Hodge v. Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen, Milk Processors, Cannery, Dairy Employees & Helpers' Local Union 695, 82-2555

• Decision Date: 25 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-2555,82-2555
• Citation: 707 F.2d 961
• Parties: 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2916, 97 Lab.Cas. P 10,192 Janet K. HODGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DRIVERS, SALESMEN, WAREHOUSEMEN, MILK PROCESSORS, CANNERY, DAIRY EMPLOYEES & HELPERS' LOCAL UNION 695, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 961

707 F.2d 961

113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2916, 97 Lab.Cas. P 10,192

Janet K. HODGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DRIVERS, SALESMEN, WAREHOUSEMEN, MILK PROCESSORS, CANNERY DAIRY EMPLOYEES & HELPERS' LOCAL UNION 695, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-2555.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 14, 1983.

Decided May 25, 1983.

Daphne Webb, Jacobs, Webb & Weiden, Madison, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.

Marianne Goldstein Robbins, Goldberg, Previant, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants-appellees.

Before BAUER and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. ^*

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.

This appeal challenges the district court's finding that plaintiff, a union secretary who had wide-ranging responsibility and access to confidential union information and who was fired for her perceived lack of loyalty to the newly elected union administration, is not a "nonconfidential employee" who may be entitled to recover under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411, 412, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 1873 n. 11, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982). We affirm.

I.

The relevant facts are largely undisputed. Plaintiff was employed as a secretary of the defendant union local and its predecessor for a period of fourteen years until 1974, and was a union member for the latter twelve. During the last six years of her employment, plaintiff was head secretary and had supervisory authority over other clerical workers who, according to her supervisor, "looked up to her because ... in the Local she knew more about what went on...." Plaintiff also acted as personal secretary to two successive Secretary-Treasurers of the union, Al Mueller and Don Eaton. As Eaton's personal secretary, responsible for his schedule and correspondence plaintiff had special access to Eaton, allowing her at times to bypass her immediate superior. Plaintiff also had close personal ties to Eaton and other union officials with whom she discussed union business to the point that "if there was something that somebody wanted to mention, certainly did not [sic] feel they couldn't say that to me." In the course of her routine work, plaintiff also had most of the clerical contact with the office's confidential and sensitive information (although the record does not establish that other clerical workers were specifically forbidden from handling the same information and in fact some apparently did have such contact). Examples of plaintiff's contact with sensitive information included her preparation of membership meeting minutes and the typing of confidential documents which were at the heart of the union's strategic functioning: strike sanctions, internal union charges against employees, unfair labor practice charges against employers, collective bargaining contract proposals, and the roster of employees who had authorized deduction of union dues from their paychecks. Plaintiff's telephone and mail responsibilities also gave her access to strategically sensitive information; she received the incoming calls of the union's several business agents which discussed sensitive strike and bargaining information concerning the 220 represented bargaining units and even touched on internal criticisms of the actions of some of the agents. In addition, plaintiff had primary custody over the "Steward's Book" containing the names and locations of union committee members and stewards; the book was specifically designated as confidential to her and was kept under lock and key and also on magnetic tape accessory to plaintiff's typewriter.

In 1973, and ostensibly as a result of a heated dispute between the union local for which plaintiff worked and its national Teamster parent concerning the mishandling of strike benefits by the local, the local was placed under national Teamsters trusteeship, pursuant to the union's constitution. Consequently, Secretary-Treasurer Eaton was effectively displaced by a Teamster official and the local's business agents were asked to resign and most were not rehired; however, the remainder of office employees, including plaintiff, were told by the trusteeship that their tenure would be secure if they performed in a satisfactory manner. Plaintiff continued her previous role, with somewhat curtailed authority, although the record does not indicate that she was no longer privy to confidential and sensitive information. Shortly thereafter, a group of dissident rank and file members and previous business agents of the local, including some with whom plaintiff had close relations, organized as Teamsters for Democracy (TFD) to challenge the trusteeship through litigation and electoral means. In the December, 1974 union election, TFD fielded its own slate of candidates against the trusteeship-imposed officials; the leading members of the TFD slate were two candidates with whom plaintiff had a close friendship and a previous close working relationship. However, plaintiff did not openly participate in TFD's efforts but rather strived to remain outwardly neutral as between the slates. Nevertheless, after the trusteeship-imposed incumbents won the election, and despite plaintiff's attempts to convey neutrality, the victorious administration believed that plaintiff had voted for the TFD slate and thus announced its intention to "get rid of" her. Subsequently, plaintiff and all of the employees of the local were fired and instructed to speak with the president-elect about rehiring. When plaintiff asked to be rehired, her request was refused although the new union administration did not cite any deficiency in her past performance; instead, the new officers stated that she would not be rehired due to her support for the TFD. ¹ In 1976, after plaintiff had secured another job, the new administration offered her a job, but later changed its mind again and withdrew the offer.

Plaintiff then sued for reinstatement and back pay, alleging that she had been discharged in violation of Section 101(a)(1) and (2) and Section 609 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411(a)(1), 411(a)(2), 529. The former two provisions grant union members the right to exercise full electoral and political rights, while the latter provision makes it unlawful for a union to "discipline" any of its members for exercising their rights under the Act. Several months after a bench trial on plaintiff's claims, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982), which rendered a comprehensive interpretation of the scope of claims such as those asserted by plaintiff. The district court accordingly applied those principles to plaintiff's action. First, since Finnegan squarely held that Section 609 of the Act does not cover removal from union employment but only "punitive actions diminishing membership rights," 102 S.Ct. at 1871, 1872, and plaintiff did not allege any impact on her rights as a union member, the district court found that no claim could be properly stated under that Section. Plaintiff does not appeal this part of the district court's disposition below.

What plaintiff does challenge is the district court's finding that Finnegan precluded her claim from being cognizable under Sections 101(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Act. With respect to these sections, the Supreme Court in Finnegan held that whatever limits they may place on a union's authority to dismiss union officeholders as part of an attempt to suppress dissent, they "[do] not restrict the freedom of an elected union leader to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own." 102 S.Ct. at 1873. The Court based this conclusion on its finding that

neither the language nor the legislative history of the Act suggests that it was intended even to address the issue of union patronage. To the contrary, the Act's overriding objective was to ensure that unions would be democratically governed, and responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed in open, periodic elections.... Far from being inconsistent with this purpose, the ability of an elected union president to select his own administrators is an integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to the mandate of the union election.

Id. Thus, the Court found nonactionable the union's dismissal of its former business agents who had ...