Hoffman v. Jacobi
| Decision Date | 17 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB |
| Parties | DESTINY HOFFMAN, et al. Plaintiffs, v. JEROME JACOBI, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Jerome Jacobi's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim [Docket No. 38], filed on June 5, 2014 pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
The factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint are extensive, but we need not discuss them at length here; the motion to dismiss concerns only one Defendant and focuses on jurisdictional issues.
Defendant Judge Jerome F. Jacobi is an elected judge in Clark County, Indiana. At the time of the incidents alleged in the Amended Complaint, Judge Jacobi served as the presiding judge of Clark Circuit Court No. 2 and the Clark County Drug Treatment Court. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. The Clark County Drug Treatment Court was created under the auspices of a 2010 Indiana statute as a "problem solving court focused on addressing the substance abuse issues of defendants . . . in the criminal justice system by . . . bringing together substance abuserehabilitation professional, local social programs, and intensive judicial monitoring." Ind. Code § 33-23-16-5(a)(1).
Plaintiffs allege several types of misconduct by officials of the Clark County court system and other county officials.1 Four of these allegations relate to Judge Jacobi. First, a number of Plaintiffs who were participants in the Clark County Drug Treatment Court allege that they suffered periods of detention without hearing, notice, counsel, the consideration of bond, or the opportunity to hear evidence against them or cross-examine witnesses—all in violation of their rights to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145-154. Second, Plaintiff Jesse Hash alleges that he was incarcerated for 60 days as a pretrial detainee by order of officials of Clark Circuit Court No. 2 without any appearance before a judicial officer, without a probable cause hearing, without consideration of bail or the appointment of counsel, and without notice of the charges against him—in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at ¶¶ 155-161. Third, Plaintiff James Bennett, a convict serving a portion of his sentence on a work-release program, alleges that he was re-arrested and held for 74 days without ever having been told the reason for his detention, and in violation of his due process rights to a hearing, counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination.2 Id. at ¶¶ 162-171. Finally, four Plaintiffs allege that they were arrested by Clark County officials who lacked lawful arrest powers, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at ¶¶ 172-178. Plaintiffs sue Judge Jacobi in his official capacity, and they state with respect to each of these four claims that they are suing him "for the sole purposes of obtaining adeclaration" that the actions taken under the aegis of his courts violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. See id. at ¶¶ 148, 157, 165, 174.3
On February 14, 2014, shortly before Plaintiffs initiated this action, the Indiana Judicial Center informed Judge Jacobi that it had suspended the operations of the Clark County Drug Court in light of the allegations of "unlawful conduct by drug court staff and drug court practices harmful to participants." Docket No. 39, Ex. 1. The letter went on to state that "[s]hould the allegations involving drug court practices prove to be unfounded, the Judicial Center will lift the suspension and work with you to restore drug court operations." Id. As of April 10, 2014, an electronic directory issued by the Indiana Judicial Center listed Judge Vicki Carmichael, rather than Judge Jacobi, as the presiding judge of the Clark County Drug Court; the directory did not indicate that the court was inactive or in suspended operations. Docket No. 39, Ex. 2.
Defendant Jacobi seeks dismissal both on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1), and on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). Because he seeks dismissal only on the basis of jurisdictional and justiciability issues, we weigh his motion to dismiss according the standard provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 970 F. Supp. 655, 657-658 (S.D. Ind. 1997). See also Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Grillo, 438 F. Supp. 2d 919, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Manos v. Caira, 162 F. Supp. 2d 979, 986(N.D. Ill. 2001) () (additional citations omitted).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure command that courts dismiss any suit over which they lack subject matter jurisdiction—whether acting on the motion of a party or sua sponte. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), we "must accept the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor." Franzoni v. Hartmax Corp., 300 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2002); Transit Express, Inc. v. Ettinger, 246 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2001). We may, however, "properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." See Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993); Estate of Eiteljorg ex rel. Eiteljorg v. Eiteljorg, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
Defendant Judge Jacobi seeks dismissal on two grounds. First, he asserts that he no longer presides over the Clark County Drug Court, and he therefore contends that Plaintiffs' allegations against him are moot. Second, he urges that the Court abstain from considering the claims against him pursuant to the doctrine established by the United States Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. We address first the question of subject matter jurisdiction raised by Defendant Jacobi's mootness argument, before turning to Defendant Jacobi's argument that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction it may possess with regard to the claims involving the Clark Circuit Court. Ultimately, we find neither of Defendant's arguments persuasive.
The doctrine of mootness is a temporal manifestation of the jurisdictional limits imposed by Article III—that courts "may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). "A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (citing County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). Regardless of the circumstances present when the acts or omissions giving rise to a cause of action occurred, a federal court must abjure decision on a question that intervening factual events have rendered moot, lest it run afoul of the judiciary's longstanding prohibition on rendering merely "advisory" opinions. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199 (1988); City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 287; A.B. ex rel. Kehoe v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, 683 F.3d 844, 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief with respect to Defendant Jacobi. As the Seventh Circuit has explained:
A demand for present or prospective (declaratory or injunctive) relief imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiff to show survival of the controversy. Thus, when a public official is sued in his official capacity and the official is replaced or succeeded in office during the pendency of the litigation, the burden is on the complainant to establish the need for declaratory or injunctive relief by demonstrating that the successor in office will continue the relevant policies of his predecessors.
Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514, 520-523 (1974)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Salazar v. City of Chi., 940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, where a plaintiff can show that an official's actions reflect an institutional policy that could be assumed to persist under that official's successor, the suit may continue and the defendant in question may be substituted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). See, e.g., Rowe v. Davis, 373 F. Supp. 2d 822, 828 (N.D. Ind. 2005). Where theplaintiff has failed to meet that burden, the suit against that official is moot and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Kincaid, 670 F.2d at 741.
Here, we conclude that Defendant Jacobi's mootness argument is, at the very least, premature. Defendant has attached to his motion a February 14, 2014 letter from the Indiana Judicial Center informing Judge Jacobi that allegations of unlawful conduct necessitated "an immediate suspension of Clark County Drug Court operations," remaining in effect "until further notice from this office." Docket No. 39, Ex. 1. "Should the allegations involving drug court practices prove to be unfounded," the letter continued, "the Judicial Center will lift the suspension and work with you to restore drug court operations." Id. Defendant has also submitted a document indicating that, as of April 2014, the Indiana Judicial Center listed Judge Vicki Carmichael, rather than Judge Jacobi, as the presiding officer for the Clark County Drug Court. Docket No. 39, Ex. 2.
Taken together, these documents establish that the Judicial Center temporarily suspended the Clark County Drug Court in February 2014; we do not know how long the suspension lasted, or which judge currently presides over...
To continue reading
Request your trial