Hipp v. Farrell
Decision Date | 06 October 1915 |
Docket Number | 141,142. |
Citation | 86 S.E. 570,169 N.C. 551 |
Parties | HIPP v. FARRELL ET AL. (TWO CASES). |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Lee County; Bond, Judge.
Action by Lester H. Hipp against T. E. Farrell and others. From overruling of their demurrer, and motions to dismiss the action, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Judicial and administrative officers engaged in official acts involving the exercise of discretion are not liable for injuries sustained by individuals through negligence in failing to perform, or in the performance of, their duties in the absence of corrupt or malicious action.
The actions were instituted against the defendants as individuals for an alleged breach of duty on their part as members of the highway commission of Lee county and R. P. Coble as superintendent of said county, holding their offices under chapter 586, Local Laws of 1911, for breach of duty on their part, in that, having means available for the purpose, they knowingly, negligently, and carelessly failed to repair the wooden approaches to a certain bridge in Lee county whereby plaintiff, in attempting to drive his team over said bridge and by the falling in of the same, received severe injuries to his person and to his property. No. 141 having been instituted for recovery of damage done to the team and No 142 for injuries to the person, the question of liability in each being dependent on the same state of facts and set forth in the complaint as follows: Sections 1 and 2 of the complaint allege the positions held by defendants under chapter 586, Public Local Laws 1911, R. P. Coble as superintendent and the others as members of the highway commission. In sections 4 and 5, the facts relevant to the alleged liability are set forth as follows:
And section 6 states the extent of the injury as claimed in the one case to the person of plaintiff and the other to the wagon and team.
The defendant, in apt time, filed a written demurrer to the complaint in terms as follows:
On the hearing the defendants in addition moved ore tenus to dismiss the action as to R. P. Coble for that no cause of action was stated against him. And also the other defendants so moved to dismiss the action as to them. The court overruled both the demurrer and the motions made, and defendants, having duly excepted, appealed.
A. A. F. Seawell, of Sanford, for appellants.
Clarkson & Taliaferro, of Charlotte, for appellee.
HOKE, J. (after stating the facts as above).
Authority here and elsewhere is to the effect that, where the wrongful acts of two or more persons concur in producing a single injury and with or without concert between them, they may be treated as joint tort-feasors and, as a rule, sued separately or together at the election of the plaintiff. Hough v. Railroad, 144 N.C. 692, 57 S.E. 469; Clark v. Guano Co., 38 Cyc. p. 488 et seq. The only case with us which tends to impose any restriction on the position is that of Guthrie v. Durham, 168 N.C. 573, 84 S.E. 859, where, on a question of primary and secondary liability of joint tort-feasors, it was held that, on application of the defendants, the person primarily liable should be made party; the policy and purpose of our present Code of procedure requiring that every feature of a given controversy should be settled in one action as far as consistent with the orderly and efficient administration of justice. Again, it is held with us that, where two or more are sued as jointly responsible for a wrong, a joint demurrer filed will be held bad, if a cause of action is stated against either of the defendants. Caho v. Railroad, 147 N.C. 20, 60 S.E. 640.
It would seem therefore that the first and second grounds, as stated in the written demurrer, cannot be sustained.
Recurring then to the third position of the written demurrer and as presented by the motion to dismiss ore tenus, it is recognized in this state, supported, we think, by the weight of well-considered authority in other jurisdictions, that one who holds a public office, administrative in character and in reference to an act clearly ministerial, may be held individually liable, in a civil action, to one who has received special injuries in consequence of his failure to perform or negligence in the performance of his official duty, and it is very generally held that a failure to keep in repair the public highway or bridges, when the duty is plain and the means for the purpose available, should be construed as a breach of a ministerial duty, rendering the offender liable within the meaning of the principle. Hathaway v Hinton, 46 N.C. 243; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N.Y. 113; Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 N.Y. 389, 90 Am. Dec. 713; Doeg v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 58 P. 707, 77 Am. St. Rep. 171; Adsit v. Brady, 4 N.Y. (Hill) 630, 40 Am. Dec. 305; Robinson v. Rohr, 73 Wis. 436, 40 N.W. 668, 2 L. R. A. 366, 9 Am. St. Rep. 810; Commissioners v. Blackburn, 105 Md. 226, 66 A. 31; Smith v. Zimmer, 48 Mont. 332, 137 P. 538; Throop on Public Offices, § 737; 2 Elliott on Roads & Streets, § 858. The position referred to is all the more insistent with us for having held, in White v. Commissioners, 90 N.C. 437, 47 Am. Rep. 534, and other cases, that the county, as a municipality, cannot be held liable, unless expressly made so by statute. If the county officials, guilty of a breach of a plain ministerial duty, are not liable as individuals, the greatest wrongs could be perpetrated and the citizen left...
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