Stiltner v. Bahner

• Decision Date: 24 May 1967
• Docket Number: No. 40405,40405
• Citation: 10 Ohio St.2d 216,227 N.E.2d 192
• Parties: , 39 O.O.2d 319 STILTNER, Appellee, v. BAHNER, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 216

10 Ohio St.2d 216

227 N.E.2d 192, 39 O.O.2d 319

STILTNER, Appellee, v. BAHNER, Appellant.

No. 40405.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 24, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A nonmonetary benefit of a rider's company, society or companionship is not such a material consideration as may constitute payment and remove the rider from the status of 'a guest * * * being transported without payment therefor' within the meaning of the Ohio Guest Statute, section 4515.02, Revised Code.

2. A reluctant guest is a guest within the meaning of the Ohio Guest Statute; and the fact that the host-driver is much more interested in having the rider's social companionship than the rider is in giving that social companionship, cannot support a conclusion either that the rider is not a guest or that he is paying for his transportation.

3. Where a driver by repeated requests persuades a friend to go in the driver's automobile to spend the night at the driver's home because the driver is lonely, and where no other service is to be performed by the friend, and no benefit other than his company is to be conferred upon the driver, such friend, as a matter of law, becomes a guest 'being transported without payment therefor' within the meaning of the Ohio Guest Statute.

4. A guest may cease to be a guest, within the meaning of the Ohio Guest Statute, where the driver ceases to be giving hospitality that will benefit the guest.

5. A guest in an automobile does not cease to be a guest, within the meaning of the Ohio Guest Statute, as long as the driver of the automobile reasonably intends to give hospitality that will benefit his rider, especially where the hospitality is the same that the rider expected to receive on entering the vehicle.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries to plaintiff, alleged to have been received on January 15, 1962, as a proximate result of defendant's negligence.

At the trial, the evidence, interpreted most favorably for plaintiff, disclosed the following:

Plaintiff and defendant, two women in their 50's, became acquainted in 1959. From 1959 to 1962, plaintiff had been a tenant in an apartment of defendant and her husband. On a few occasions, plaintiff and defendant had had beer or coffee together. Prior to the accident, plaintiff had lived and worked in defendant's home for a period of five weeks.

On the night of the accident, defendant was lonesome and called plaintiff at a barrestaurant, the Crystal Lunch, and asked plaintiff to spend the night at defendant's home. Plaintiff refused the request, but defendant went to the Crystal Lunch and persuaded plaintiff, by repeated requests, to spend the night with her. Plaintiff testified that she accepted because she feared being evicted from her apartment, although defendant had not threatened such action.

Despite plaintiff's knowledge that defendant was an inexperienced driver and her opinion that defendant could not drive, plaintiff agreed to accompany defendant.

After getting plaintiff's night clothes at her apartment and stopping at another bar-restaurant, plaintiff and defendant started for defendant's home.

While proceeding to defendant's home, the automobile began to weave. Plaintiff became afraid and asked defendant to drive her back to the apartment or let her out so she could walk back.

The street, on which the accident occurred, although straight, was narrow. Also, cars were parked on both sides, so that defendant's automobile could not travel without being astride the imaginary center line. The weather was dry. Because of street lights, defendant could see to drive, although she was not aware that the lights on her car were not on. The speed of her automobile was about 15 miles per hour.

After striking a parked vehicle and attempting to stop, the defendant's foot struck the accelerator. This caused other collisions and the injuries to plaintiff.

At the close of all the evidence, the Common Pleas Court directed a verdict for defendant.

The judgment rendered on that verdict was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the reasons that 'whether * * * (plaintiff) was a guest, a passenger under duress, or had some other status at the time of the accident were questions of fact for determination by the jury and not questions of law for the court,' and that 'intervening facts of a sufficient nature occurring between the time of the entrance of the * * * (plaintiff) into * * * (defendant's) car could change * * * (plaintiff's) status as a rider from one kind or type to another, but * * * that this question would be one for the jury * * *.'

The cause is now before this court on an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Gladys E. Davis, New Boston, John Alden Staker and Richard L. Eisnaugle, Portsmouth, for appellee.

Miller, Searl & Fitch and Lee O. Fiftch, Portsmouth, for appellant.

TAFT, Chief Justice.

The first question to be determined is whether the evidence was such as to enable reasonable minds to conclude that plaintiff, at the time of the accident in which she was injured, was riding in defendant's automobile as 'a guest * * * while * * * being transported without payment' for her transportation, within the meaning of those words as used in the Ohio Guest Statute, Section 4515.02, Revised Code.

Payment, within the meaning of Section 4515.02, Revised Code, must be payment or benefit accepted or agreed upon by the driver as consideration for the transportation. ¹ However, such payment or benefit need not be money. It is sufficient that the guest, by his presence in the automobile, renders service or assistance intended to benefit primarily the driver, ² or intends to render service or assistance at the destination which will primarily benefit the driver, ³ or has before the trip rendered such service or assistance, ⁴ if the benefit or service is material, as distinguished from a mere social benefit, ⁵ or nominal or incidental contribution to expenses. ⁶

In the instant case, no money was agreed upon as consideration. A non-monetary benefit of a rider's company, society or companionship is not such a material consideration as may constitute payment and remove the rider from the status of 'a guest * * * being transported without payment therefor.' ⁷

If we were to hold that plaintiff in the instant case was not a guest 'being transported without payment therefor,' then any time a driver-host, desiring to attend a social or sporting event or even watch T.V. at home but wanting companionship, should persuade a reluctant friend to join him, the friend, while being transported for such purpose, would be a paying guest.

A reluctant guest may still be a guest within the meaning of the guest statute; and the fact, that the host-driver is much more interested in having the rider's social companionship than the rider is in giving that social companionship, cannot support a conclusion either that the rider is not a guest or that he is paying for his transportation.

The Court of Appeals in the instant case relied upon its unreported opinion in Hogan v. Finch, which was affirmed in 8 Ohio St.2d 31, 222 N.E.2d 633 (1966). However, there, the defendant agreed to transport plaintiff to her home, if the plaintiff would look after defendant's younger brother at a swimming club. The plaintiff there was not giving only the pleasure of her company, but had performed a material service for the driver in return for her transportation.

We conclude that, where a driver by repeated requests persuades a friend to go in the driver's vehicle to spend the night at the driver's home because the driver is lonely, and where no other service is to be performed by the friend, and no benefit other than his company is to be conferred upon the driver, such friend, as a matter of law, becomes a guest 'being transported without payment therefor' within the meaning of the Ohio Guest Statute.

However, plaintiff contends that, even if she were a guest being transported without payment for her transportation when she entered defendant's vehicle, she divested herself of that status before the accident.

Our guest statute applies to 'a guest * * * while such guest is being transported without payment therefor.'

If there were evidence that some arrangement for payment for the transportation of the rider arose after the rider entered the driver's vehicle and before the accident, then the guest statute would not prevent recovery for negligence of the driver. There is no such evidence in the instant case.

Where there is no such arrangement, the question remains as to whether the rider's status a guest may change after her entry into the vehicle. ⁸

In our opinion, the answer to the question, whether a rider's status as a guest may be changed after entering into the vehicle, depends upon the definition of the word 'guest' as used in the Ohio Guest Statute.

In Lombardo v. DeShance (1958), 167 Ohio St. 431, 149 N.E.2d 914, 66 A.L.R.2d 1313, we stated in paragraph one of the syllabus:

'* * * the word 'guest' does not require anything more than the giving of * * * hospitality in order to make the person, receiving and to be benefited by it, a guest.'

Our decisions recognize that a guest may cease to be a guest where the driver ceases to be 'giving * * * hospitality,' that will benefit the guest. Lombardo v. DeShance, supra (167 Ohio St. 431, 149 N.E.2d 914); Redis v. Lynch (1959), 169 Ohio St. 305, 159 N.E.2d 597.

Thus, in Lombardo, it is stated:

'* * * Obviously, one who is kidnapped or forced against his will to ride in an automobile is not a 'guest,' even though no payment is made for his transportation.' Also, in Redis v. Lynch, supra (169 Ohio St. 305, 159 N.E.2d 597), it was held that, where a plaintiff was to be taken by a defendant-driver to her home but, against such plaintiff's protests and objections, she was instead taken elsewhere, she would cease to be a guest within the...