Hoffman v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.

• Citation: 306 N.C. 502,293 S.E.2d 807
• Decision Date: 03 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 89PA82,89PA82
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Parties: Jack A. HOFFMAN, Employee, Plaintiff, v. RYDER TRUCK LINES, INC., Employer, Self-Insured, Defendant.

Page 807

293 S.E.2d 807

306 N.C. 502

Jack A. HOFFMAN, Employee, Plaintiff, v. RYDER TRUCK LINES, INC., Employer, Self-Insured, Defendant.

No. 89PA82.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 3, 1982.

Byrd, Byrd, Ervin, Blanton, Whisnant & McMahon by C. Scott Whisnant, Morganton, for plaintiff-appellant.

Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis by Russell P. Brannon and Albert Sneed, Jr., Asheville, for defendant-appellee.

COPELAND, Justice.

It is axiomatic that an opinion and award entered by the Industrial Commission may not be disturbed on appeal unless a patent error of law exists therein. See G.S. 97-86; Godley v. County of Pitt, and cases there cited, 306 N.C. 357, 293 S.E.2d 167 (1982). In the instant case, our review is directed toward the resolution of a single issue: whether the Commission erred as a matter of law in finding and concluding that plaintiff's injury arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment as a truck driver for defendant. We disagree with the Court of Appeals and hold that, on these particular facts, the employee-driver and owner-lessor of the truck is entitled to workers' compensation for the accidental injury sustained by him.

We begin our analysis by reciting the familiar and well settled rule that "[w]hether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a mixed question of law and fact, and where there is evidence to support the Commissioner's findings in this regard, we are bound by those findings." Barham v. Food World, 300 N.C. 329, 331, 266 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1980). An appellate court is, therefore, justified in upholding a compensation award if the accident is "fairly traceable to the employment as a contributing cause" or if "any reasonable relationship to employment exists." Kiger v. Service Co., 260 N.C. 760, 762, 133 S.E.2d 702, 704 (1963). In other words, compensability of a claim basically turns upon whether or not the employee was acting for the benefit of his employer "to any appreciable extent" when the accident occurred. Guest v. Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 452, 85 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1955). Such a determination depends largely upon the unique facts of each particular case, and, in close cases, the benefit of the doubt concerning this issue should be given to the employee in accordance with the established policy of liberal construction and application of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976); Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930). With these principles in mind, we proceed to examine the individual merits of the case presently before us.

To clarify the matter, we note at the outset that, strictly speaking, there is no question here concerning the existence of a dual relationship between plaintiff and defendant. As driver and operator of the truck in the service of the defendant-carrier, plaintiff was, like any other driver, clearly an employee who was generally protected by the provisions of our workers' compensation law. As owner-lessor and caretaker of the truck, however, he was an independent contractor with defendant who was excluded from such statutory protection. Plaintiff wore these work "hats" separately at different times and which one he wore depended entirely upon the specific nature and aim of the duties he was then performing. See McGill v. Freight, 245 N.C. 469, 96 S.E.2d 438 (1957); Newsome v. Surratt, 237 N.C. 297, 74 S.E.2d 732 (1953); Hill v. Freight Carriers Corp., 235 N.C. 705, 71 S.E.2d 133 (1952); Roth v. McCord, 232 N.C. 678, 62 S.E.2d 64 (1950); Smith v. Central Transport, 51 N.C.App. 316, 276 S.E.2d 751 (1981). In short, the actual circumstances surrounding the task undertaken by plaintiff determined whether he was working for himself or the carrier at any given time and thus whether he was, in fact, covered under the Act. See Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 105 (1958); see also Suggs v. Truck Lines, 253 N.C. 148, 116 S.E.2d 359 (1960).

The crux of this case initially rests upon an interpretation of section eight of the parties' term leasing agreement, which undisputedly sets forth plaintiff's tasks as an independent contractor with defendant, as follows:

OWNER shall have the duty to repair and/or accomplish all repairs and pay for the same as well as to make, provide, accomplish and pay for all costs of operation which may include but shall not be limited to the following maintenance: fuels, lubricants, tires (including changing and/or repairs), etc.; public liability and property damage insurance on the Equipment while not being operated in the service of CARRIER; payments for injury or damages to the operator, driver and helpers and to the Equipment while the Equipment is not being operated in the service of the CARRIER....

The defendant-carrier essentially contends that this contractual provision conclusively establishes that all truck repairs were exclusively plaintiff's responsibility as owner-lessor and that the performance of such tasks were not included within the scope of his employment as a driver under any circumstances. We reject defendant's broad and all-encompassing interpretation of this clause.

Reading section eight as a whole, its logical and plain intent is to assign to the owner-lessor all costs and burdens associated with the general repair, maintenance and operation of the truck, regardless of who actually drives it for the carrier, and the duty to obtain his own liability and damage insurance to cover the vehicle when it is not in the carrier's service. By its terms, the clause does not exclude or affect the possible liability of the carrier for workers' compensation with respect to injuries received by an employee-driver, whomever he may be, as a result of his attempt to repair some part of the vehicle, and we shall not expand the applicability of the separate equipment lease beyond that for which it clearly provides. In any event, an employer would not be permitted to escape his liability or obligations under the Act through the use of a special contract or agreement if the elements required for coverage of the injured individual would otherwise exist. G.S. 97-6; see Watkins v. Murrow, 253 N.C. 652, 118 S.E.2d 5 (1961); Brown v. Truck Lines, 227 N.C. 299, 42 S.E.2d 71 (1947).

Thus, the real issue in this case develops into a two-fold inquiry: (1) which "hat" was plaintiff wearing when he attempted to replace the universal joints on his truck at his home, and (2) if he was wearing the "hat" of an employee-driver, and not that of an owner-lessor and independent contractor, did this type of repair work fall within the scope of his employment? The overall circumstances of this case convince us that the Commission correctly concluded that plaintiff was indeed an employee of the carrier at the time of the accident and that his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment.

The Commission's findings of fact nos. 2-7, to which defendant did not except and by which we are bound, are especially pertinent and persuasive in this regard. These findings are quoted in the beginning of the opinion and need not be reiterated in detail. It suffices to say that, in this record, it is undisputed that plainti...