Hines v. City of Buffalo

• Decision Date: 26 February 1981
• Citation: 436 N.Y.S.2d 512,79 A.D.2d 218
• Parties: Pauline HINES, Respondent, v. The CITY OF BUFFALO, New York, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 512

436 N.Y.S.2d 512

79 A.D.2d 218

Pauline HINES, Respondent, v. The CITY OF BUFFALO, New York, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Feb. 26, 1981.

Joseph P. McNamara, Buffalo, for appellant (James Quinlivan, Buffalo, of counsel).

Collins, Collins & DiNardo, Buffalo, for respondent (Frank Dolce, Buffalo, of counsel).

Before DILLON, P. J., and CARDAMONE, HANCOCK, CALLAHAN and SCHNEPP, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Justice.

The issue for our determination is whether a prior jury verdict of no cause of action in favor of police officers in an action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 bars a subsequent state court action under tort law against the municipality employing them based on the same acts asserted in the prior federal action. Further, we must decide whether a court may grant permission to file a late notice of claim in order to assert a cause of action for malicious prosecution when the initial notice of claim, timely filed, gave notice of only facts surrounding the arrest of plaintiff.

On March 31, 1977 plaintiff filed a notice of claim and supporting affidavit with the City of Buffalo (City), asserting that on December 31, 1976, at about 4 a. m., two City police officers, without any cause, stopped an automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff claims that she was thereafter pulled by her coat collar from the rear seat, verbally abused, assaulted, arrested and jailed for five hours before being hospitalized for injuries she sustained. She was charged with obstructing governmental administration, assault in the third degree and resisting arrest in violation of sections 195.05, 120.00 and 205.30 of the Penal Law. These charges were subsequently dismissed after a hearing in the City Court of Buffalo in accordance with a decision dated June 15, 1977.

Early in November 1977, plaintiff instituted simultaneous actions. An action was commenced in the U. S. District Court against the two police officers under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and pursuant to the civil rights provisions of section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. A state court action was instituted against the City alleging causes of action based upon assault, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and negligence. A summons and complaint was served on the City on November 7, 1977 and issue was joined on December 6, 1977 by answer containing the affirmative defense of justification. A jury trial held in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York on the alleged civil rights violation resulted in a verdict of no cause of action on November 27, 1978.

On February 25, 1980, the City brought a motion in Supreme Court, Erie County, seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the causes of action alleged therein were barred by the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The City also sought leave to amend its answer to allege that plaintiff had failed to file a notice of claim regarding the third cause of action in her complaint, alleging malicious prosecution. Special Term denied summary judgment but granted the City leave to file an amended answer asserting additional affirmative defenses based upon res judicata and collateral estoppel. In addition, Special Term, in its discretion, granted plaintiff permission to file a late notice of claim with respect to her third cause of action. The City appeals.

At the outset, we are concerned with the principles of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, rather than claim preclusion since the prior action in the Federal District Court was against the officers individually, not against the City; the City was not a party nor did it participate in any manner (Malloy v. Trombley, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 49, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969, 405 N.E.2d 213; 9 Carmody-Wait 2d, N.Y.Prac. § 63:229). Special Term erroneously assumed that issue preclusion could not apply because the City was not a party in the prior action (see Schwartz v. Public Administrator of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 70, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 275; B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195).

It has been established that there are but two necessary requirements for invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling (Schwartz v. Public Administrator of County of Bronx, supra, at p. 71). Collateral estoppel is founded on the necessity of conserving judicial resources by discouraging redundant litigation and is premised on the view that once a person has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a particular issue, that person may not be permitted to do so again (Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 386 N.E.2d 1328; see also Matter of Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172). Since there are serious consequences arising from a determination that a party is collaterally estopped from litigating a particular issue, strict requirements for application of the doctrine must be satisfied. The party seeking to invoke the benefits must prove the necessary elements. There must be proof that the issue in the prior claim is identical and thus decisive of the issue in the current action. Additionally, it must be shown that the party against whom collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision said to be dispositive of the present controversy.

In the prior federal action, plaintiff, Pauline Hines, was the plaintiff against the two officers, employees of the City, in the action premised on a claimed violation of her rights under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. The civil rights action was fully litigated before a jury resulting in a verdict. It appears then that the second requirement has been satisfied (see Schwartz v. Public Administrator of Bronx County, supra, 24 N.Y.2d p. 72, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 275).

Inasmuch as this record does not contain a transcript of the prior federal court trial, resolution of the first phase would be speculative. The purpose of section 1983 ¹ is to create a right of action, enforceable against those who, "under color of" state law deprive any person of any rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. It was intended to provide a federal remedy supplementary to any state remedy available where basic civil rights are violated (McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671-672, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1435, 10 L.Ed.2d 622). The remedies are distinct, thus the federal remedy may be sought without prior resort to a state action (Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 481, 5 L.Ed.2d 492). However, it is not "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States." (Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, rehearing denied 425 U.S. 985, 96 S.Ct. 2194, 48 L.Ed.2d 811). The same set of facts may very well give rise to violations of both the federal statute ² and the state common law, where the rights are not necessarily common and the essential criteria are not necessarily similar (Martin v. Duffie, 10 Cir., 463 F.2d 464).

We recognize that a single event may provide grounds for separate lawsuits when the factual predicates needed to establish liability are not necessarily the same. A common-law action for malicious prosecution could coexist with a pending federal civil rights action based upon the same set of facts (Neulist v. County of Nassau, 50 A.D.2d 803, 375 N.Y.S.2d 402). However, it is apparent from a juxtaposition of the federal and state case law that the elements of proof required for establishing a prima facie case of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution in a state action in the ordinary case are nearly identical to the prerequisites for recovery under section 1983 for the deprivation of a constitutional right involved in an alleged unlawful arrest or wrongful prosecution (see Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310, cert. den. sub nom. Schanberger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257; Smith v. County of Nassau, 34 N.Y.2d 18, 355 N.Y.S. 349, 311 N.E.2d 489; Mullen v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 71 A.D.2d 21, 421 N.Y.S.2d 490, revd. on other grds., 51 N.Y.2d 924, 434 N.Y.S.2d 982, 415 N.E.2d 971, and compare Hampton v. Hanrahan, 7 Cir., 600 F.2d 600, mod. on other grds., 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 65 L.Ed.2d 670, rehearing den. --- U.S. ----, 101 Sup.Ct. 33, 65 L.Ed.2d 1176; Landrum v. Moats, 8 Cir., 576 F.2d 1320, cert. den. 439 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 282, 58 L.Ed.2d 258; Morrison v. Jones, 4 Cir., 551 F.2d 939; Brubaker v. King, 7 Cir., 505 F.2d 534; Martin v. Duffie, supra). Nonetheless section 1983 was never intended to afford any party multiple recovery in separate court actions for the same acts (Zarcone v. Perry, 78 A.D.2d 70, 434 N.Y.S.2d 437, nor may a successful plaintiff in a prior section 1983 judgment utilize that verdict offensively in a summary judgment against a municipality (Duverney v. State of New York, 76 A.D.2d 962, 429 N.Y.S.2d 70).

We hold that the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel can apply in the context of a civil rights action under section 1983 to bar a subsequent state court action to recover damages for common law torts. While the remedies provided by section 1983 are distinct and supplementary to those provided by state law, this pertains only to the initial option of the plaintiff to seek redress under section 1983 or under the common law courts or both. It does not address the question of whether, under the...