Hochstedler v. ST. JOSEPH CTY. SOLID WASTE MGMT. DIST.

• Decision Date: 28 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 71A03-0110-CV-330.,71A03-0110-CV-330.
• Citation: 770 N.E.2d 910
• Parties: Sandra HOCHSTEDLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. ST. JOSEPH COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

770 N.E.2d 910

Sandra HOCHSTEDLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. ST. JOSEPH COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 71A03-0110-CV-330.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 28, 2002.

John R. Price, Bruce A. Stuard, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Mark D. Boveri, Patrick D. Murphy, Boveri Murphy Rice Ryan & Ladue, South Bend, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Judge.

Sandra Hochstedler appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of St. Joseph County Solid Waste Management District (the "District"). Hochstedler raises three issues, which we restate as:

1. Whether the small claims court erred by entering judgment in favor of the District because the mandatory recycling fee imposed by Resolution 5-97 represented an unauthorized tax;

2. Whether the small claims court erred by entering judgment in favor of the District because Resolution 5-97 violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution; and

3. Whether the small claims court erred by entering judgment in favor of the District because the District exceeded its statutory authority when it enacted Resolution 5-97, which exempted certain individuals and entities from the recycling assessment.

We affirm.

The facts most favorable to the judgment follow. In 1991, St. Joseph County established the District pursuant to Indiana statutory authority.¹ On March 10, 1997, the District adopted Resolution 5-97, which established a mandatory curbside recycling program in St. Joseph County. The mandatory curbside recycling program applies to "all single family residences and rental complexes with fewer than five units" in St. Joseph County. Appellant's Appendix at 16. Resolution 5-97 allows the District to charge a mandatory fee for the recycling service that is "based either on the price bid per residence in each zone, or a blended rate based upon the average of the per residence rates bid for all zones." Id. at 14. Pursuant to Resolution 5-97, the District established a mandatory monthly recycling fee of two dollars and seventy cents ($2.70) per property owner covered by the recycling program. Hochstedler, a property owner covered by the recycling program, refused to pay the mandatory monthly recycling fee.

On September 8, 2000, the District sued Hochstedler in small claims court for her failure to pay the mandatory recycling fee for a period of twelve months. After conducting a bench trial, the small claims court found in favor of the District and against Hochstedler in the amount of seventy-nine dollars and fifty cents ($79.50).

Before we address the three issues raised by Hochstedler, we recognize that judgments in small claims actions are "subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes." Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). When reviewing claims tried by the bench without a jury, we shall not set aside the judgment "unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). In determining whether a judgment is clearly erroneous, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Dado v. Jeeninga, 743 N.E.2d 291, 293 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Rather, we consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id. A judgment in favor of a party having the burden of proof will be affirmed if the evidence was such that from it a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the elements of the party's claim were established by a preponderance of evidence. Id. This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are "informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law." S.C.R. 8(A). With this standard of review in mind, we now address Hochstedler's claims of error.

I.

The first issue is whether the small claims court erred by entering judgment in favor of the District because the mandatory recycling fee imposed by Resolution 5-97 represented an unauthorized tax. Hochstedler argues that the mandatory recycling fee imposed by Resolution 5-97 is actually a tax because every citizen of St. Joseph County benefits from the curbside recycling program, but only a few citizens are obligated to pay for the program. Accordingly, Hochstedler asserts, Resolution 5-97 imposes an invalid tax because the District did not follow the proper statutory procedures for enacting a valid tax.

Because we are analyzing the terms of Resolution 5-97, a brief review of our rules of statutory construction is necessary. Interpretation of an ordinance is subject to the same rules that govern the construction of a statute.² Ragucci v. Metro. Dev. Comm'n of Marion County, 702 N.E.2d 677, 681 (Ind.1998). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the drafter by giving effect to the ordinary and plain meaning of the language used. T.W. Thom Const., Inc. v. City of Jeffersonville, 721 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Accordingly, if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation. State v. Rans, 739 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. In addition, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law reserved for the courts. Id. We review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions. Id.

We begin our analysis by determining whether the mandatory recycling charge is tantamount to a tax or is a fee. Hochstedler argues that the mandatory recycling charge is not a fee because it is not based upon a property owner's use of curbside recycling services. Rather, she contends that property owners "in the [mandatory recycling] program are forced to pay, not based on their benefit, but to support a benefit for the entire community." Appellant's Brief at 9. Ind.Code § 13-21-3-12(2) enables the District to impose a fee on the final disposal of solid waste, including recyclables, within St. Joseph County. To determine a value for a recycling fee, Ind. Code § 13-21-14-2 provides that:

The [District] may fix the solid waste management fees on the basis of the following:

(1) A flat charge for each residence or building in use in the waste management district.

(2) The weight or volume of the refuse received.

(3) The average number of containers or bags of refuse received.

(4) The relative difficulty associated with the collection or management of the solid waste received.

(5) Any other criteria that the board determines to be logically related to the service.

(6) Any combination of these criteria.

Here, in enacting Resolution 5-97, the District expressly based the fee for curbside services "either on the price per bid per residence in each zone, or a blended rate based upon the average of the per residence rates bid for all zones." Appellant's Appendix at 14. Hochstedler argues that, with the exception of Ind.Code § 13-21-14-2(1), the criterion for determining the proper fee is usage. Thus, Hochstedler contends, because the mandatory recycling fee is not based upon usage, but rather property ownership, for Resolution 5-97 to impose a valid fee, the District must have enacted it pursuant to Ind.Code § 13-21-14-2(1). In sum, Hochstedler argues that the flat mandatory recycling fee was not based upon use of recyclables, but rather upon property ownership, regardless of whether the property owners subject to the recycling program actually used the program. Therefore, Hochstedler contends, the District's failure to link the flat fee "to or to base the fee upon the payer's use of publicly-owned or privately-funded facilities is what transformed the fee into a tax." Appellant's Brief at 10.

As we have previously observed:

A tax is compulsory and not optional; it entitles the taxpayer to receive nothing in return, other than the rights of government which are enjoyed by all citizens. On the other hand, a user fee is optional and represents a specific charge for the use of publicly-owned or publicly-provided facilities or services.

Ace Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Indianapolis Airport Auth., 612 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ind.Ct. App.1993), reh'g denied, trans. denied; see also City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 732 N.E.2d 149, 156 (Ind.2000),

reh'g denied. "Generally, a tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government, whereas a fee is a charge for a particular benefit to the payer." Id. (quoting BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, 337 S.C. 35, 522 S.E.2d 804, 806 (1999),

reh'g denied).

Hochstedler agrees that the mandatory nature of the recycling fee does not, by itself, transform the fee into a tax. However, Hochstedler argues that the District's failure to base the recycling fee upon the payer's use of curbside recycling services converted the fee into a tax. See Ace Rent-A-Car, 612 N.E.2d at 1108

. To support such a proposition, Hochstedler relies upon Ace Rent-A-Car and Ind. Bell. In Ace Rent-A-Car, the Indianapolis Airport Authority ("IAA"), a municipal corporation empowered with the specific authority to adopt a schedule of reasonable charges and to collect them from all users within the district, imposed a fee upon all off-airport car rental companies for the privilege of using airport roadways to operate their shuttle services. 612 N.E.2d at 1106. Because the fee pertained to off-airport car rental companies, the companies "would be assessed a fee of 7% of all sales for the rental of automobiles to customers originating at the airport." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Ace Rent-A-Car challenged the fee and argued that because the 7% fee is based solely upon revenue, it was transformed into a tax. Id. We disagreed and held that "the airport's very existence provides a marketplace from which Ace Rent-A-Car derives an economic benefit," such that a user...