Hines v. Hendricks Canning Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 19936,19936
• Citation: 263 S.C. 399,211 S.E.2d 220
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: David L. HINES, Appellant, v. HENDRICKS CANNING COMPANY, and U.S. Fire Insurance Company, Respondents.

Page 220

211 S.E.2d 220

263 S.C. 399

David L. HINES, Appellant, v. HENDRICKS CANNING COMPANY, and U.S. Fire Insurance Company Respondents.

No. 19936.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 8, 1975.

Abrams, Bowen, Hagins & Robertson and McDonald, Cox & Stilwell, Greenville, for appellant.

Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for respondents.

BUSSEY, Justice:

This is a workmen's compensation case wherein an injured employee appeals from an order of the circuit court reversing a compensation award of the Industrial Commission. At least tangentially there is involved the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the factual findings of the Commission and for this reason the facts are stated in the light most favorable to the claimant in accordance with the well established rule.

The claimant, a 16 year old boy was injured on August 5, 1972 when both of his hands were caught in machinery with the result of quite serious injuries to his left hand and somewhat less severe injuries to his right hand, there being permanent injury to both. Immediately following such injuries Dr. Bowick, a general surgeon, performed surgery on both hands and continued to attend him until January 15, 1973, at which time he referred the claimant to Dr. William Eckstein, whose speciality is that of plastic and reconstructive surgery. In February, 1973 Dr. Eckstein performed surgery to free the joints of the ring and little fingers of claimant's left hand. He proposed to do thereafter further reconstructive surgery upon the left hand. He considered it possible, if not probable, that more than one further operation would be required and inticipated that it would be 12--18 months, after March 16, 1973, before the maximum rehabilitation of claimant's left hand was attained.

At the time of his injury claimant had finished his sophomore year in high school. He had worked during the summer of 1971 and part-time during a portion of the 1971--72 school year. He returned to high school in the fall of 1972 as a junior and had planned to work part-time throughout that scholastic year, but was unsuccessful in obtaining employment because of his disability, except for one week when he worked at a job which he found he could not do in comfort because of the condition of his left hand. In November, 1972 a representative of the carrier received an erroneous report to the effect that claimant was engaged in playing football on his high school team. It is reasonably inferable that such report was the genesis of the controversy which is now before us.

In any event on November 30th the carrier applied to the Industrial Commission for permission to stop payment of compensation for temporary total disability to the claimant on the grounds that,

'1. Employee's job was seasonal and is no longer available.

'2. Employee is presently a full-time student and not available for employment if job existed.'

There was no contention that the claimant's total disability had in fact ceased or that he had reached maximum medical recovery. If there be any authority for terminating compensation on the grounds asserted by the carrier, such has not been called to our attention, but on December 15th an order was issued by the Commission authorizing the carrier to terminate compensation effective November 15, 1972.

Thereafter there was filed on behalf of claimant a request for a hearing in the matter, which was held by a Commissioner in Pickens, South Carolina on May 17, 1973. The Commissioner found as a fact that the claimant had been physically unable to work since the time of his injury, except for one week; that he had not reached maximum medical recovery and that he was entitled to further medical care and treatment which would tend to reduce the extent and period of the claimant's disability. He also found that determination of permanent disability and disfigurement would be premature and as to this latter all parties seem to be in agreement. His award revoked the order of the Commission which had granted the employer-carrier the right to stop benefits as of November 15, 1972, they being ordered to resume payment of weekly compensation until such time as it was shown that the claimant's total disability had ceased, but with the employer-carrier taking credit for the one week in which the claimant had actually been employed. Further medical expenses were also awarded and claimant's entitlement to such is not challenged.

The award of the hearing Commissioner was unanimously affirmed by the full Commission, but on appeal to the circuit court such award was reversed. While the order of the circuit court does not purport to expressly reverse any of the findings of fact by the full Commission, some of the language therein contained appears to be at variance with the findings of fact by the Commission. As to such it is only necessary to state that the findings of fact by the Commission are quite fully supported by the evidence. It follows that any factual content of the circuit court decree which is at variance with the findings of fact by the Commission is erroneous.

It was the conclusion of the circuit court that the award of the Industrial Commission had to be reversed upon the authority of Singleton v. Young Lumber Company, 236 S.C. 454, 114 S.E.2d 837. In our view the Singleton case is clearly distinguishable from the instant case and not at all controlling. There a claimant lost a leg as the result of an injury sustained on August 16, 1956. He was paid compensation for total disability until July 15, 1957 when the employer-carrier stopped payment of compensation after receiving a report from the attending physician that the claimant had been released from further medical treatment as having reached maximum medical improvement. There was no contention in the Singleton case that the claimant was not entitled to compensation for temporary total disability until such time as he reached maximum improvement. The controversy was simply whether having reached maximum improvement, he was thereafter entitled to an award for permanent total disability instead of a specific award for the partial loss of a leg. The holding of this...