Hogan v. Fairfax County School Bd.
| Citation | 645 F.Supp.2d 554 |
| Decision Date | 03 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:08cv250 (JCC).,1:08cv250 (JCC). |
| Parties | Lucia HOGAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
William Henry Hurd, Stephen Charles Piepgrass, Troutman Sanders LLP, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiffs.
Andrea Dawn Gemignani, Blankingship & Keith PC, Fairfax, VA, for Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment on the administrative record in a case brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The motions were filed by Defendant Fairfax County School Board ("Defendant") and Plaintiffs Lucia Hogan (the "Student"), Lucia Hogan by and through her father and attorney-in-fact, William Hogan, and William Hogan in his own capacity (the "Parent") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Also before the Court are two related motions regarding supplemental evidence offered by Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs' motion to allow certain additional evidence, some of which relates to the issue of attorney's fees, and Defendant's motion to strike a declaration by Plaintiffs' former counsel related to the attorneys' fee request. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, the Court will deny Defendant's motion to strike and grant Plaintiff's motion to allow additional evidence.
Plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint (the "Complaint") in this Court on March 14, 2008. The Complaint challenges two rulings made by the hearing officer (the "Hearing Officer") in the state administrative due process hearing (the "Hearing") initiated by the Plaintiffs. At the Hearing, Plaintiffs argued that Defendant should reimburse them for their private placement of the learning-disabled student and provide compensatory education.1 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Count I challenges the Hearing Officer's partial reduction of the reimbursement amount (Compl. ¶¶ 29-39) and Count II challenges his denial of compensatory education (Compl. ¶¶ 40-51). Count III asks Defendant to reimburse Plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs related to the state administrative proceedings. (Compl. ¶¶ 52-62.)
This case deals only with the 2005-2006 school year. During that year, Fairfax County Public Schools ("FCPS") did not provide any educational services to the Student. The Parent placed the Student in a private educational program for 12 weeks. At the Hearing, Plaintiffs sought both reimbursement for the expenses related to that private placement and, as an equitable remedy for FCPS's failure to provide the "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") required by the IDEA, compensatory education. During the Hearing, held over four days in November 2007, the Hearing Officer agreed with Plaintiffs that the FCPS, operated by Defendant, failed to provide the Student with a FAPE during the 2005-2006 school year. (Admin. R., tab 465, at 2.)2
The Hearing Officer agreed with Plaintiffs that the education provider that they used for the Student in 2005 was an appropriate placement. (Hr'g Dec. 22-23.) After finding that the Parent's "unjustified lack of real cooperation" was partly to blame for the FCPS's failure to offer a FAPE, the Hearing Officer decided that Plaintiffs deserved reimbursement for the private placement but reduced the reimbursement award by 1/3rd—from $28,079.52 to $18,719.68—to reflect the "unreasonable actions" of the Parent. (Hr'g Dec. 2, 28). The Hearing Officer also denied Plaintiffs' request for compensatory education. (Hr'g Dec. 30.)
Plaintiffs brought suit in this Court as parties aggrieved by a decision of an administrative hearing officer. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). This case differs from the typical IDEA action in that no party is challenging the Hearing Officer's decision as to whether FCPS provided the Student with a FAPE; instead, the dispute centers on the appropriate remedy for the FCPS's acknowledged failure to provide a FAPE during the 2005-2006 school year. Defendant also does not challenge the Hearing Officer's finding that Plaintiffs deserve at least some reimbursement for the private placement. Indeed, FCPS has already paid the Parent the $18,719.68 awarded by the Hearing Officer.
Plaintiffs and Defendant filed their respective motions for summary judgment on the administrative record on February 23, 2009. In accordance with the deadlines set by two agreed orders, the parties submitted opposition briefs on March 11, 2009 and reply briefs on March 23, 2009. Two other issues are before the Court. On January 14, 2009, Plaintiffs moved the Court to allow them to submit additional evidence. Defendant opposed the motion on January 20, 2009, and Plaintiffs filed a reply brief on January 28, 2009. On March 27, 2009, Defendant moved to strike a declaration by Plaintiffs' former counsel in support of their attorney's fee request. Plaintiffs opposed the motion to strike on March 30, 2009.
The Court heard oral arguments on the cross-motions on March 31, 2009 and took the matter under advisement. On June 23, 2009, the Court asked the parties to submit additional briefing on the Supreme Court's recent IDEA decision, Forest Grove School District v. T.A., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009). The parties submitted their memoranda on July 2, 2009; on July 14, Plaintiffs asked to file a reply memorandum to respond to arguments raised in Defendant's brief. The Court granted that request on July 17, 2009. The parties' motions are before the Court.
A district court reviewing a state administrative decision under the IDEA may grant summary judgment based upon the administrative record. See, e.g., DeLullo v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Educ., 71 F.Supp.2d 554 (N.D.W.Va.1998), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1304 (4th Cir.1999). "Actions authorized under [20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)] are procedurally unique in that they are independent civil actions in which the district court considers the record of the state administrative hearing, as well as any new evidence offered by a party, and makes findings based on the preponderance of the evidence." County Sch. Bd. of Henrico v. Z.P., 399 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir.2005) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)). The reviewing court should make an independent decision based on the preponderance of the evidence, but give due weight to the state administrative findings. See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985); Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir.1991).
In particular, the reviewing court should consider the factual findings in an IDEA state agency decision to be prima facie correct. See Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir County Bd. of Educ., 216 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir.2000). When factual findings are "regularly made," and thus entitled to a presumption that they are prima facie correct, the district court must explain any disagreements it has with or deviations it takes from those findings. County Sch. Bd. of Henrico, 399 F.3d at 304 (citing Doyle, 953 F.2d at 105). The Court must give due regard to the hearing officer's judgments as to the credibility of witnesses. Doyle, 953 F.2d at 104-05. Credibility determinations implicit in a hearing officer's decision are also entitled to deference. County Sch. Bd. of Henrico, 399 F.3d at 306-07 (citing A.B. ex rel. D.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 327-28 (4th Cir. 2004)). After giving the administrative factual findings their proper weight, "the district court is then free to decide the case on the preponderance of the evidence." Doyle, 953 F.2d at 105 (citations omitted). The party seeking to overturn a hearing officer's decision bears the burden of proof in showing that the decision was erroneous. See Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152 (4th Cir.1991); cf. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005).
The purpose of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To achieve this purpose, the IDEA extends federal funding to the states to provide disabled schoolchildren with a FAPE. Id. at § 1412(a)(1)(A). A FAPE requires a school district to provide educational services in the so-called "least restrictive environment," i.e., the educational environment suitable for the disabled student that is most similar to the public school environment in which non-disabled children are educated. Id. at § 1412(a)(5); Sch. Bd. of Prince William County v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1213 (4th Cir.1985).
Where the public school district is unable to provide a FAPE in the public schools, the IDEA requires the school district to assume the cost of educating the child in a private school that meets the child's educational and social services needs. Id. at § 1412(a)(10)(B). In some circumstances, parents may be reimbursed for a unilateral private placement: "When a court or hearing officer concludes that a school district failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement was suitable, it must consider all relevant factors . . . in determining whether reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child's private education is warranted." Forest Grove School District v. T.A., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2496, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009).
The IDEA establishes detailed procedures for the development and review of the Individualized Education Program ("IEP"), a plan designed by a team consisting of school district...
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