Hinckley v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners
Citation | 801 So.2d 193 |
Decision Date | 05 December 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 4D00-3770.,4D00-3770. |
Parties | Susan Kent HINCKLEY, As Next Best Friend of Rebecca Hearthway, Appellant, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AAA Wheelchair, Wagon Service, Inc., d/b/a Ambulette of the Palm Beaches, Henry Mesidor, an individual, and ADP Totalsource Services, Inc., Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ann Porath, Wellington, for appellant.
Dawn S. Wynn, Assistant County Attorney, West Palm Beach, for appellee, Palm Beach County.
This appeal arises from the trial court's dismissal of a negligence complaint, alleging that the County had a duty to provide safe transportation to a developmentally disabled patron. The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the County could not be liable where it had contracted with an independent contractor to provide the services. Because we conclude that, having undertaken to supply transportation to the disabled, the County's duty to provide safe transportation was non-delegable, we reverse. Appellant's daughter, Rebecca, is a developmentally disabled adult, having the mental age of an eight year old girl. As such, she qualifies for services provided by the Department of Children and Family Services under chapter 393, Florida Statutes. She relies on SpecTran for transportation to and from the Association of Retarded Citizens ("ARC") facility, where she receives services. SpecTran is a division of Palm Tran, Palm Beach County's county-wide bus service. According to the complaint, SpecTran provides transportation for mentally disabled individuals pursuant to chapter 393. Appellee Ambulette provides vans and drivers for SpecTran, as a "transportation partner" of the County.
Rebecca was picked up from her home on the morning of the incident by an Ambulette driver and transported to the ARC facility. During the ride, the driver sexually molested Rebecca, prompting appellant to file suit against the County, Ambulette, and the driver. She alleged that the County, in its provision of transportation services, had a special duty to the disabled, a particularly susceptible population of riders. The complaint also alleged that this duty was non-delegable and was breached by the County's failure to provide a safe environment for persons using its SpecTran services. Appellant also alleged causes of action for violation of the County's statutory duty under chapter 393 and breach of fiduciary duty.
The County moved to dismiss, admitting that it had the duty to provide transportation services pursuant to chapter 393, but alleging that Ambulette was an independent contractor for which it could not be liable. At the hearing, appellant's attorney objected to the characterization of Ambulette as an independent contractor because the complaint alleged they were partners, and no contract between the County and Ambulette had been produced. Nevertheless, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding, "[w]hen they [the County] decided to contract with somebody else, then they no longer have the duty to supervise the method used by SpecTran, the Ambulette people." Appellant appeals the order dismissing the County as a party defendant.
In Bell v. Indian River Memorial Hospital, 778 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), this court summarized the appropriate standard by which an appellate court should review an order granting a motion to dismiss:
A motion to dismiss tests whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action. Because a ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is an issue of law, it is reviewable on appeal by the de novo standard of review. When determining the merits of a motion to dismiss, the trial court's consideration is limited to the four corners of the complaint, the allegations of which must be accepted as true and considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
(Citations omitted). See also Rohatynsky v. Kalogiannis, 763 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
. It would be simple to reverse this case because the trial court went outside the four corners of the complaint in dismissing it on the ground that Ambulette was an independent contractor, where the complaint alleged a partnership arrangement between the County and Ambulette. However, the court also erred in determining under these facts that the County is relieved from liability because Ambulette was an independent contractor. Therefore, we also address the substantive issue raised.
"[F]or there to be governmental tort liability, there must be either an underlying common law or statutory duty of care with respect to the alleged negligent conduct." Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 917 (Fla. 1985). Moreover, "in the absence of a special relationship between the individual and the governmental entity, a common law duty is not owed to the victim of a criminal offense, even though the offense might have been prevented." Sams v. Oelrich, 717 So.2d 1044, 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). An example of such a special relationship "is illustrated by the situation in which the police accept the responsibility to protect a particular person who has assisted them in the arrest or prosecution of criminal defendants and the individual is in danger due to that assistance." Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla. 1985). In Gross v. Family Services Agency, Inc., 716 So.2d 337, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998),approved sub nom., Nova Southeastern University, Inc. v. Gross, 758 So.2d 86 (Fla.2000),
we explained:
exceptions to this general rule have emerged, including the "special relationships" exception. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). Among the recognized "special relationships" where defendants have been held liable for failure to exercise reasonable care when injuries have actually been inflicted by third parties are employer-employee; landlord-tenant; landowner-invitee; and school-minor student.
(Emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315, referred to in Gross, states:
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