Hoffler v. Bezio

• Decision Date: 17 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 9:11–CV–0396 (TJM).,9:11–CV–0396 (TJM).
• Citation: 831 F.Supp.2d 570
• Parties: Michael HOFFLER, Petitioner, v. Norman R. BEZIO, Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

831 F.Supp.2d 570

Michael HOFFLER, Petitioner,

v.Norman R. BEZIO, Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents.

No. 9:11–CV–0396 (TJM).

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Nov. 17, 2011.

Office of Raymond A. Kelly, of Counsel, Raymond A. Kelly, Esq., Albany, NY, for the Petitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, of Counsel, Lisa E. Fleischmann, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, State of New York, New York, NY, for the Respondent.

MEMORANDUM–DECISION AND ORDER

THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior District Judge.

I. BACKGROUNDA. State Court Proceedings

On March 19, 2004, a Rensselaer County Grand Jury charged petitioner Michael Hoffler with two counts of Murder in the First Degree, contrary to New York Penal Law (“Penal Law”) §§ 125.27(1)(a)(v)(b) and 125.27(1)(a)(vi)(b) (witness-elimination murder; contract killing); Murder in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 125.25(1); and Second Degree Conspiracy, contrary to Penal Law § 105.15, arising out of the December 30, 2003 fatal shooting of Christopher Drabik, who at the time had been acting as a confidential informant for the Albany Police Department. See Indictment No. 04–1024.¹ Hoffler's jury trial on those charges commenced in May, 2005 before Rensselaer County Court Judge Patrick J. McGrath. At the conclusion of that trial, Hoffler was convicted of murder in the first degree (witness-elimination murder). See Transcript of Trial of Michael Hoffler (5/2005) (Dkt. Nos. 2–1 through 2–8) (“Trial Tr.”) at pp. 1672–76. However, on appeal, the New York State, Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department reversed Hoffler's conviction and ordered a new trial because the oath of truthfulness had not been administered to the jurors before they were questioned during voir dire. See People v. Hoffler, 53 A.D.3d 116, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266 (3d Dept.2008). In arriving at that decision, the Appellate Division initially rejected Hoffler's claims alleging pretrial error on the part of the Trial Court, including his claims that the grand jury evidence was legally insufficient, and that the County Court erred in denying Hoffler's pretrial motion which sought the suppression of certain evidence. Id. at 118–19, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266. However, the Appellate Division reversed Hoffler's conviction because that court found that “the complete failure to provide the oath of truthfulness to the prospective jurors constituted a clear violation of the statutory mandate of [Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) ] § 270.15(1)(a), dissolved an important safeguard to [Hoffler's] constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and invalidated the entire trial.” Id. at 124, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266 (citations omitted). After arriving at that determination, that court did not address various other appellate claims asserted by Hoffler, including his arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial, the weight of that evidence, and Hoffler's claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 124, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266. The New York Court of Appeals subsequently denied Hoffler permission to appeal the Appellate Division's order to the Court of Appeals. People v. Hoffler, 11 N.Y.3d 832, 868 N.Y.S.2d 607, 897 N.E.2d 1091 (2008).

On May 15, 2009, Hoffler moved to dismiss the Indictment pursuant to New York's Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) §§ 210.20, 40.20(1), and 40.30(1)(b). See Dkt. Nos. 7 & 7–1 at FA–1153–1373 (“May, 2009 Motion to Dismiss”). In that application, Hoffler argued, inter alia, that because the Appellate Division had ordered a re-trial of Hoffler without first evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence adduced at his trial, his re-trial would violate his Double Jeopardy rights. May, 2009 Motion to Dismiss at Points I, V, VIII–XII.

In his Decision and Order dated September 16, 2009, Rensselaer County Court Judge Robert M. Jacon denied Hoffler's May, 2009 Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. See Decision and Order of Judge Jacon (09/16/09) (Dkt. No. 9–1 at pp. 40–48) (“September, 2009 Decision”). In that ruling, the court initially noted that the Appellate Division order which reversed Hoffler's conviction and ordered a new trial served to nullify Hoffler's first trial, and that therefore a re-trial under the Indictment was permissible. September, 2009 Decision at p. 5. In addressing Hoffler's argument that the Appellate Division was legally required to address his challenges to the sufficiency of evidence prior to ordering a re-trial, and that its failure to do so constituted a fundamental defect barring his re-trial, the court found that the Appellate Division's decision reversing Hoffler's conviction was in full compliance with CPL § 470.25,² and because the AppellateDivision's decision was in compliance with that provision of the CPL, such court was not legally required to address Hoffler's evidence sufficiency claims. September, 2009 Decision at pp. 5–6. The court also rejected Hoffler's argument that by not ruling on the evidence sufficiency claims, the Appellate Division subjected Hoffler to a second trial in violation of Double Jeopardy principles by concluding that an “intermediate appellate court is not required to address all issues raised in an appeal” because under CPL § 470.15(1), “an intermediate appellate court may consider and determine any question of law or fact involving error or defect in the criminal court proceedings. The language does not say must address all questions of law or fact.” September, 2009 Decision at p. 6 (emphasis in original).

Hoffler thereafter filed an application pursuant to Article 78 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules in the Third Department for an order from the Appellate Division barring his re-trial. See Dkt. No. 8 at FA–1410–35 (“Article 78 Petition”). The District Attorney opposed that application (Dkt. No. 10 at FA–1765–1805), and on April 1, 2010, the Third Department dismissed the petition and found that Hoffler had not demonstrated a clear legal right to an order prohibiting the prosecutor from re-trying Hoffler. Hoffler v. Jacon, 72 A.D.3d 1183, 897 N.Y.S.2d 755 (3d Dep't 2010). Specifically, that Court noted that “under New York's statutory double jeopardy scheme, a person is considered to have been ‘prosecuted’ on an offense after the action proceeds to trial and the jury has been impaneled and sworn.” Hoffler, 72 A.D.3d at 1184, 897 N.Y.S.2d 755 (citing CPL § 40.30(1)(b)). Since, in reversing Hoffler's conviction, the Appellate Division concluded that the jury had never been properly sworn pursuant to CPL § 270.15(1)(a), which failure in turn “invalidated the entire trial” ( Hoffler, 53 A.D.3d at 124, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266), the Appellate Division found that his prior trial “was a nullity and petitioner was never ‘prosecuted’ under the indictment.” Hoffler, 72 A.D.3d at 1185, 897 N.Y.S.2d 755 (citations omitted). That court therefore concluded that Hoffler “was never placed in jeopardy even though the trial proceeded to its conclusion.” Hoffler, 72 A.D.3d at 1185, 897 N.Y.S.2d 755 (citations omitted). The Third Department found Hoffler's argument that his re-trial was barred because the Appellate Division failed to address his legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence claims in the context of his direct appeal to be “unavailing,” Hoffler, 72 A.D.3d at 1185, 897 N.Y.S.2d 755, and found no impediment to his retrial “[w]here, as here, a fundamental defect rendered the entire trial invalid.” Id. On July 1, 2010, the New York Court of Appeals denied Hoffler's leave application “upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.” Hoffler v. Jacon, 15 N.Y.3d 768, 906 N.Y.S.2d 812, 933 N.E.2d 212 (2010), reconsideration denied, Hoffler v. Jacon, 15 N.Y.3d 872, 912 N.Y.S.2d 561, 938 N.E.2d 994 (2010).

B. This Action

With the assistance of counsel, Hoffler commenced this action on April 11, 2011 through the filing of a habeas corpus petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”). In his pleading, Hoffler argues that: (1) by failing to resolve Hoffler's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence prior to ordering his re-trial, the Appellate Division violated Hoffler's constitutional rights; (2) the evidence presented by the prosecution at Hoffler's trial was legally insufficient to establish his guilt; and (3) CPL § 40.30(3), which allows the re-prosecution of an individual under the same indictment if an earlier prosecution has been nullified by court order, is unconstitutional. See Petition; see also Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition (Dkt. No. 1–1) (“Supporting Mem.”) at pp. 6–15. Petitioner has also requested that this Court conduct an evidentiary hearing to consider: (1) Rensselaer County's alleged policy of not administering the oath of truthfulness to prospective jurors; (2) the “lack of manifest necessity for not issuing an oath of truthfulness to prospective jurors;” and (3) whether Hoffler “received an implicit acquittal” during the internal appellate process relating to his appeal. Petition at ¶ 16.

On May 27, 2011, the Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York, acting on respondent's behalf, filed a response in opposition to Hoffler's petition. See Dkt. No. 15. Respondent attached to his response a memorandum of law in opposition to Hoffler's petition. See Dkt. No. 15–1 (“Resp. Mem.”).

On August 5, 2011, Hoffler filed a reply memorandum in further support of his application for habeas relief. See Dkt. No. 19 (“Reply”).

II. DISCUSSIONA. Propriety of Bringing Action Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Initially, this Court notes that Hoffler has entitled this matter as a “Pretrial Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Petition at p. 1. Hoffler asserts that this action is properly brought by him pursuant to § 2241, rather than § 2254, while respondent argues that this Court should...