Hodges v. State, 33881
| Citation | 176 So.2d 91 |
| Decision Date | 09 June 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 33881,33881 |
| Parties | Harold HODGES, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Milton M. Ferrell, Henry R. Carr, G. David Parrish, Paul A. Louis, Bertha Claire
Lee and Sinclair, Barfield & Louis Miami, for petitioner.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard E. Gerstein, State Atty., and Roy S. Wood, Asst. State Atty., for respondent.
We go immediately to the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, for a resume of the facts with which that tribunal dealt when it reversed the order of the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County granting the present petitioner a new trial after his conviction of grand larceny.
The petitioner and one Gerald D. Keller were charged with the crime. Keller was acquitted.
The motions for Hodges for a new trial were based on many grounds, some of them stereotyped, but there is no need to analyze them because the trial judge focused his ruling on the complaint 'that the State had failed to prove the corpus delicti independently of admissions and statements of the defendants,' to quote from his order, and to stress the point, he observed that in the trial, relying on representations of the prosecution that the corpus delicti would be established independently of such admissions and statements the Court admitted into evidence 'oral admissions and statements of the defendants.' He concluded that in such a situation he should have granted the motions of the defendants for a directed verdict in their favor. This is, indeed, a forceful showing by the judge, who having conducted the trial, and being thoroughly familiar with its atmosphere and progress, that he had been, no doubt inadvertently on the part of the prosecution as well as himself, led into an error which he was impelled to rectify.
Now, back to the dellneation of the facts as it appeared in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal and as we understand it from the record, briefs, and argument of counsel. The defendants were proprietors of a convalescent home. Hodges was president and manager; Keller was Secretary; one Powell was an inmate of the place. In some way which is not clear to us, the sum of $2020 was produced as the property of Powell, said to have been found 'in and about Powell's personal effects and in his room.' An employee, who did not testify, brought the money to Hodges who delivered it to Keller. The following day Keller, not Hodges, placed the money in a bank and it was noted on the books of the home as an escrow account of Powell.
Eventually Hodges sold his interest in the home to Keller and Keller then re-deposited the money in a bank and delivered the sum to the probate court for administration as an asset of Powell's estate, Powell having meanwhile died.
Noting in the opinion, as we have already remarked, that the person who served as carrier of the money to Keller had failed to testify, it was written that the origin of the funds 'was established through admission against interest by Hodges [who did not testify] and by certain other direct and circumstantial evidence.' The State had argued before the District Court of Appeal that the trial court had erred by holding that the corpus delicti must be proved independently of admissions by the defendants and that in the instant case it was proved by admissions 'plus other evidence.'
The decision in Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380, to which the District Court of Appeal referred, seems to us now as sound as when it was written 37 years ago. It re-announced the rule appearing in Groover v. State, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, 26 A.L.R. 373, that while the corpus delicti cannot be established by a confession alone, confessions and admissions may be considered in connection with other evidence to established it and that it is not necessary in larceny cases that it be proved independently of evidence pointing to the accused as perpetrator of the crime. It is significant that as a prerequisite to the introduction of a confession the corpus delicti need be established only prima facie, but in the end it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction.
As we construe the trial judge's order in the light of the authority cited in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, and in...
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Thomas v. State
...to the facts of this case. Although it is true that corpus delicti cannot be established solely by resort to a confession, Hodges v. State, 176 So.2d 91 (Fla.1965), the existence of additional substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a violation is enough to allow the case to go to ......
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Baxter v. State, 89-02939
...solely by a confession, "confessions and admissions may be considered in connection with other evidence to establish it." Hodges v. State, 176 So.2d 91, 92 (Fla.1965). As explained by the United States Supreme Court: "It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitt......
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Golden v. State, 78982
...135 (Fla.1961); Lee v. State, 96 Fla. 59, 117 So. 699 (1928). The corpus delicti must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 Hodges v. State, 176 So.2d 91 (Fla.1965); Jefferson; Lee; Drysdale v. State, 325 So.2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Moreover, when circumstantial evidence is used to prove......
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Burks v. State
...term "confession" in Allen, it is clear we were, in fact, dealing with an admission, not a confession. We likewise held in Hodges v. State, 176 So.2d 91, 92 (Fla.1965), where "admissions against interest" were involved, that a new trial was required because "the fact that the crime of larce......