Hinson v. State, No. 22986

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
Writing for the CourtCHANDLER; GREGORY
Citation377 S.E.2d 338,297 S.C. 456
PartiesRobert S. HINSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
Docket NumberNo. 22986
Decision Date06 March 1989

Page 338

377 S.E.2d 338
297 S.C. 456
Robert S. HINSON, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
No. 22986.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted Dec. 9, 1988.
Decided March 6, 1989.

Page 339

[297 S.C. 457] Asst. Appellate Defender Stephen P. Williams, of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for petitioner.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, and Asst. Atty. Gen., Salley W. Elliott, Columbia, for respondent.

CHANDLER, Justice:

In this post-conviction matter Petitioner Robert S. Hinson (Hinson) contends that his trial attorney's erroneous advice concerning parole eligibility rendered his guilty plea invalid. We agree and reverse the denial of post-conviction relief.

On July 9, 1979, Hinson was indicted for murder for his part in a robbery attempt which resulted in the death of one Teagus Griffis. The following day he pled guilty to the crime of "common law murder" and was sentenced to life in prison.

Prior to the plea, Hinson was advised by his attorney that a ten year parole eligibility applied to "common law" murder as opposed to the twenty year provision then applicable to statutory murder. Hinson, alleging that he entered[297 S.C. 458] his plea upon the assumption this distinction existed, contends his attorney provided ineffective assistance.

To prevail in this action Hinson must satisfy the two prong test of Strickland v. Washington: 1 (1) that counsel's advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted upon a trial. In Hill v. Lockhart 2 this test was held applicable to guilty plea challenges based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

PRONG I

Counsel's advice regarding parole eligibility misstated the law. There is no distinction between statutory and common law murder: the statute is merely declaratory of the common law. 3 The advice given Hinson falls below the level of competence reasonably expected of attorneys in criminal cases.

PRONG II

The evidence is uncontroverted that Hinson entered his plea in expectation of receiving the lesser period for parole eligibility. His own testimony to that effect at post-conviction was corroborated by that of William Runyon, attorney for a codefendant. Hinson's trial counsel testified that he remembered virtually nothing about the case since...

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15 practice notes
  • United States v. Castro-Taveras, No. 14-1879
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • October 31, 2016
    ...v. Goforth, 130 N.C.App. 603, 503 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1998) ; People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d 937, 942 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Hinson v. State, 297 S.C. 456, 377 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1989) ; Matter of Peters, 50 Wash.App. 702, 750 P.2d 643, 646 n.3 (1988) ; Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 198......
  • State v. Elliott, No. 25356.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • September 4, 2001
    ...provides for its punishment. Despite these statutes, murder remains a common law offense in this State. See, e.g., Hinson v. State, 297 S.C. 456, 377 S.E.2d 338 (1989)("There is no distinction between statutory and common-law murder: the statute is merely declaratory of the common law.......
  • Roscoe v. State, No. 25287.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • April 30, 2001
    ...See Alexander v. State, 303 S.C. 539, 402 S.E.2d 484 (1991); Ray v. State, 303 S.C. 374, 401 S.E.2d 151 (1991); Hinson v. State, 297 S.C. 456, 377 S.E.2d 338 (1989). In each of these cases, however, there was evidence supporting a finding that the defendant's plea was induced such that, but......
  • Hawkins v. Greenwood Development Corp., No. 2741
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • September 11, 1997
    ...presented abundant evidence that the flooding of his land thwarted financing and negotiations for commercial development. Id. at 455, 377 S.E.2d at 338. The court held that "while this element of damages does not flow as a natural consequence of the breach, it is clear that commercial ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
15 cases
  • United States v. Castro-Taveras, No. 14-1879
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • October 31, 2016
    ...v. Goforth, 130 N.C.App. 603, 503 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1998) ; People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d 937, 942 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Hinson v. State, 297 S.C. 456, 377 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1989) ; Matter of Peters, 50 Wash.App. 702, 750 P.2d 643, 646 n.3 (1988) ; Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 198......
  • State v. Elliott, No. 25356.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • September 4, 2001
    ...provides for its punishment. Despite these statutes, murder remains a common law offense in this State. See, e.g., Hinson v. State, 297 S.C. 456, 377 S.E.2d 338 (1989)("There is no distinction between statutory and common-law murder: the statute is merely declaratory of the common law.......
  • Roscoe v. State, No. 25287.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • April 30, 2001
    ...See Alexander v. State, 303 S.C. 539, 402 S.E.2d 484 (1991); Ray v. State, 303 S.C. 374, 401 S.E.2d 151 (1991); Hinson v. State, 297 S.C. 456, 377 S.E.2d 338 (1989). In each of these cases, however, there was evidence supporting a finding that the defendant's plea was induced such that, but......
  • Hawkins v. Greenwood Development Corp., No. 2741
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • September 11, 1997
    ...presented abundant evidence that the flooding of his land thwarted financing and negotiations for commercial development. Id. at 455, 377 S.E.2d at 338. The court held that "while this element of damages does not flow as a natural consequence of the breach, it is clear that commercial ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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