Hoffler v. Jacon

• Decision Date: 01 April 2010
• Citation: 72 A.D.3d 1183,897 N.Y.S.2d 755
• Parties: In the Matter of Michael HOFFLER, Petitioner, v. Robert M. JACON, as Judge of the County Court of Rensselaer County, Respondent, and Christopher J. Belling, as Special Prosecutor, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

897 N.Y.S.2d 755 72 A.D.3d 1183 In the Matter of Michael HOFFLER, Petitioner, v. Robert M. JACON, as Judge of the County Court of Rensselaer County, Respondent, and Christopher J. Belling, as Special Prosecutor, Respondent. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York. April 1, 2010.

Ray Kelly, Albany, for petitioner.

Christopher J. Belling, New York Prosecutors Training Institute, Albany, respondent pro se.

Before: CARDONA, P.J., LAHTINEN, MALONE JR., STEIN and GARY, JJ.

STEIN, J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to CPLR 506[b][1] ) to prohibit respondents from trying petitioner in the County Court of Rensselaer County on an indictment charging him with murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree.

Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to a prison term of life without parole. On direct appeal to this Court, petitioner argued, among other things, that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the conviction should be reversed because the prospective jurors were not properly sworn. Ultimately, this Court reversed on the law and remitted the matter to County Court for a new trial based on our finding that the prospective jurors had not been properly sworn to truthfully answer the questions posed to them regarding their qualifications to serve as jurors( People v. Hoffler, 53 A.D.3d 116, 120-124, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266 [2008], lvs. denied11 N.Y.3d 832, 834, 868 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608, 897 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 [2008] ). In so doing, we determined that the failure to administer this oath to the jurors constituted a fundamental defect in the proceedings, rendering the trial a nullity ( id.).

Respondent County Judge of Rensselaer County was assigned to preside over the retrial of the indictment against petitioner and respondent Christopher J. Belling (hereinafter respondent) was appointed as a Special Prosecutor to prosecute the case. Petitioner moved to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment that charged him with the crimes of murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree ¹ on the ground that retrial would violate his statutory and constitutional double jeopardy rights. Upon the denial of the motion, petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents from trying him on the remaining counts.² Because we now conclude that, under the particular circumstances of this case, petitioner has not demonstrated a clear legal right to such relief, the petition must be dismissed.

Preliminarily, we note that a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition is a proper mechanism to raise a claim that retrial is barred by double jeopardy principles ( see Matter of Di Lorenzo v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 306, 309-310, 367 N.Y.S.2d 761, 327 N.E.2d 805 [1975]; Matter of Stewart v. Hartnett, 34 A.D.3d 1134, 1136, 824 N.Y.S.2d 786 [2006], appeal dismissed 8 N.Y.3d 936, 834 N.Y.S.2d 505, 866 N.E.2d 451 [2007] ). Nonetheless, a petitioner must "demonstrate a clear right to [such] extraordinary remedy" ( Matter of Baim v. Eidens, 279 A.D.2d 787, 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d 718 [2001] ) and the absence of an adequate remedy at law ( see Matter of Newfield Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 66 A.D.3d 1314, 1315, 888 N.Y.S.2d 244 [2009]; Rafferty v. Owens, 82 A.D.2d 582, 585, 442 N.Y.S.2d 571 [1981]; see also Matter of Whitehead v. Vizzie, 223 A.D.2d 938, 637 N.Y.S.2d 227 [1996] ). The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against repeated prosecutions for the same criminal offense after an acquittal or a conviction ( see U.S. Const. 5th, 14 Amends.; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6; CPL 40.20 et seq.; People v. Gonzalez, 99 N.Y.2d 76, 82, 751 N.Y.S.2d 830, 781 N.E.2d 894 [2002] ). As relevant here, under New York's statutory double jeopardy scheme, a person is considered to have been "prosecuted" on an offense after the action proceeds to trial and the jury has been impaneled and sworn (CPL 40.30[1][b] ). Thus, in a trial on anindictment, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not implicated-and jeopardy does not attach-in the absence of a duly impaneled and sworn jury ( see Matter of Rivera v. Firetog, 11 N.Y.3d 501, 506, 872 N.Y.S.2d 401, 900 N.E.2d 952 [2008], cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 2012, 173 L.Ed.2d 1105 [2009]; People v. Mergenthaler, 13 A.D.3d 984, 985, 787 N.Y.S.2d 486 [2004] ).

Here, because it has been established that the jury was never properly sworn pursuant to CPL 270.15(1)(a) and that such failure "invalidated the entire trial" ( People v. Hoffler, 53 A.D.3d at 124, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266), the trial was a nullity and petitioner was never "prosecuted" underthe indictment ( see Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL 40.30, at 62; Matter of Cummings v. Koppell, 212 A.D.2d 11, 14, 627 N.Y.S.2d 480 [1995], lv. denied 86 N.Y.2d 702, 631 N.Y.S.2d 606, 655 N.E.2d 703 [1995]; see also Matter of Cunningham v. Dwyer, 302 A.D.2d 888, 889, 754 N.Y.S.2d 499 [2003], appeal dismissed 99 N.Y.2d 649, 760 N.Y.S.2d 97, 790 N.E.2d 271 [2003] ). Consequently, petitioner was never placed in jeopardy even though the trial proceeded to its conclusion ( see CPL 40.30[3]; Matter of Stewart v. Hartnett, 34 A.D.3d at 1136, 824 N.Y.S.2d 786; People v. Mergenthaler, 13 A.D.3d at 985, 787 N.Y.S.2d 486; see generally Matter of Kelly v. Bruhn, 3 A.D.3d 783, 784, 771 N.Y.S.2d 561 [2004], appeal dismissed 2 N.Y.3d 793, 781 N.Y.S.2d 291, 814 N.E.2d 463 [2004], lv. denied 3 N.Y.3d 698, 785 N.Y.S.2d 17, 818 N.E.2d 660 [2004]; Matter of Cheatom v. Kreindler, 173 A.D.2d 703, 703, 570 N.Y.S.2d 350 [1991]; Matter of Chang v. Rotker, 155 A.D.2d 49, 54-55, 552 N.Y.S.2d 676 [1990] ).³ Nor are we persuaded that double jeopardy principles are implicated because the fundamental error here-failure to properly administer the oath to the jurors-could have been corrected before the trial commenced. Notwithstanding defense counsel's timely objection to the error, County Court (McGrath, J.) apparently proceeded on a mistaken impression that the oath had been properly administered ( see People v. Hoffler, 53 A.D.3d at 120, 860 N.Y.S.2d 266). In the absence of evidence of intentional or egregious misconduct by the People ( see People v. Adames, 83 N.Y.2d 89, 90-93, 607 N.Y.S.2d 919, 629 N.E.2d 391 [1993] ) or evidence that a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial was otherwise irreparably harmed by the error such that it could not be cured by retrial ( see Matter of Randall v. Rothwax, 78 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 577 N.Y.S.2d 211, 583 N.E.2d 924 [1991], cert. denied 503 U.S. 972, 112 S.Ct. 1588, 118 L.Ed.2d 306 [1992] ), double jeopardy does not bar petitioner's retrial on the indictment.

Petitioner's argument that retrial is barred by virtue of what he characterizes as a second fundamental defect-this Court's failure to address petitioner's legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence claims on his direct appeal of the prior murder conviction-is also unavailing. Where, as here, a fundamental defect rendered the entire trial invalid, we discern no impediment topetitioner's retrial ( compare Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 [1978] ). Furthermore, inasmuch as petitioner had an adequate remedy at law ⁴ and is now seeking to collaterally attack our determination and obtain review of his claims regarding legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence, which were not previously addressed by this Court, a CPLR article...