Hilton Head Auto. Llc v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp.
Decision Date | 15 August 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 27026.,27026. |
Citation | 394 S.C. 27,714 S.E.2d 308 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | HILTON HEAD AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, Appellant,v.SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Richard D. Bybee and M. Brent McDonald, of Smith, Bundy, Bybee & Barnett, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant.Marshall H. Waldron, Jr., and Matthew D. Cavender, of Griffith Sadler & Sharp, P.A., of Beaufort, for Respondent.Justice KITTREDGE.
This is an inverse condemnation case. Appellant Hilton Head Automotive, LLC, contends the South Carolina Department of Transportation's reconfiguration of the median crossovers on U.S. Highway 278, which Appellant's business abuts, was a taking because it deprived Appellant and its customers of the ability to enter or exit the highway by making a left turn. We disagree and affirm the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the Department of Transportation.
The facts of this case are similar to those of the Hardin case as described in Hardin v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, 371 S.C. 598, 641 S.E.2d 437 (2007). As in Hardin, the property owner in this case was deprived of immediate left turn access to an abutting highway, but it retained a reasonable means of ingress and egress from that highway. Because Hilton Head Automotive (“HHA”) was not deprived of a reasonable means of ingress and egress from Highway 278, it did not suffer a material injury to its easement of access to that highway, and therefore, did not suffer a compensable taking.
I.
In response to population growth and business development along U.S. Highway 278 in Beaufort County, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (“the Department”) engaged experts for the purpose of streamlining the flow of traffic on that highway. Relying on the opinions of those experts, the Department determined that it should widen the highway, close two median crossovers, and open a new median crossover at a central location between the two intersections that bound HHA's property: Burnt Church Road and Bluffton Road/Highway 46.
The properties on the north side of Highway 278 agreed among themselves to share the cost of modifying and/or building private roads that would allow left turn access to all of their properties by way of the new median crossover. The properties on the south side of the highway, however, were unable to reach such an agreement. As a result, HHA's property—which is on the south side of the highway—lost its immediate left turn access to and from Highway 278. Nonetheless, HHA retained direct right turn access to and from the eastbound lanes of Highway 278. Moreover, HHA could be reached from the westbound lanes of Highway 278 by making a U-turn at the new median crossover or at the lighted intersection with Bluffton Road/Highway 46. Correspondingly, a vehicle exiting HHA's property could reach westbound Highway 278 by making a U-turn at Burnt Church Road.1
HHA sought monetary and declaratory relief for inverse condemnation, violation of its due process and equal protection rights under the South Carolina Constitution, and civil conspiracy. The Department successfully moved for summary judgment on all causes of action. We certified HHA's appeal pursuant to Rule 204, SCACR.
II.
Summary judgment “shall be rendered ... if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), SCRCP.
A.
Inverse Condemnation
The South Carolina Constitution provides, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first made for the property.” S.C. Const. art. I, § 13(A). In an inverse condemnation action, a private property owner seeks to establish that a government entity has taken his or her property. The governmental conduct at issue generally takes one of two forms: (1) the entity has physically appropriated private property or (2) the entity has imposed restrictions on the use of the property that deprive the owner of the property's “economically viable use.” See, e.g., Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 S.C. 650, 656–58, 620 S.E.2d 76, 79–80 (2005). In this case, HHA has alleged that the Department physically appropriated private property by materially injuring an easement appurtenant thereto.2
Following Hardin, a proper analysis of an inverse condemnation claim premised on an alleged physical taking must begin with a determination of the scope of the property rights at issue. 371 S.C. at 605, 609, 641 S.E.2d at 441, 443 ( ). As an abutting property owner, HHA had “an easement for access” to Highway 278, “regardless of whether [it had] access to and from an additional public road.” Id. at 606, 641 S.E.2d at 442. In addition, HHA had “an easement for access to and from the public road system.” Id.3 If governmental action materially injured either of these easements, such that HHA no longer enjoyed the reasonable means of access to which it was entitled, a physical taking has occurred.4E.g., S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Allison, 246 S.C. 389, 393, 143 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1965) (); Sease v. City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 524–25, 131 S.E.2d 683, 685 (1963) (); Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S.C. 395, 403–04, 45 S.E.2d 603, 606–07 (1947) .
The gravamen of HHA's claim is that its easements included a right to make an immediate left turn to and from Highway 278, and such right could not be infringed without just compensation. We disagree. As recognized in Hardin, a regulation or traffic control device preventing immediate left turns to or from one's property does not result in a taking, provided it does not otherwise cause a material injury to the abutter's easements of access. 371 S.C. at 607, 641 S.E.2d at 442 . The relevant inquiry, then, is whether the abutter has retained a reasonable means of access to and from abutting roads and the public road system. Cf. Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Abutting owner's right to damages for limitation of access caused by conversion of conventional road into limited-access highway, 42 A.L.R.3d 13, § 3, 30 (1972) . Historically, courts have rejected the view that a regulation regarding the direction of travel upon a particular road, without more, materially impaired an abutter's easement of access. Marvel, supra, 73 A.L.R.2d at § 3, 692 (); see also S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Carodale Assocs., 268 S.C. 556, 561, 235 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1977) ( ...
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