Hodge v. Shea

Citation168 S.E.2d 82,252 S.C. 601
Decision Date14 May 1969
Docket NumberNo. 18921,18921
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesDr. Joseph HODGE, Respondent, v. George A. SHEA and Carrie S. Shea, Appellants.

Horace L. Bomar, of Holcombe, Bomar & Cureton, Spartanburg, for appellants.

Paul M. Moore, Spartanburg, Edward C. Roberts, Geddes H. Martin, Columbia, for respondent.

BRAILSFORD, Justice.

In this equitable action the circuit court decreed specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, and the defendant has appealed. The plaintiff is a physician, and the contract was prepared and executed in his medical office on August 19, 1965. The defendant had been plaintiff's patient for a number of years. On the contract date, he was seventy-five years of age, was an inebriate of long standing, and was afflicted by grievous chronic illnesses, including arteriosclerosis, cirrhosis of the liver, neuritises, arthritis of the spine and hip and varicose veins of the legs. These afflictions and others required constant medication and frequent medical attention, and rendered him infirm of body and mind, although not to the point of incompetency to contract.

During the period immediately before and after August 19, 1965, George A. Shea, the defendant, was suffering a great deal of pain in his back and hip and was having difficulty in voiding. He was attended professionally by the plaintiff, Dr. Joseph Hodge, either at the Shea home, at the doctor's office or in the hospital at least once each day from August 9 through August 26, 1965, except for August 17. The contract was signed during the morning of August 19. One of Dr. Hodge's frequent house calls was made on the afternoon of that day, and Mr. Shea was admitted to the hospital on August 21, where he remained until August 25.

Mr. Shea was separated from his wife and lived alone. He was dependent upon Dr. Hodge for house calls, which were needed from time to time. His relationship with his physician, who sometimes visited him as a friend and occasionally performed non-professional services for him, was closer than ordinarily arises from that of patient and physician.

Mr. Shea owned valuable property in and near the City of Spartanburg. However, he was in serious financial difficulties. For at least several years prior to August 19, 1965, he had been indifferent and irresponsible about the management of his affairs. In 1962, a building on North Liberty Street was sold by the South Carolina Tax Commission, inferably for much less than its value, to satisfy a deficiency tax assessment against Mr. Shea. At the same time, large claims for Federal income taxes were pending against him, which resulted in the filing in May, 1964, of a tax lien for some $250,000.00. One or more judgments were entered against him, on apparently debatable claims, by default.

Mr. Shea was seemingly indifferent toward these reverses and made no effort to prevent the sale of the North Liberty Street property or to redeem it after the sale. This was accomplished by his son-in-law, William G. Ransdell, Jr., a lawyer of Raleigh, North Carolina, and by Mrs. Ransdell. Mr. Ransdell also assumed the responsibility, with Mr. Shea's complete acquiescence, of negotiating with the Federal authorities concerning the amount of the tax obligation and in trying to raise funds to satisfy the assessment after the lien was filed. These efforts involved negotiations for the sale of various parcels of real estate, which were carried on with Mr. Shea's full knowledge and consent. Mr. Shea placed his full confidence in 'Buck', as he called his son-in-law, and assumed no initiative of his own.

A 125 acre tract of land near Mr. Shea's home, adjacent to land which was being developed as residential property, was one of his most valuable and readily salable assets. In 1962, the developer of this contiguous land had expressed to Mr. Shea an interest in it at.$1000.00 per acre. A firm offer of this amount was made in November, 1964, and was refused by Mr. Shea on the advice of his son-in-law that the property was worth at least $1500.00 per acre. Negotiations between the developer and Mr. Ransdell commenced at that time and were in progress when Mr. Shea, at the instance of Dr. Hodge and without consulting Mr. Ransdell or anyone else, signed the contract of August 19, 1965. Under this contract Dr. Hodge claims the right to purchase twenty choice acres of the 125 acre tract for a consideration calculated by the circuit court to be the equivalent of $361.72 per acre. The market value of the land on the contract date has been fixed by an unappealed finding of the master at $1200.00 per acre.

In June of 1966 the negotiations between Mr. Ransdell and the developer resulted in the sale of 66.35 acres of the 125 acre tract, with an option arrangement as to the remainder (which made appropriate reference to the cloud created by Dr. Hodge's claim) for $99,525.00 or $1500.00 per acre. This sale was closed at the Spartanburg County Court House, simultaneously with two others which Mr. Ransdell had negotiated, with all interested parties or their representatives present. The purchase money, supplemented by $85,000.00 which Mr. Ransdell had arranged to borrow, was used to discharge the tax lien and judgments against Mr. Shea.

The consideration was expressed in the contract between Dr. Hodge and Mr. Shea as follows:

'The purchase price being (Cadillac Coupe DeVille 6600) & $4000.00 Dollars, on the following terms: Dr. Joseph Hodge to give to Mr. George Shea a new $6600. coupe DeVille Cadillac which is to be registered in name of Mr. George A. Shea at absolutely no cost to him. In return, Mr. Shea will give to Dr. Joe Hodge his 1964 Cadillac coupe DeVille and shall transfer title of this vehicle to Dr. Hodge. Further, Dr. Joseph Hodge will pay to Mr. George A. Shea the balance of $4000.00 for the 20 acres of land described above subject to survey, title check, less taxes on purchase of vehicle.'

Dr. Hodge was fully aware of Mr. Shea's financial troubles, the liens on his property and his son-in-law's efforts in his behalf. He was also aware of his patient's predilection for new Cadillacs. 1 Although he was not obligated to do so until the property was cleared of liens, which was not accomplished until the following June, Dr. Hodge hastened to purchase a 1965 Cadillac Coupe DeVille and delivered it to Mr. Shea on the day after his discharge from the hospital on August 25, 1965. If he acted in haste in an effort to fortify what he must have realized was a dubious contract, he has so far succeeded. The ground of the circuit court's favorable decision was that Mr. Shea's acceptance of the new Cadillac and his surrender of the old one to Dr. Hodge amounted to a binding confirmation of the contract. We quote from the decree:

'The inadequate purchase price for the property involved is clearly and convincingly established. The very close association of plaintiff and defendant Shea as doctor and patient, considered in the light of the ill health and infirmity of Shea, renders this transaction clearly suspect. The master expressly found, however, that there was no undue influence exercised by plaintiff. The record does not contain any clear proof of overreaching as such; but defendant makes a persuasive argument that all of the circumstances considered in their totality justify a refusal by the Court to decree specific performance. Were it not for the fact that the defendant Shea some five days after the contract accepted the new automobile and voluntarily and intentionally transferred his older car to plaintiff, I might be disposed to a different conclusion. * * *'

The court interpreted the report as including an affirmative finding that the transaction was not tainted by undue influence, but neither joined in nor rejected such finding. Instead, the court made the negative finding that the 'record does not contain any clear proof of overreaching as such * * *.' Actually, the master's finding was also negative. 'I do not find from the testimony that there was any undue influence exercised by the plaintiff to obtain the agreement * * *.' The difference is of paramount importance because from the circumstances of this case, I.e., the gross inadequacy of consideration, the confidential relationship of physician and patient, and the inequality between the parties resulting from the patient's infirmity of body and mind, an implication or presumption arose that the doctor had obtained the advantage of his patient by fraud or overreaching. The burden was upon Dr. Hodge to remove this presumption by affirmative proof of the complete fairness of the transaction, including proof that the terms of the contract were fully understood by Mr. Shea, and that his assent thereto was the product of a deliberate exercise of his own judgment, uninfluenced by any unfair representation, inducement or enticement. 41 Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, Sec. 74, p. 196; Hewett v. Bullard, 258 N.C. 347, 128 S.E.2d 411; Peterson v. Budge, 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 211; Matthaei v. Pownall, 235 Pa. 460, 84 A. 444; Clinton v. Miller, 77 Okl. 173, 186 P. 932; Norflett v. Beall, 82 Miss. 538, 34 So. 328; Butler v. Gleason, 214 Mass. 248, 101 N.E. 371; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483.

All of the above cited decisions involved the physician-patient relationship. In each of them the burden was upon the physician to establish the complete fairness of the transaction in which the physician obtained a benefit. In the Hewett case, Supra, the point was stated tersely:

'Where a physician regularly treats a chronically ill person over a period of two years, a confidential relationship is established, raising a presumption that financial dealings between them are fraudulent.' 128 S.E.2d at 413.

No South Carolina case involving the physician-patient relationship has been cited or found by us. However, the applicable principles are the same as in our rather numerous decisions involving persons in other...

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  • Sard v. Hardy
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • December 21, 1976
    ...v. Sisler, 198 Okl. 107, 175 P.2d 796, 799 (1946); Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa.Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (1962); Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 168 S.E.2d 82, 84, 87 (1969).21 Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo.App.1961).22 Canterbury, supra, 464 F.2d at 782.23 Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d......
  • Wogan v. Kunze, 4026.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • September 26, 2005
    ...a confidential relationship. McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 639, 494 S.E.2d 431, 437 (Ct.App.1997); see also Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 608, 168 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1969). However, this state has not found that medical negligence or malpractice will support a cause of action for breach of......
  • Canterbury v. Spence
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • May 19, 1972
    ...v. Woodbury, 141 Mass. 329, 5 N.E. 275, 278, 279 (1886); Clinton v. Miller, 77 Okl. 173, 186 P. 932, 933 (1919); Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 168 S.E.2d 82, 84, 87 (1969). 29 See, e. g., Sheets v. Burman, 322 F.2d 277, 279-280 (5th Cir. 1963); Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147, 149......
  • McCormick v. England
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • November 4, 1997
    ...South Carolina has a public policy in favor of maintaining the confidentiality of physician-patient relationships. In Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 168 S.E.2d 82 (1969), our Supreme Court stated that the physician-patient relationship is a confidential relationship. 6 Further, South Carolina......
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