Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 480PA83

• Decision Date: 10 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 480PA83,480PA83
• Citation: 337 S.E.2d 477,315 N.C. 127
• Parties: James C. HOGAN, Employee, Plaintiff, v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 477

337 S.E.2d 477

315 N.C. 127

James C. HOGAN, Employee, Plaintiff, v. CONE MILLS CORPORATION, Employer and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants.

No. 480PA83.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 10, 1985.

Boone, Higgins, Chastain & Cone by Peter Chastain, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter by J. Donald Cowan, Jr., and Caroline Hudson, Greensboro, for defendants-appellees.

EXUM, Justice.

This is a worker's compensation claim filed in 1980 by plaintiff appellant James C. Hogan for total disability caused by long exposure to cotton dust in the employ of defendant Cone Mills. The Industrial Commission found claimant to be totally disabled due to byssinosis and awarded him compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed on three grounds: (1) This action, initiated in 1980, was filed more than two years after claimant became disabled in 1976; (2) the summary dismissal of an earlier claim filed by Hogan in 1976 seeking relief on the same facts barred this 1980 claim under the doctrine of res judicata and (3) Hogan should not be granted relief from the former dismissal of his claim under N.C.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) because he never filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion and Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appellate review. We agree with the first two conclusions of the Court of Appeals but with respect to its third conclusion hold: (1) The Commission has inherent power, analogous to that conferred on courts by Rule 60(b)(6), in the exercise of supervision over its own judgments to set aside a former judgment when the paramount interest in achieving a just and proper determination of a claim require it; (2) there are sufficient facts in the record to warrant a remand of this case to the Commission in order for it to consider whether to set aside its former judgment; (3) Hogan's claim may be entitled to prevail on the merits; and (4) this case should be remanded to the Commission in order for it to consider whether to set aside its former judgment dismissing Hogan's claim.

I.

Appellant Hogan worked for appellee Cone Mills Corporation from 1932 to 1959 either in the card or slashing room, both of which were dusty. Cone Mills is a textile corporation and the Minneola Plant of that company, where Hogan worked, runs 100 percent cotton. Hogan was continuously exposed to cotton dust. He left Cone on his doctor's advice due to breathing problems in 1959.

Hogan took a vocational rehabilitation course and began working for J.P. Stevens in 1962 as an operator of a small printing press, a job which did not contribute to his pulmonary impairment. He stopped working there in 1975 after his production dropped because he tired easily. In February 1976 Dr. Herbert O. Sieker informed Hogan that he suffered from byssinosis and was totally and permanently disabled from all but the most sedentary types of employment. On 12 August 1976 Hogan filed a claim with the Industrial Commission which was calendared for hearing on 19 January 1977. The hearing officer assigned to Hogan's case, Deputy Commissioner Richard B. Conely, wrote Hogan's former attorney on 8 December 1976 and inquired whether plaintiff's last injurious exposure to cotton dust was before 1 July 1963. He advised that Hogan would not be entitled to compensation for byssinosis if he was last exposed before that date and attached an opinion and award in which he denied compensation in another case on those grounds.

In 1976 a commonly held but erroneous interpretation of the law which permits compensation for byssinosis, G.S. 97-53(13), was that it had no application to claimants last injuriously exposed to cotton dust before 1 July 1963. In 1959 when Hogan stopped working for Cone Mills, G.S. 97-53(13) defined occupational disease as the following:

Infection or inflammation of the skin or eyes or other external contact surfaces or oral or nasal cavities due to irritating oils, cutting compounds, chemical dust, liquids, fumes, gases or vapors, and any other materials or substances.

1935 N.C. Public Laws ch. 123, as amended by 1957 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 1396, § 6, quoted in Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Company, 297 N.C. 636, 642, 256 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1979). The legislature amended G.S. 97-53(13) in 1963 to include infections or inflammations of "any other internal or external organ or organs of the body." 1963 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 965, § 1. This amendment applied only to cases in which "the last exposure in an occupation subject to the hazards of such disease occurred on or after July 1, 1963." Id.; Wood, 297 N.C. at 642-43, 256 S.E.2d at 697. In 1971 the legislature amended G.S. 97-53(13) to its present form, which defines occupational disease as:

Any disease, other than hearing loss covered in another subdivision of this section, which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.

The 1971 amendment applies to all "cases originating on and after July 1, 1971." 1971 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 547, § 3. Unlike the 1963 amendment, it was not limited to cases in which the "last exposure" to disease occurred after its effective date but to cases "originating" after such date.

The Industrial Commission interpreted the date a case "originated" as the date an employee's medical case arose or the date an employee contracted disease. A person last injuriously exposed before 1963 was deemed to have contracted disease before 1 July 1971. Wood v. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979). Under the Commission's interpretation of G.S. 97-53(13), then, neither the 1971 nor the 1963 amendments would apply to persons exposed before 1963. That person's claim was governed by the 1958 version of G.S. 97-53(13) which the Commission in 1976 interpreted to provide no compensation for byssinosis. ¹

In 1979 we concluded these interpretations of G.S. 97-53(13) were erroneous. Wood v. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979). The claimant in Wood brought an action for compensation alleging total disability as a result of exposure to cotton dust. She was last exposed to cotton dust before 1 July 1963 and suffered total permanent disability as of 12 November 1975. Id. at 638, 256 S.E.2d at 694. Both the Commission and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals (Judge, now Justice, Mitchell dissenting) concluded, under the same interpretation of the occupational disease statute, G.S. 97-53(13), as employed here by Deputy Commissioner Conely, that the 1958 version applied to Wood's claim; under it byssinosis was not compensable as an occupational disease. Former Chief Justice Sharp, writing for the Court, explained that under the 1971 legislation a case originates when the claim arises. The claim arises when the employee becomes disabled. "Under our Workmen's Compensation Act injury resulting from occupational disease is compensable only when it leads to disablement. G.S. 97-52. Until that time the employee has no cause of action and the employer had no liability." Id. at 644, 256 S.E.2d at 697. The Court in Wood held that the "current [1971] version of G.S. 97-53(13) applies to all claims for disablement in which the disability occurs after the statute's effective date, 1 July 1971." Id. The Court reversed and remanded the case to permit the Commission to determine when Wood's disability occurred.

In 1976 when Deputy Commissioner Conely had Hogan's claim before him, he did not have the benefit of our decision in Wood. His letter inquiring of the date of Hogan's last injurious exposure stemmed from the then prevailing interpretation of the law that persons last exposed before 1963 were not entitled to compensation. After Deputy Commissioner Conely inquired of the date of Hogan's last exposure to cotton dust, defendants moved on 13 December 1976 to dismiss the claim on the ground that Hogan was last exposed in 1959.

Hogan's attorney informed Deputy Commissioner Conely by letter dated 28 December 1976 that the date of Hogan's last injurious exposure to cotton dust was before 1963. The letter by Hogan's attorney went on to say:

I have discussed your letter and the accompanying portion of an opinion and award which you forwarded to me along with your letter of December 8, 1976, with Mr. Hogan, and in doing so, have informed him that the opinion forwarded seemed to control in regard to his case and would appear to terminate any claim he might have regarding this matter....

Deputy Commissioner Conely had a telephone conversation with Hogan's attorney on 3 January 1977 in which Hogan's attorney told Conely Hogan did not intend to pursue his claim and would not object to dismissal of his case. Deputy Commissioner Conely entered an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss on 4 January 1977. Hogan did not appeal from the dismissal.

There was apparently some confusion on the part of Hogan, his former attorney, or both of them, concerning the effect of Conely's order. Hogan testified he consented to dismissal of his claim in 1976 on the express condition that he would have the right to refile it. He stated:

I filed a claim for benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act before this claim, on August 12, 1976. I'm not too positive about the date. I can't seem to remember. At that time [my former attorney] represented me in that. Commissioner Conely wrote me a letter and wrote [my attorney] a letter and said that I wasn't eligible for workmen's compensation because I left the cotton mill before 1963, and [my attorney] suggested to me that we drop it. He wasn't getting anything out of it and he was just going to drop it, and he wanted me to sign a letter to that effect. I refused to sign a letter. I told him the only way I would sign a letter to that effect would be the right to re-open the case at a later date, and that was the letter I signed. My...