Himmel v. Chase Manhattan Bank

• Decision Date: 09 August 1965
• Citation: 262 N.Y.S.2d 515,47 Misc.2d 93
• Parties: Philiburt G. HIMMEL et al., Petitioners-Tenants, v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK et al., Respondent-Landlord.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 515

262 N.Y.S.2d 515

47 Misc.2d 93

Philiburt G. HIMMEL et al., Petitioners-Tenants, v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK et al., Respondent-Landlord.

Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County, Trial

Term, Part XIX.

Aug. 9, 1965.

Newman, Aronson & Neumann, New York City, Edwin Ostrow, New York City, of counsel, for petitioners-tenants.

Leight, Drimmer & Weinstein, New York City, for respondent-landlord.

Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, New York City, special counsel for Chase Manhattan Bank.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MAURICE WAHL, Judge.

This is an Article 7-A proceeding grounded on the new legislative enactment (L.1965, ch. 909), effective July 17, 1965, when the Governor approved Print No. 7324 introduced by Senator Wilson. This law amends the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law and the New York City Civil Court Act, in relation to special proceedings by tenants of multiple dwellings in the City of New York for a judgment directing deposit of rents and application thereof under the direction of the court, through a court-appointed administrator, where conditions exist dangerous to life, health or safety.

At the outset, this court finds and it is so admitted by both the attorney and the special counsel for the Chase Manhattan Bank which is attacking the constitutionality of this law, that they did not notify the Attorney General of the State of New York. Sec. 71, Executive Law, requires the Attorney General to appear, after order made, in support of the constitutionality of such attacked statute. R. 1012(b) CPLR mandates that the court shall notify the Attorney General, who shall be permitted to intervene in support of its constitutionality. Thus while it would appear that the bank's legal representatives should have complied with these relevant provisions to properly have this issue determined, they omitted to so do. The court has on its own motion done so after its decision hereinafter set forth upholding the statute.

The building involved herein is located at 511 East 80th Street, in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, and was completed about November, 1963; and it was to be a fine and elegant fourteen (14) story apartment residence for rental to one hundred twenty-four (124) tenants, as dwelling units with above-average comfort. The first mortgagee was The Chase Manhattan Bank. The owner met financial difficulties with the result that in 1964 there was a default under the terms of the mortgage and The Chase Manhattan Bank instituted a foreclosure proceeding. In June, 1964, The Chase Manhattan Bank obtained as assignment of rents and took over the operation and management of the premises. At that time, The Chase Manhattan Bank designated Brown, Harris, Stevens, Inc. as its managing agent.

On May 1, 1965, a judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered. On June 24, 1965, the foreclosure sale was held, and the property was purchased by The Chase Manhattan Bank. At the time of such sale, the approximate amount due The Chase Manhattan Bank on its judgment of foreclosure was TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETYNINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT AND 33/100 DOLLARS ($2,799,688.33), with interest from April 5, 1965, together with costs, disbursements and allowances.

It appears that from the very beginning of their occupancies the tenants in the building had various complaints:

1. The central air-conditioning system did not appear to be of sufficient capacity to adequately air-condition the building, with the result that the system fell into disrepair regularly. Ample proof on this score was submitted by the tenants in their proceedings.

2. The water supply in the building appeared to be contaminated, with a heavy-like sediment as a result of a corrosion condition within the hotwater system in the building.

3. The incinerator shaft in the building appeared to have insufficient insulation, in that it created an undue amount of heat, smoke, fumes, and odors which seeped into the public incinerator rooms and in the adjoining apartments.

4. The plumbing fixtures drained either very poorly or not at all.

5. The ventilators did not operate properly.

6. The elevators in the building were frequently out of order and not available for tenants' use.

7. The laundry equipment in the basement was regularly out of order and unavailable for tenants' use.

8. Many tenants complained of an infestation of rodents throughout the building.

9. The security system in the building was inadequate and resulted in a substantial number of instances of burglary, vandalism and loitering.

As a result of these problems, a tenants' committee was organized. The committee dicided to withhold the payment of rent and various summary proceedings were commenced by the landlord. On the return date of the said summary proceedings a petition under the new Article 7-A of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law was presented to the court, on behalf of many of the tenants. The caption in the proceeding lists over seventy of such tenants.

The preamble (Sec. 1) of the statute states the legislative intent to judicially police the conditions dangerous to life, health or safety of the occupants of any such multiple dwelling, without regard to the age of the structure, location or area of location of any such multiple dwelling.

The threshold question is whether this statute would apply as against accrued and past-due rents prior to July 17, 1965, the statute's effective date.

This is a remedial statute, not unlike 302 CPLR and City Court Act, Sec. 404, the 'long arm' statutes concerning personal jurisdiction. As to those statutes our highest court has affirmatively expressed itself (Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 290, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 440, 200 N.E.2d 427, 432) that 'CPLR 302 has retroactive effect to the extent of embracing suits instituted after its effective date but based on previously accrued causes of action.' That determination was re-affirmed by Judge Fuld in Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. Inc. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., decided May 27, 1965, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 453, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15, 209 N.E.2d 68, 73, saying '* * * and no reason has been shown to cause us to alter our opinion.'

Generally the retroactive application of similar remedial statutes has been upheld as constitutional (Simonson, supra; Longines-Wittnaur, supra; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 382-383, 143 N.E.2d 673; and most recently in United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 85 S.Ct. 528, 13 L.Ed.2d 365.

Article 7-A Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law is clearly remedial as it opens up this judicial forum to protect the rights of tenants whose multiple dwelling occupancies are within the purview of the legislative mandate, endangering life, health or the safety of the occupants thereof. No substantive right or obligation is impaired, nor does the court perceive that any such impairment may occur. Under Sec. 1446-a CPA, now repealed, and newly enacted as Sec. 755 Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, the court was and is empowered to direct rent deposits where nuisances or violations have not been removed or necessary repairs have not been made by the landlord; and such rent deposits shall not be relaeased except upon court order, presumably upon a showing of removal of violations or curing of the defects; meanwhile staying the eviction proceedings.

Article 7-A enlarges this remedy by permitting one third of the tenants in the nature of a class action (presumably in the Legislature's wisdom to prevent individual nuisance proceedings) to pray for such relief even without a departmental violation, where dangerous to life, health or the safety of the occupants. It further permits, instead of staying the eviction proceedings to have the rent deposited and applied to remedying the conditions complained of, if found to exist, through a court-appointed administrator. Patently this is a remedy not heretofore existing. It merely and more definitely facilitates the enforcement of pre-existing rights--it creates no new rights. As the constitutionality of old Sec. 1446-a CPA has been...