Tax Appeals declined to award the plaintiffs damages; therefore, under the above principles, the plaintiffs are entitled to no further compensation. The plaintiffs['] reliance on Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), is arguably misplaced. In Dolan, the petitioner was required, pursuant to express conditions, to dedicate a public greenway and bicycle path in order to obtain approval of a store expansion. No such conditions were demanded of the plaintiffs in this case; rather, a voluntary dedication and acceptance occurred. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to damages under either the law of New Hampshire or the Dolan decision.

On January 12, 1998, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, presenting these questions:

a. Does the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (applicable to New Hampshire through the Fourteenth Amendment), or the New Hampshire Constitution, Pt. 1, Art. 12, prohibit the taking of private roadway by a municipality's assertion of a dedication pursuant to N.H.R.S.A. 231:51, without just compensation?

b. Does the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (applicable to New Hampshire through the Fourteenth Amendment), or the New Hampshire Constitution, Pt. 1, Art. 12, prohibit the taking of private roadway by a municipality's assertion of a dedication pursuant to N.H.R.S.A. 231:51 where dedication results as a matter of law, and without a showing that the required dedication was related either in nature or extent of [sic] the impact of the Plaintiffs' proposed development on the public?⁵ c. Does R.S.A. 231:51 deprive a landowner of all property rights retained under common law after a dedication, without any consideration to just compensation?

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, on May 29, 1998, ruled: "Notice of Appeal is declined. See Rule 7(1)."⁶

Plaintiffs thereupon filed this § 1983 suit. In the first amended complaint three causes of action were alleged, each of them challenging the...