Hoffman v. Colorado State Bd. of Assessment Appeals
| Decision Date | 04 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83SA47,83SA47 |
| Citation | 683 P.2d 783 |
| Parties | Abe L. HOFFMAN and Florence Hoffman; Sidney Reckler and Sarah Redman Reckler; Edward and Dorothy Hirschfield; Stuart and Irene Fiedelman; Herbert and Tillie Kirschbaum; Shirley K. Storey; Max M. and Florence J. Glaston; Stanley J. Hinson; and Eileen L. Hamley, for themselves and for all others similarly situated, Petitioners and Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The COLORADO STATE BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS; the Board of Equalization of the City and County of Denver; Jerry Kempf, as Manager of Revenue, and Mike R. Licht, as Deputy Assessor of the City and County of Denver; and the City and County of Denver, Respondents and Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
James H. Downey, Goldstein & Armour, P.C., Denver, for petitioners and plaintiffs-appellees.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Joel W. Cantrick, Sol. Gen., Billy J. Shuman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for Colorado State Bd. of Assessment Appeals.
Stephen H. Kaplan, City Atty., Robert F. Strenski, Asst. City Atty., Denver, for The Bd. of Equalization of the City and County of Denver; Denver Manager of Revenue; Denver Deputy Assessor; and the City and County of Denver.
The Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals and the City and County of Denver (Denver) appeal a judgment of the Denver District Court that the Denver assessor improperly increased the 1980 valuation of apartments converted to condominiums in Denver. The court certified as a class all similarly situated condominium owners and ordered that they be granted a property tax refund. Because the statutory scheme for protesting property valuations provides a complete, adequate, and speedy remedy, we conclude that the district court was without jurisdiction to grant equitable relief in the nature of a class action suit to all similarly situated condominium owners and reverse the judgment.
Abe and Florence Hoffman initiated this action by protesting the 1980 valuation of their Denver condominium. The Hoffmans purchased the condominium in 1979 when it was converted from an apartment, which they had rented for ten years, to a condominium. In May 1980, the Hoffmans received a "Notice of Valuation" indicating an increase in the condominium's property tax valuation for tax year 1980.
The Denver assessor in 1980 routinely increased the valuation of condominiums upon their conversion from apartments to condominiums, relying on section 39-1-104(11)(b), 16B C.R.S. (1982). 1 In June 1980, the Hoffmans, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, protested the increased valuation by letter to the assessor. The assessor's office denied the Hoffmans relief. The Hoffmans then petitioned for relief, for themselves and for all other owners similarly situated, to the Denver County Board of Equalization, which denied class relief and also denied relief specifically to the Hoffmans.
In August 1980, the Hoffmans appealed the decision of the county board of equalization to the Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA). The respondent board of equalization filed a motion to dismiss that portion of the appeal asserting the rights of all others similarly situated. The BAA, noting that the county board of equalization had only denied relief to the Hoffmans, granted the motion and limited its hearing to the Hoffmans' protest of the valuation of their condominium. After the hearing, the BAA concluded that there was no basis for the increased valuation of the Hoffmans' condominium and ordered reduction of the assessed value.
The Hoffmans subsequently filed an action in Denver District Court, along with other named individuals, 2 seeking relief for all similarly situated taxpayers whose property valuations had been increased because of the conversion of apartments to condominiums. The district court, at a hearing upon the plaintiff-condominium owners' motion to certify the matter as a class action, found that the "ruling of the Board of Assessment Appeals, declaring that the reassessment of the Hoffmans' unit was illegal, creates a strong position in equity that all persons similarly situated to the Hoffmans should be accorded relief," and certified the class. 3 Judgment subsequently was entered in favor of the plaintiffs, and the court ordered property tax refunds. The court also awarded costs and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs to be paid from the refunds. The issue before us is whether the district court had jurisdiction to permit the condominium owners to bring this case as a class action. 4
The district court allowed the plaintiffs to bring this class action without requiring that the named plaintiffs other than the Hoffmans and the members of the class exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the General Assembly. The general rule is that a court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief if a plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Gramiger v. Crowley, 660 P.2d 1279 (Colo.1983); Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Authority of City of Boulder, 176 Colo. 281, 490 P.2d 299 (1971). This is especially true in tax relief cases. In City and County of Denver v. Lewin, 106 Colo. 331, 105 P.2d 854 (1940), this court acknowledged that the taxing power of the state is exclusively a legislative function.
[T]he legislature has plenary power on the matter of taxation, and it alone has the right and discretion to determine all questions of time, method, nature, purpose, and extent in respect of the imposition of taxes, the subjects on which the power may be exercised, and all the incidents pertaining to the proceedings from beginning to end; and the exercise of such discretion, within constitutional limitations, is not subject to judicial control.
105 P.2d at 858. Where the General Assembly has established complete, adequate, and speedy statutory remedies for alleged tax irregularities, a taxpayer must exhaust them. City and County of Denver v. Athmar Park Building Co., 151 Colo. 424, 378 P.2d 638 (1963); Liebhardt v. Department of Revenue, 123 Colo. 369, 229 P.2d 655 (1951); Davison v. Board of County Commissioners, 41 Colo.App. 344, 585 P.2d 315 (1978).
The important question, therefore, is whether the remedy provided by the General Assembly in this situation is complete, adequate, and speedy. We conclude that it is. If any taxpayer believes that his property has been valued incorrectly, he must timely protest the valuation to the county assessor. Section 39-5-122(2), 16B C.R.S. (1982). 5 If his protest is denied, he may appeal to the county board of equalization. Section 39-5-122(3), 16B C.R.S. (1982). 6 The petition for appeal to the county board of equalization must include a description of the property claimed to be erroneously valued, the valuation placed upon it by the assessor, and the valuation for assessment placed upon it by the person whose protest has been denied. Section 39-8-106(1), 16B C.R.S. (1982). 7 If this petition is denied, the taxpayer may appeal to the board of assessment appeals. Section 39-8-108(1), 16B C.R.S. (1982). 8 If the decision of the board is against the taxpayer, he may petition the district court for judicial review. Section 39-8-108(2), 16B C.R.S. (1983 Supp.). 9
The conclusion that this remedy is complete, adequate, and speedy may be demonstrated by examining the facts of this case. The Hoffmans protested the valuation of their condominium to the county assessor in June 1980, and were granted the individual relief they sought on November 13, 1980. The only relief not granted was that requested for the similarly situated condominium owners. The procedure described in sections 39-5-122, 39-8-106, and 39-8-108 indicates that the General Assembly did not intend this to be a class remedy. The county board of equalization is required to examine the description of the particular property assessed, the assessor's valuation, and the taxpayer's valuation. This procedure contemplates an individualized treatment of claims rather than an examination of a general protest of all similarly situated owners. 10 The denial by the General Assembly of this procedure as a class remedy is within its discretion, especially in light of the fact that the General Assembly has provided other ways for a taxpayer to protest the valuation of classes or subclasses of property. At the time this action was initiated a taxpayer could file a complaint with the state property tax administrator alleging that a class or subclass of property had been erroneously valued, section 39-2-111, 16B C.R.S. (1982), 11 or he could appeal a decision of the board of assessment appeals with regard to valuation of classes or subclasses of property to the state board of equalization. Section 39-9-103(2), 16B C.R.S. (1982). 12 The plaintiffs here pursued neither of these remedies.
We conclude that the district court had no jurisdiction in this case. All plaintiffs, except the Hoffmans, failed to exhaust the complete, adequate, and speedy remedy provided by the General Assembly to protest property valuations. The Hoffmans could not bring this action to the district court on their own because the decision of the BAA was not against them. See section 39-8-108(2), 16B C.R.S. (1982) set out in fn. 9, supra. 13
The plaintiffs argue that Rodgers v. Atencio, 43 Colo.App. 268, 608 P.2d 813 (1979) supports allowing a class action in this case. In Rodgers, the Court of Appeals held that the certification of a class of disabled individuals to challenge the termination of disability benefits was correct. The defendant Department of Social Services contended that some class members had not timely pursued administrative remedies, but the court held that it was unnecessary for the class members to pursue those remedies because the agency did not have the authority to rule on the substantive issue presented. That is not the case here; the relief sought by...
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