Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 10 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 231516,231516 |
| Citation | 471 A.2d 980,39 Conn.Supp. 107 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Lorraine HINCHLIFFE et al. v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION et al. -New Britain at New Britain |
Pearl & Robertson, New Britain, for plaintiffs.
Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, for named defendant et al.
Cohn & Birnbaum, Hartford, for defendant Lipman Motors, Inc.
This action to recover damages for allegedly false representations made in connection with the sale of a motor vehicle and for failure to honor express and implied warranties was retried by the court after a judgment dismissing the complaint had been reversed in part and sustained in part by the Supreme Court. Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corporation, 184 Conn. 607, 440 A.2d 810 (1981). The plaintiffs' original complaint contained six counts. The Supreme Court sustained the trial court's dismissal, pursuant to Practice Book § 302, of counts one, three and six, but required a retrial on counts two, four and five.
Count four of the plaintiffs' complaint asserts a claim under a manufacturer's standard warranty against the defendant American Motors Corporation, and a limited warranty against the defendant American Motors Sales Corporation. Reference is made in the complaint to the cooling system, timing chain, transmission, oil lubrication system, trailer towing assembly and hose connections. The plaintiffs assert that some or all of these components failed to function properly within the warranty periods and that the defendants failed to honor the warranties or failed to remedy the defects in a workmanlike manner. The plaintiffs claim they suffered expense and inconvenience as a result of these deficiencies and claim monetary damages.
The answer of the defendants denied the essential and material allegations in count four of the complaint. Both the April 23, 1976 purchase order for the new car, a 1976 Jeep, No. 15, Four-Door Wagoneer, Custom Wagon, and the April 27, 1976 invoice refer to a manufacturer's standard warranty given to the buyer; the invoice refers also to a limited warranty by American Motors Sales Corporation. The reference to the manufacturer's warranty notes that the motor vehicle is guaranteed up to one year or 12,000 miles. Both documents disclaim, on their face, any guarantee by the defendant Lipman Motors, Inc. The terms and conditions of the purchase order contain an additional disclaimer in paragraph one on the reverse side. Although the plaintiffs introduced thirty-three exhibits and the defendants eight exhibits, the limited warranty of the defendant American Motors Sales Corporation, and the manufacturer's warranty of the defendant American Motors Corporation, were not introduced into evidence.
At the first trial, the plaintiffs complained about the problems with the fuel delivery system, the air conditioning system, the transmission, the electrical system, the cooling system and the back door. The Supreme Court, which did not have the precise nature of the express warranty before it, was satisfied that a warranty existed and that the notice requirements of General Statutes § 42a-2-607(3)(a) were met. At the second trial, the plaintiffs made the same complaints. In their brief, however, the plaintiffs assert that the defendants were given notice of the following items during the warranty period: the transmission, the cooling system and the air conditioning system. The defects nevertheless persisted throughout the plaintiffs' ownership of the vehicle. The plaintiffs claim a warranty under General Statutes § 42a-2-313(1)(a), a breach and notice under General Statutes § 42a-2-607(3)(a), and a measure of damages under General Statutes §§ 42a-2-714 and 42a-2-715. The plaintiffs suggest to the court that if it finds a breach in one or more of the aspects claimed, it should award damages such as (a) the cost of a replacement vehicle, less a setoff for that amount recouped upon resale of the defective vehicle, plus incidental and consequential damages; (b) the cost of repair or replacement of the defective systems, plus incidental and consequential damages; and (c) rescission and restitution. Several of these remedies are at variance with the specific claim under count four which restricts itself to monetary damages.
The defendants do not now dispute the existence of an express warranty, nor do they dispute that the plaintiffs gave them notice of the claimed defects in the transmission, cooling system and air conditioning system. The defendants' defenses are several: the plaintiffs abused the vehicle, voiding the warranty; the defendants made good faith efforts to comply with their warranty obligations and did, in fact, remedy all objective defects; the plaintiffs offered no evidence to sustain their burden of proof on direct or consequential damages.
At the trial, the evidence would have enabled the court to find that the plaintiffs purchased the 1976 Jeep Wagoneer, Four-Door Custom Wagon, on April 27, 1976, from Lipman Motors, Inc., for $8396. The salesman was Peter O'Shana. The defendants drove the vehicle until on or about June 21 of 1980, when they sold the vehicle to Chester V. D'Agostino. At the time of resale, the vehicle had been driven between 50,000 and 60,000 miles. The bill of sale from that transaction was introduced on November 23, 1981; it stated that the purchase price was $1500. The plaintiff David Hinchliffe testified initially at the trial that he had received $1500 for the vehicle "as is fit for the road, not guaranteed." On November 30, 1981, he testified that he had in fact received $3000 for the vehicle despite the lower figure shown on the bill of sale. The vehicle was in good general repair at the time of sale and the plaintiffs had advertised it for sale at a price of $3000. This price was lower than the average retail price in March, 1980, of $4050; and in November, 1980, of $3395. The vehicle, in addition to having been driven between 50,000 and 60,000 miles, had been used to pull a house trailer on numerous long trips: Connecticut to Florida to Arizona and back in 1976; Connecticut to Montana and the west coast and return to Connecticut in 1977; Connecticut to Glacier National Park in Montana and return in 1978; Connecticut to Florida and return in 1979. The defendant Lipman Motors serviced the vehicle fifteen times after the sale in response to complaints from the plaintiffs. This service was without charge to the plaintiffs. The first service was rendered on April 28, 1976, when the mileage was 102 miles. The last service was April 4, 1977, when the mileage was 15,732. The bulk of the plaintiffs' complaints were minor and most of the defects complained of were remedied adequately. The transmission was defective and was replaced on December 21, 1976. It was replaced without charge to the plaintiffs despite the fact that it was over the 12,000 mile warranty. The plaintiffs incurred no further expense for warranty related items during the remaining life of the car, which had on it between 50,000 and 60,000 miles when sold on June 21, 1980. The only repair expense incurred by the plaintiffs during their ownership of the vehicle and supported by credible evidence was a bill incurred in California on August 27, 1977, at Zenker-Felt Motors. This was occasioned by a timing chain failure. The repair was made when the vehicle was out of warranty in excess of one year from the purchase date, April 27, 1976, with mileage of 26,320, in excess of 12,000 miles. The plaintiffs offered no evidence that this problem had been noticed to the defendants within the warranty period. The last time the defendant Lipman Motors serviced the car was on April 4, 1977, when it had mileage of 15,732. The service was for a transmission oil leak requiring a gasket replacement. The vehicle was examined on June 22, 1978, by Robert Cromwell, engineering consultant for the dealers and repairers section of the department of motor vehicles. Cromwell examined the vehicle, which then had on it more than 38,000 miles, test drove it and determined the vehicle to be in generally good operating condition with the exception of a passing gear switch and transmission leakage. The engineering consultant concluded that these items were minor. Testimony suggested that David Hinchliffe corrected the passing gear switch with tape at no cost. No evidence was offered to suggest a transmission seal replacement prior to the sale of the car on June 21, 1980, to Chester D'Agostino.
From all of the credible evidence offered, the court cannot find or infer that the plaintiffs sustained loss or damage directly or indirectly resulting from any defects covered by the warranty postulated in count four. Many of the defects complained of were minor, but the court is satisfied they were remedied properly by the dealer. The transmission defect was significant; the dealer replaced it and the plaintiffs offered no credible evidence that as replaced it resulted in diminished resale value or out of pocket expense to them. The plaintiffs did complain of overheating, but the court is satisfied that the driving advice offered by the defendants rectified this problem. The plaintiffs' complaints about the air conditioning were unsupported by expert testimony or repair bills or claims of diminished value. It is significant to the court that no mention of air conditioning problems was made to the dealers and repairers division by the plaintiffs.
From all the evidence, the court is satisfied that the defendants have proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that they have complied with their express warranty obligations. The court is equally satisfied that the plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proving by the same standard that they sustained loss or damages as a result of a breach of express warranty by the defendants.
Judgment may enter for the defendants on the fourth count, with costs.
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