Pratt v. Morris Roofing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3591.,3591.
• Citation: 353 S.C. 339,577 S.E.2d 475
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Richard PRATT, Claimant/Appellant, v. MORRIS ROOFING, INC., Employer, and Transportation Insurance Company, Carrier, Respondents.

353 S.C. 339

577 S.E.2d 475

Richard PRATT, Claimant/Appellant, v. MORRIS ROOFING, INC., Employer, and Transportation Insurance Company, Carrier, Respondents.

No. 3591.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard December 11, 2002.

Decided January 21, 2003.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 2003.

Darrell Thomas Johnson, Jr., of Hardeeville; and R. Thayer Rivers, Jr., of Ridgeland; for Appellant.

W. Hugh McAngus, of Columbia; for Respondents.

ANDERSON, J.

In this Workers' Compensation case, Richard Pratt appeals the Circuit Court's affirmance of the Workers' Compensation Commission's order denying him benefits. The Commission found Pratt did not sustain an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Richard Pratt was employed by Morris Roofing, Inc., a roofing and subcontracting business co-owned by Paul Morris and Ray Morris. Pratt was involved in a single-vehicle collision while driving a Morris Roofing truck to work on May 11, 1999, from his home in Savannah, Georgia, to his job location in Hilton Head.

Morris Roofing provided transportation to its employees in company trucks and vans. The employer charged the employees thirty-five dollars per week for this transportation, whether they rode in a work van or drove a company truck.

Before the accident, Pratt occasionally drove a Blazer owned by Morris Roofing. Because Pratt had been arriving late to work, Paul Morris had a conversation with Pratt on May 10, 1999, and specifically forbade him from taking the company vehicle home. Paul instructed Pratt to deliver the vehicle to another employee, Tony Wilson, after Pratt completed the job he was working on that day. Paul informed Pratt that Wilson would then drive Pratt home and bring him back to work the next day. Wilson overheard the colloquy between Pratt and Paul Morris and verified the conversation occurred. Wilson stated he waited with the construction crew for over two hours for Pratt to appear but he never showed up.

According to Ray Morris, Pratt advised him that Paul had prohibited Pratt from taking the vehicle home. Pratt asked Ray to overrule Paul's directive, but Ray refused to do so.

Despite contrary instructions from Paul Morris, which were then buttressed by Ray Morris, Pratt drove the company vehicle home the night of May 10, 1999. He was injured in a single-vehicle accident the next day as he returned to work.

Melanie Adams, a claims specialist with CNA Insurance Company, met with Pratt at his apartment the day he was released from the hospital. Adams declared Pratt admitted he was not supposed to take the vehicle home the night before the accident but decided to take it home anyway against Paul Morris' instructions.

Pratt testified that he was not forbidden to take the truck home, but merely instructed not to take it home if he could not arrive at the job site on time.

Pratt alleged he sustained a compensable injury in the accident. The Single Commissioner ruled the injury did not arise out of and in the course of Pratt's employment. The Commissioner found (1) Pratt knowingly violated his employer's instructions not to take the company vehicle home and (2) the transportation was not provided by the employer because Pratt was required to pay for it. The Full Commission,¹ by unanimous vote, affirmed the Commissioner's findings. The Circuit Court affirmed the Full Commission.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of a Workers' Compensation decision is governed by the substantial evidence rule of the Administrative Procedures Act. Gray v. Club Group, Ltd., 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000); Lake v. Reeder Constr. Co., 330 S.C. 242, 498 S.E.2d 650 (Ct.App.1998). In an appeal from the Commission, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse where the decision is affected by an error of law. Gibson v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. No. 3, 338 S.C. 510, 526 S.E.2d 725 (Ct.App.2000); Stephen v. Avins Constr. Co., 324 S.C. 334, 478 S.E.2d 74 (Ct.App.1996); S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(d) (Supp. 2001); see also Etheredge v. Monsanto Co., 349 S.C. 451, 562 S.E.2d 679 (Ct.App.2002)

(stating court may reverse or modify Commission's decision if substantial rights of appellant have been prejudiced because administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are affected by other error of law). This Court's review is limited to deciding whether the Commission's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled by some error of law. See Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981); see also Lyles v. Quantum Chem. Co. (Emery), 315 S.C. 440, 434 S.E.2d 292 (Ct.App. 1993) (in reviewing decision of Workers' Compensation Commission, Court of Appeals will not set aside its findings unless they are not supported by substantial evidence or they are controlled by error of law).

Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify its action. Etheredge, 349 S.C. at 456, 562 S.E.2d at 681-82; Broughton v. South of the Border, 336 S.C. 488, 520 S.E.2d 634 (Ct.App. 1999). The Appellate Panel is the ultimate fact finder in Workers' Compensation cases and is not bound by the Single Commissioner's findings of fact. Muir v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 336 S.C. 266, 519 S.E.2d 583 (Ct.App.1999). The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the Appellate Panel. Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 535 S.E.2d 438 (2000); Parsons v. Georgetown Steel, 318 S.C. 63, 456 S.E.2d 366 (1995); Gibson, 338 S.C. at 517, 526 S.E.2d at 729. The findings of an administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. Anderson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 343 S.C. 487, 541 S.E.2d 526 (2001); Hicks v. Piedmont Cold Storage, Inc., 335 S.C. 46, 515 S.E.2d 532 (1999). It is not within our province to reverse findings of the Commission which are supported by substantial evidence. Broughton, 336 S.C. at 496, 520 S.E.2d at 637.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Sphere of Employment

Pratt argues the Commission erred in finding that his injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Pratt contends he was acting within the scope of employment even though he had been instructed not to drive the vehicle. We disagree.

This Court, in Wright v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 314 S.C. 152, 442 S.E.2d 186 (Ct.App.1994), articulated:

Our Supreme Court has succinctly stated the applicable law on this question:

[N]ot every violation of an order given to a workman will necessarily remove him from the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act.... "Certain rules concern the conduct of the workman within the sphere of his employment, while others limit the sphere itself. A transgression of the former class leaves the scope of his employment unchanged, and will not prevent the recovery of compensation, while a transgression of the latter sort carries the workman outside of the sphere of his employment and compensation will be denied."

Johnson v. Merchant's Fertilizer Co., 198 S.C. 373, 378-379, 17 S.E.2d 695, 697-698 (1941) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). When an employer limits the sphere of employment by specific prohibitions, injuries incurred while violating these prohibitions are not in the scope of employment and, therefore, not compensable. Black v. Town of Springfield, 217 S.C. 413, 60 S.E.2d 854 (1950).

Wright, 314 S.C. at 155, 442 S.E.2d at 188 (footnote omitted).

In Wright, the employee and all hourly wage earners were prohibited from approaching or apprehending suspected shoplifters. Wright ignored this rule. The Court found that "Wright left the sphere of his employment by violating the specific orders not to confront, pursue, or apprehend suspected shoplifters." Id. He was thus not entitled to Workers' Compensation benefits.

Pratt invites the Court's attention to Howell v. Kash & Karry, 264 S.C. 298, 214 S.E.2d 821 (1975). In Howell, the Court affirmed an award of compensation to a grocery store bag boy who injured himself while chasing someone who had snatched a purse from a potential customer outside the store. The Court held that a good faith act outside the employee's regular duties is compensable if undertaken to advance the employer's interest, even if the act does not further the employee's assigned tasks. Acts furthering the employer's interest were identified: (1) recovery of the customer's money, thereby enabling her to spend it in the store; and (2) the customer good-will created by the bag boy's act. Most importantly, there is no indication in Howell that the employer had specifically prohibited the bag boy from chasing purse snatchers, shoplifters, or any other type of fleeing criminal suspect. In the present case, the testimony reveals Pratt was acting against specific orders from his employer. During direct examination, Paul Morris stated:

Q. So, [Pratt] drove it home at least on the 9th and he drove it to Moss Creek on the 10th?

A. Yeah. Well, the 9th—on the 10th, the day before the accident, he—the homeowner called me. [Pratt] wasn't there. They told me he was going to be there at a certain time and he didn't get there on time. So, when he went and had communications with me, I told him that he couldn't drive the truck home because he was late to the job.

Q. All right.

A. That ended that conversation about the truck.

...

Q. And the—what time did he leave Moss Creek [that night]?

A. I couldn't tell you the time he left Moss Creek. I told him to come to Sea Pines that—to meet the guys and Tony would take him home and he came and seen my younger brother at the office when he went to pick the sprayer up and he said that I told him

...