Hogan v. Finch
Decision Date | 21 December 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 39984,39984 |
Citation | 8 Ohio St.2d 31,222 N.E.2d 633 |
Parties | , 37 O.O.2d 379 HOGAN, a Minor Appellee, v. FINCH, a Minor, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where the evidence in a case permits a factual finding that plaintiff rendered a service for defendant at his (defendant's) request, and as an accommodation to him, upon his promise that he would transport plaintiff to her home in his automobile as a consideration therefor, and that plaintiff performed such service and was injured by defendant's negligent operation of the automobile on the way to plaintiff's home, a determination by a jury, under appropriate instructions of the court, that plaintiff occupied the status of passenger, entitled to recover damages for her injuries from defendant on the basis of his negligence, will be allowed to stand.
2. A general verdict for plaintiff in such a case will not be disapproved and set aside, unless the answers to special interrogatories submitted to the jury, considered together, are inconsistent and irreconcilable with the verdict.
This action to recover damages for personal injuries and grounded on negligence originated in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County with Mary Amy Hogan, a minor, as plaintiff and Steven Dwight Finch, a minor, as defendant.
In her amended petition plaintiff alleges that 'on May 29, 1960, she was at Riverside Swimming Club at Chesapeake, Lawrence County, Ohio, with her (older) sister; that when her sister was ready to leave, defendant requested said plaintiff to watch and play with his ten year old brother and relieve defendant of this duty until said defendant was ready to leave and that at such time he would bring the plaintiff home and that by reason of such request, said plaintiff did accept said offer and did remain to watch and play with defendant's brother and to be brought home by defendant in his car.'
Further allegations are 'that defendant did begin to drive her (plaintiff) home and that as he approached the traffic light at the intersection in Chesapeake, Ohio, he failed to keep his car under control and struck a car that was stopped at said traffic light which was red * * * at the time of said collision.'
Continuing, the amended petition charges defendant with such excessive speed that he could not stop within the assured clear distance ahead; that as a result of the collision plaintiff was thrown into and against the cowl and windshield of defendant's automobile with such force that she received bruise and cuts about her mouth and face; that her jawbone was fractured; that five of her teeth were knocked out; and that five prominent teeth were so damaged as to require removal.
Necessary expenses incurred and to be incurred by reason of the alleged injuries are listed at $8,526, and additional general damages are claimed in the sum of $50,000.
Defendant's answer admits the allegations of the amended petition as to plaintiff's minority; that plaintiff was an occupant in defendant's car at the time and place alleged; that defendant was driving the automobile; and that a collision occurred. Then follows a general denial. Additional allegations are in substance that plaintiff was in fact a guest in defendant's automobile, and that the amended petition alleges mere negligence, does not state a cause of action and should be dismissed at plaintiff's costs.
The reply specifically denies that plaintiff 'was in fact a guest in defendant's automobile at said time and place.'
Upon the jury trial of the action, evidence was presented substantiating the allegations of the petition with respect to defendant's negligence, the substantial personal injuries sustained by plaintiff and the status of plaintiff in the automobile at the time of her injuries.
On direct examination, plaintiff testified that she was about to leave the swimming club with her older sister and some other companions when defendant 'yelled to his younger brother (Karl) who was beside me at the time. * * * he asked for me that if I would stay, that he would give me a ride home if I would stay with his brother.' This version of what occurred was denied by defendant.
At the request of counsel for defendant and before oral argument, the court gave the following three special charges to the jury:
In its general charge, the court instructed the jury:
* * *'
At defendant's request, two interrogatories were submitted to the jury. These, with the answers thereto, each signed by nine of the jurors, are as follows:
A general...
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Pierce v. Durrani
...conflict and irreconcilable.” Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 78 Ohio App.3d 545, 553, 605 N.E.2d 468 (10th Dist.1992). See Hogan v. Finch, 8 Ohio St.2d 31, 222 N.E.2d 633 (1966), paragraph two of the syllabus; Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 37 Ohio St.3d 33, 523 N.E.2d 835 (1988). In the conte......
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Stiltner v. Bahner
...not a guest or that he is paying for his transportation. The Court of Appeals in the instant case relied upon its unreported opinion in Hogan v. Finch, which was affirmed in 8 Ohio St.2d 31, 222 N.E.2d 633 (1966). However, there, the defendant agreed to transport plaintiff to her home, if t......
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Coleman v. Excello-Textron Corp.
...verdict. Prendergast v. Ginsburg (1928), 119 Ohio St. 360, 164 N.E. 345, paragraph one of the syllabus; Hogan v. Finch (1966), 8 Ohio St.2d 31, 37 O.O.2d 379, 222 N.E.2d 633. In the case at bar, Excello has shown with vigor that the general verdict is indeed inconsistent with the findings o......
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Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 89AP-1326
...must find the general verdict and the interrogatory answers are both inconsistent and irreconcilable. See Hogan v. Finch (1966), 8 Ohio St.2d 31, 37 O.O.2d 379, 222 N.E.2d 633; Becker v. BancOhio Natl. Bank (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 158, 17 OBR 360, 478 N.E.2d 776; and Otte v. Dayton Power & Li......