Hobbs v. Baird
| Decision Date | 16 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-123,11-123 |
| Parties | RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, APPELLANT, v. CHANCEY BAIRD, APPELLEE, |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
AFFIRMED.
Appellant Ray Hobbs, Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appeals from an order of the Jefferson County Circuit Court granting declaratory relief to appellee Chancey Baird regarding the interpretation of the deadly-weapon enhancement statute that was applicable at the time of Baird's sentence. Hobbs argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding that Baird will be eligible to accrue good-time credits toward a possible parole-eligibility date after the first ten years of his thirty-year sentence. We disagree and affirm the order of the circuit court.
Baird was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, which occurred on February 7, 2001. He was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for the conviction pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-121 (1987). That conviction and sentence were upheld by this court inBaird v. State, 357 Ark. 508, 182 S.W.3d 136 (2004). He was later that same year convicted of delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment to run consecutive to the first thirty-year sentence.
On September 30, 2009, Baird filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the Department of Correction asserting that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-121 was erroneously interpreted by the Department to mean that Baird's entire thirty-year sentence for the attempted first-degree murder had to be served without eligibility for good time and, therefore, the department erroneously denied him the opportunity to be eligible for parole. The circuit court agreed and entered an order granting a declaratory judgment in favor of Baird. The circuit court found that, based on the applicable statute, at the conclusion of ten years of his sentence, Baird's sentence could become subject to meritorious good-time credit. It is from that order and finding that Hobbs now appeals on behalf of the Department.
Hobbs argues that the proper interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-121 as it was written at the time of the crime is that it prohibited parole for any sentence, no matter how long, to which it was applied. He asserts that when the statute was written, the inclusion of the words "meritorious good time" did not conflict with the inclusion of the words "without parole" because good time could have actually reduced the overall length of an inmate's sentence; however, Hobbs argues, that language was repealed by implication when the legislature reworked the meritorious good-time statute in 1993. Baird responds that the circuit court was correct in its interpretation of the statute and that Hobbs's interpretation contradictsprior interpretations of the statute, the basic rules of statutory interpretation, and the rule of lenity.
We review statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for this court to determine the meaning of a statute. See Dachs v. Hendrix, 2009 Ark. 542, ___ S.W.3d ___; Osborn v. Bryant, 2009 Ark. 358, 324 S.W.3d 687. Our rules of statutory construction are well settled:
The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible.
Dachs, 2009 Ark. 542, at 7-8, ___ S.W.3d at ___(quoting City of Little Rock v. Rhee, 375 Ark. 491, 495, 292 S.W.3d 292, 294 (2009)).
Turning to the merits, this court has held that a sentence must be in accordance with the statutes in effect on the date of the crime. See State v. Burnett, 368 Ark. 625, 249 S.W.3d 141 (2007). On the date of the crime, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-121 stated:
Any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty to a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, whether or not an element of the crime, shall be sentenced to serve a minimum of ten (10) years in the state prison without parole but subject to reduction by meritorious good-time credit.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-121 (1987).
When Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-121 was originally enacted, meritorious good time allowed for a reduction from an inmate's maximum prison sentence and parole-eligibility date. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-29-201 (1987). Therefore, the legislature intended that a reductionin sentence be possible. However, on the date of Baird's offense, Ark. Code Ann. § 12-29-201 had been changed to no longer permit meritorious good time to actually reduce the length of a sentence; instead, meritorious good-time credit applied to an inmate's transfer-eligibility date. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-29-201 (Repl. 1995). Hobbs asserts that the language in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-121 was repealed by implication by the changes made to Ark. Code Ann. § 12-29-201.
It is well settled that statutes relating to the same subject should be read in a harmonious manner if possible. See Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002). All legislative acts...
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