Hirschle v. Mabe, 2009 Ohio 1949 (Ohio App. 4/27/2009)
| Decision Date | 27 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 22954.,No. 22975.,22954.,22975. |
| Citation | 2009 Ohio 1949 |
| Parties | Tamara S. Hirschle, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William E. Mabe, Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, et al., Defendant-Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Gary D. Plunkett, Atty. Reg. #0046805, and Brett R. Bissonnette, Atty. Reg. #0076527, Hochman & Plunkett, Co., L.P.A., 3077 Kettering Boulevard, Suite 210, Dayton, Ohio 45430, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee, Tamara S. Hirschle.
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., by Robert L. Guehl, Atty. Reg. #0005491, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Montgomery County Stillwater Health Center.
Nancy H. Rogers, Attorney General of Ohio, by Stephen D. Plymale, Atty. Reg. #0033013, 150 East Gay Street, 22nd Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Bureau of Workers' Compensation.
{¶ 1} The central issue in this appeal concerns the Workers' Compensation Act's coverage formula. Is an injury suffered on an employer's premises "received in the course of, and arising out of" employment when the employee is voluntarily on the premises solely to pick up a paycheck, an activity that the employer's pay policy expressly permits but does not require? The trial court said it is, and it granted Tamara Hirschle's (Appellee) partial summary judgment motion. Both the Montgomery County Stillwater Health Center and the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation (Appellants) disagree. They argue that she was on a purely personal errand. We will affirm.
{¶ 2} The facts are not in dispute. Ms. Hirschle is employed by Stillwater, an agency owned and operated by Montgomery County, Ohio. Stillwater has a formal policy that allows each of its employees to choose the method by which she would like to receive her pay. The method selected also determines when an employee actually receives her pay. Friday is payday, and employees can choose to have their pay directly deposited into a financial account on that day. For employees who do not choose this method, on Friday Stillwater puts their paychecks in the mail, which they then generally receive the following Monday. But Stillwater also offers a third option that allows an employee to pick up her paycheck at its offices on Thursday afternoon, the day before payday. This was Ms. Hirschle's customary practice because she preferred to obtain her pay early. Because she did not work on Thursdays, she drove to Stillwater each Thursday before payday solely to pick up her check.
{¶ 3} On Thursday December 1, 2005, she followed her usual custom. She drove to Stillwater and parked in the employee parking lot, which is owned, maintained, and controlled by the county. While walking back to her car after picking up her check, Ms. Hirschle slipped and fell near her car in the parking lot and broke her hip.
{¶ 4} The Industrial Commission ultimately denied her right to workers' compensation. She appealed to the trial court. The parties stipulated to the facts. Ms. Hirschle moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether she suffered her injury "in the course of, and arising out of" her employment. Appellants, too, each moved for summary judgment on the same issue. The trial court granted Ms. Hirschle's motion and denied Appellants'. There remained the issue of her statutory entitlement to costs and attorney fees, so to avoid the necessity of a trial, the parties agreed to a second set of stipulations. The trial court concluded that Ms. Hirschle had the right to workers' compensation and ordered Appellants to pay her costs and attorneys' fees. Stillwater and the Bureau appeal from this judgment only the issue of her entitlement to workers' compensation.
{¶ 5} Appellants each assign a single error to the trial court's decision. Stillwater asserts that
{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE MRS. HIRSCHLE'S INJURY DID NOT OCCUR IN THE COURSE OF AND ARISING OUT OF HER EMPLOYMENT, FOR PURPOSES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND."
{¶ 7} The Bureau asserts similarly that
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BWC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE MS. HIRSCHLE'S INJURY DID NOT OCCUR IN THE COURSE OF AND ARISING OUT OF HER EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE HER PERSONAL ERRAND CONFERRED NO BENEFIT TO THE EMPLOYER."
{¶ 9} They both argue that Ms. Hirschle was injured while engaging in a purely personal activity. It was her day off, they argue, so she was on Stillwater's premises voluntarily. Also, they point out, she was not required to pick up her check. She could have had it directly deposited into her bank account, which she admits to having, or waited to receive it in the mail. We will address their assigned errors and arguments together.
{¶ 10} Summary judgment should be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C). Before ruling on a motion, the court must construe all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. If reasonable minds can reach only the conclusion argued by the movant, the motion should be granted. Appellate courts review grants of summary judgment de novo. Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, at ¶8. This means that the appellate court applies the same standard as did the trial court and determines, without deference to the trial court's decision, whether it erred.
{¶ 11} Access to the workers' compensation fund is limited. Ohio law is "well settled that the Workmen's Compensation Act does not create a general insurance fund for the compensation for injuries in general to employees." Lohnes v. Young, Admr. (1963), 175 Ohio St. 291, 292, 194 N.E.2d 428. Rather, a compensable injury is one that has a sufficiently strong connection to the injured person's employment. Bralley v. Daugherty (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 302, 303, 401 N.E.2d 448.
{¶ 12} The Workers' Compensation Act states that the required connection exists when the injury is "received in the course of, and arising out of the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01(C). Both conjuncts in this formula must be satisfied. Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 277, 551 N.E.2d 1271. And it is "axiomatic" that the formula be liberally construed "in favor of awarding benefits." Id. at 278.
{¶ 13} Beginning with the less-complicated second conjunct, the question is whether the injury was one "arising out of" Ms. Hirschle's employment. This phrase refers to a "causal connection" between the injury and the employment. Fisher, at 277-278. "Whether there is a sufficient `causal connection' between an employee's injury and his employment . . . depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident." Lord v. Daugherty (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 441, at syllabus, 423 N.E.2d 96.
{¶ 14} Here, Ms. Hirschle suffered her injury while walking back to her car, which was parked in Stillwater's employee parking lot, after obtaining her paycheck. "[T]he receipt of wages [is] a fundamental aspect of the employment relationship." Hoffman v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Westmoreland Hosp.) (1999), 559 Pa. 655, 659, 741 A.2d 1286. The reason for this lies in the nature of an employee-employer relationship. At root it is one of contract—express or implied—in which "the employee agrees to perform work under the direction and control of the employer, and the employer agrees to pay the employee at an agreed rate." Lake Land Emp. Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 101 Ohio St.3d 242, 2004-Ohio-786, at ¶17. This also means that an employer has the right to an employee's services, and an employee has the right to be paid for providing those services. Indeed, no sooner would an employment relationship cease if an employer stopped paying an employee than if an employee refused to work.
{¶ 15} Stillwater let Ms. Hirschle choose how part of the contract would be satisfied. She chose to have it satisfied "face-to-face." Thus, Ms. Hirschle's injury arose out of Stillwater's performance of a duty and her exercise of a right under the employment contract.
{¶ 16} It is true that courts often examine three particular factors to help determine whether an injury arose out of employment. See Lord, at syllabus (identifying the three factors). One of these factors asks whether the employer derived a benefit from the activity that caused the injury. Seizing on this factor, Appellants, the Bureau in particular, argue that Stillwater derived no benefit from Ms. Hirschle's presence on its premises; therefore, her injury did not arise out of her employment. Their premise is arguably correct, but their conclusion does not necessarily follow.
{¶ 17} Fisher warns that "a reviewing court must examine the separate and distinct facts of each case." Fisher, at 280. Workers' compensation cases are very fact specific, said the Court. "As such, no one test or analysis can be said to apply to each and every factual possibility." Id. We observe that cases in which the Lord factors are examined generally concern activities that occurred off of the employer's premises and bore an uncertain connection to employment. Here, conversely, Ms. Hirschle suffered an injury on her employer's premises while exercising a right under her employment contract in a permitted way. This activity bears a definite connection to her employment, as we discussed above. Because the reason for her presence on Stillwater's premises was related to a fundamental aspect of her employment contract, there is no need for Stillwater to have derived a benefit from it. See Nunn v. First Healthcare Corp (Sept. 10, 2004), Ky. App. No. 2003-CA-000777-MR, 2004 WL 2011282. Her injury has a...
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